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Abstract of the Dissertation
Inference Processing and Error Recovery
in Sentence Understanding
by
Kurt Paul Eiselt
Doctor of Philosophy in Information and Computer Science
University of California, Irvine, 1989
Professor Richard H. Granger, Jr., Chair
Solving the mysteries of human language understanding inevitably requires an
answer to the question of how the language understander resolves ambiguity, for
human language is certainly ambiguous. But ambiguity leads to choices between
possible explanations, and choice opens the door for mistakes. Unless we are willing
to believe that the human language understander always makes the correct choice,
any explanation of ambiguity resolution must be considered incomplete if it does not
also account for recovery from an incorrect decision.
This dissertation describes a new approach to lexical ambiguity resolution dur
ing sentence understanding which is implemented in a program called ATLAST. Many
computational models of natural language understanding have dealt with lexical am
biguity resolution, but ATLAST is one of the few models to address the associated
problem of error recovery. ATLAST's ability to recover from an incorrect lexical in
ference decision stems from its ability to retain unchosen word meanings for a period
of time after it selects the apparently context-appropriate meaning of an ambigu
ous word. The short-term retention of possible lexical inferences permits ATLAST
XIV
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to recover from incorrect decisions without backtracking and reprocessing text, and
without keeping a record of possible choices indefinitely.
The principle of retention provides a solution to the problem of error recovery
which is compatible with current psycholinguistic theories of lexical disambiguation.
Furthermore, the existence of some form of retention in lexical disambiguation is sup
ported by the results of experiments with human subjects. This dissertation includes
a discussion of these results and speculation on how the principle of retention might
be extended to account for recovery from erroneous higher-level inference decisions.
Chapter 1
Scope of the Dissertation
1.1 The paradox of ambiguity
Ambiguity is essential to efficient communication with natural languages. Were
we to communicate with our fellow natural language users so precisely that no ambi
guity existed, we would find that communication was actually impaired by the myriad
of tediousdetails which would necessarily be explicitly expressed in our text or speech.
We economize by eliminating much of what could be said or written and rely on the
listener or reader to supply the missing knowledge that is necessary to extract the
intended meaning. We can never be sure, however, that the understander will supply
the appropriate knowledge and arrive at the intended interpretation. Therein lies
the paradox of ambiguity in language: we rely on ambiguity to make communication
more efficient by decreasing the quantity of information being transmitted, but by
doing so we also increase the potential for misunderstanding.
Fortunately, the human language understanding mechanism is very good at
dealing with ambiguity. In fact, it is so good that we are seldom conscious that there
is any ambiguity at all, although our daily communication is laden with multiple
interpretations. This dissertation presents a theory of some of the processes involved
2in coping with ambiguity in language and a computational model called ATLAST
which embodies that theory.
Ambiguity in language takes many forms, but the theory presented herein deals
with only a subset of them. For example, the theory does not address problems of
pronominal or syntactic ambiguity. The theory deals only with two types of ambi
guity: lexical ambiguity, which arises from a word having more than one meaning,
and pragmatic ambiguity, which occurs when a text implies more than one plausible
sequence of events or state of affairs.
One example of lexical ambiguity comes from Swinney (1979):
Text 1: Rumor had it that, for years, the government building had been plagued
with problems. The man was not surprised when he found several bugs
in the corner of his room.
In this case, the language understander must decide whether the word "bugs" refers to
insects or hidden microphones; usually the understander chooses the latter meaning
because it seems more appropriate in the context established by the words "govern
ment building."
Pragmatic ambiguity, on the other hand, forces the language understander to
make what ostensibly is a different kind of decision, as in this text from Schank and
Riesbeck (1981):
Text 2: John went to a restaurant. He ordered chicken. He left a large tip.
Did John eat the chicken he ordered? Our knowledge of dining in restaurants tells us
that he probably did so, though we can conceive of circumstances, such as a sudden
illness or loss of appetite, which are not contradicted by the above story and which
suggest the possibility that John did not eat the chicken.
3ATLAST is able to make both kinds of decisions using a single mechanism for
resolving ambiguity. In doing so, ATLAST accounts for the findings of psychologi
cal experiments investigating the nature of lexical access and disambiguation while
accommodating recent theories about pragmatic inferences.
Many of the computational models of language understanding which have been
proposed over the years are reviewed in the next chapter. These offerings represent
only a small fraction of the natural language understanding systems which have been
constructed in recent years, which suggests that a considerable amount of effort has
been invested in solving the problem of ambiguity resolution. Many of these systems
attack the problemof lexical ambiguity but ignore pragmatic ambiguity, while others
deal with pragmatic ambiguity and ignore lexical ambiguity. ATLAST is one of the
few systems which is capable of dealing with both kinds of ambiguity.
Another feature which sets ATLAST apart from other models is that it rec
ognizes that a language understander makes mistakes. With very few exceptions,
models of language understanding have assumed that although the input may be
ambiguous, the understander always makes the correct decision the first time. This
is of course false, as is demonstrated by the following text (inspired by Text 1):
Text 3: Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow have called for a specialist to
rid the new building of bugs. Secretaries there have reported seeing
cockroaches in the employees' cafeteria.
Considering recent news reports about problems with the new U.S. Embassy building
in Moscow (and the fact that the discussion of Text 1 above has biased the reader
even if he or she is unaware of the problems), it is difficult to interpret the word
"bugs" in Text 3 as meaning anything but hidden microphones on the first reading.
By the time the reader sees the word "cockroaches" in the second sentence, however.
4the reader must revise the interpretation by supplanting the original choice with the
insect meaning of "bugs."
ATLAST explains this ability to recover from an incorrect choice of word mean
ing with a process called conditional retention in which all meanings ofan ambiguous
word are retrieved, the meaning most appropriate to the preceding context is chosen,
and the other meanings are temporarily retained. If later text contradicts the ini
tially chosen meaning, the retained meanings are reconsidered in light of the updated
context and a new meaning is selected. The conditional retention theory, which is
supported byexperimental evidence, is further extended in this dissertation to explain
recovery from erroneous choices in resolving pragmatic ambiguity and to account for
some individual differences in pragmatic ambiguity resolution.
1.2 Goals of the dissertation
As noted above, a great deal of effort has been devoted to solving the prob
lem of ambiguity resolution in language understanding. One very simple and purely
practical reason for this is that ambiguity is rampant in language, so understanding
language requires the ability to resolve ambiguity. Another reason for addressing the
problemof ambiguity resolution, one which motivates this dissertation, is that under
standing ambiguity resolution may help us understand human cognitive processes.
Because the language understanding process lies "beneath our conscious aware
ness" (Carroll, 1986, p. 4), it does not readily lend itself to introspection. Thus, other
investigative methods must be employed to gain insight intolanguage understanding.
Building a computational model of language understanding offers the opportunity to
refine psychological theories by translating the theories into executable procedures.
5Psychologists generally look to data from experiments with human subjects to de
termine the correctness of a theory, but a working computational model can serve
to establish in advance the plausibility of that theory if the behavior of the model
compares favorably to human behavior. The model-building process may also lead
to predictions that are more specific and more easily tested through experiments
with human subjects than those which may arise in the absence of a computational
model. Furthermore, once built, a computational model provides a readily accessible
framework for exploring changes to the theory before running new experiments with
human subjects.
Although the techniques used in ATLAST may be useful in practical applica
tions of language understanding systems, the goals that motivate the construction
of this model arise from a desire to shed light on the human understanding process.
These goals are:
• The model should demonstrate the plausibility of conditional retention and the
associated mechanism for recovery from incorrect choice of word meaning as a
theory of lexical ambiguity resolution in humans.
• The model should demonstrate the plausibility of a uniform theory of inference
processing which arises from extending the theory of lexical ambiguity resolu
tion to inference decision processes at the pragmatic level of understanding.
• The model should serve as the source of ideas, predictions, and constraints for
experimental work with human subjects.
In deciding whether ATLAST satisfies these goals, one must consider the simplifying
assumptions that have been made in constructing the model. These assumptions are
described in the following section.
1.3 ATLAST: Assumptions and overview
A model of any process carries with it a set of assumptions which make life
easier for the model builder. One frequent assumption is that the process being
modeled can be isolated from its environment in such a way that the model still
provides useful information. Without this assumption, the complexity of the process
and its interaction with its environment may be so great as to prevent the building of
a model. This is certainly the case with models of language understanding: modelers
often assume that language understanding can be separated from other cognitive
processes. Furthermore, they often assume that individual components of language
understanding can be isolated from other components with little or no detrimental
effect on the model. Several assumptions of this nature have been made in building
ATLAST:
• ATLAST is a language understander that exists in isolation from other cogni
tive processes. For example, there is no phonological or morphological analy
sis; strings from the input stream map directly onto corresponding strings in
ATLAST's lexicon.
• ATLAST is a model of automatic or unconscious processes. It is not intended
as an explanation of what happens when the text is so confusing or the con
tradictions so severe that disambiguation or error recovery requires attentional
problem solving.
• ATLAST contains processes for both syntactic and semantic analysis, but the
emphasis is on the latter. ATLAST does not address issues of syntactic am
biguity resolution, recovery from an incorrect syntactic decision, or the degree
of interaction between syntactic and semantic processing. On the other hand,
ATLAST is designed so that these issues may be explored in the future without
drastic architectural revisions.
The assumptions listed above help to describe what ATLAST is not, but there
are other assumptions that influence what ATLAST is. For instance, ATLAST as
sumes that semantic knowledge is organized in a relational network like that described
II
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by Quillian (1968) and later elaborated by by Collins and Loftus (1975). This mem
ory consists of nodes and links; the nodes represent objects, events, or states, and
the links represent relationships between the nodes. The details of the relationships
stored in this memory are generally unimportant to ATLAST except that relation
ships of causality, intentionality, and abstraction are identifiable.
The assumption about memory in turn influences what constitutes an interpre
tation of a text. ATLAST's interpretation of a text consists of two parts: a set of
connections or paths in memory that ties together all open class words^ from the in
put text, and a set of pointers to nodes in memory that imposes a temporal ordering
on the events and states of the text and indicates which nodes fill the thematic roles
for those events and states. For example, when given this input:
John went to the pawnshop.
John sold a lamp.
ATLAST will determine that these paths in memory best explain the relationships
between the meanings of the words in the text:
Path from LAMP to SELL
LAMP is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is an instance of BUSINESS
BUSINESS can be viewed as BUYER
BUYER is a role-filler of BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
^Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs are examples of open classes of words. The name derives
from the fact that the number of members of these classes is unbounded. New names for objects,
actions, and properties can be invented by generating new words or by adding endings to existing
words. Closed classes, on the other hand, contain a fixed number of members; additions to the class
occur rarely if at all. Prepositions and conjunctions are examples of closed classes. (Winograd,
1983)
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from SELL to JOHNO
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MGNEY is a result of POOR-STATE
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Path from SELL to GO
SELL has the precondition BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
It will also determine that the thematic roles of the events explicitly stated in the
input should be filled as follows:
Event: eventO
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (GO)
Object: nil
Direction: (PAWNSHOP)
Event: event1
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (SELL)
Object: (LAMP)
Direction: nil
These two components of ATLAST's interpretation are also shown in Figure 1.1.
Finding the most explanatory set of paths is the responsibility of the semantic
analysis component, while assignment of the pointers is done by the syntactic analysis
component. Although the emphasis in this work is on semantic processing, neither
component takes a back seat to the other when ATLAST is interpreting a text;
both components contribute to a complete understanding of the input. The two
components of the interpretation are generated through the combined efforts of three
processes running concurrently: the capsulizer, the proposer, and the filter. The
relationships between these components are shown in Figure 1.2.
II
eventO
actor: JohnO
action: go
direction: pawnshop
eventl
actor: JohnO
action: sell
object: lamp
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object
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sell
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Figure 1.1: The two components of ATLAST's interpretation: event chain and active
paths.
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Figure 1.2: Relationships between ATLAST's processes.
The input is read oneword at a time by thecapsulizer. Upon reading a word, the
capsulizer finds the word in ATLAST's lexicon and activates the meanings associated
with the word. These activated word senses are the starting points for the marker-
passing search carried out by another process, the proposer, which is introduced
below. In addition to initializing the search for connecting paths in memory, the
capsulizer accumulates the syntactic category information it retrieves from the lexicon
and makes decisions about syntactic relationships within the constituent phrases of
the input text. These intra-phrasal syntactic decisions are combined with pointers
to the word senses activated by the words in the phrase and passed as capsules of
information to a third process, the filter, which is also introduced below. If a word
activates more than one word-sense, the pointers to the multiple word-senses are all
passed on to the filter, which will eventually select the most plausible word-sense.
11
The proposer is a breadth-first search mechanism that uses marker-passing to
traverse the links between the nodes in memory and find connections between word-
senses which have been activated by the capsulizer. The proposer maintains pointers
to the most recently activated nodes in memory, and to the word-senses which are
the origins of the spreading activation search. Each time the proposer is invoked,
it traverses the links leading away from the recently activated nodes, activates the
adjacent nodes at the end of those links, and updates its list of pointers. If the spread
of activation from one point of origin intersects the spread of activation from another
point of origin, then the proposer has found some plausible relationship, by way of
links and nodes, between two (and possibly more) of the word-senses activated by
the input text. The proposer then passes information about this newly-discovered
pathway to the filter.
The proposer is implemented in ATLAST as a separate process, but from a the
oretical perspective it might be more appropriately viewed as an emergent property
of human memory organization. Because computer memory works differently from
human memory, it was necessary to provide a separate process to make the spreading
activation possible.
The filter performs three functions, the first of which is inter-phrasal syntax. As
capsules are passed from the capsulizer to the filter, the filter makes decisions about
the relationships between the phrases represented by the capsules. Inter-phrasal syn
tax rules enable the filter to assign fillers to the various thematic roles such as actor,
action, and object. The filter's second function is the evaluation of explanatory paths
found by the proposer. When two competing paths are proposed (e.g., different paths
connecting the word-senses of two words from the input text), the filter attempts to
select the path more appropriate to the existing context through the application
12
of inference evaluation metrics. Finally, the filter is also responsible for correcting
ATLAST's interpretation if it discovers that a previously chosen path is contradicted
by later text.
1.4 Overview of the dissertation
Marr (1982) has proposed three levels at which a machine performing an infor
mation processing task must be understood:
• Computational theory; The goal of the computation, the reason for the
computation, and the logic of the strategy by which it can be performed.
• Representation and algorithm: The implementation of the computational
theory—therepresentationof the input and output, and the algorithm for trans
forming one into the other.
• Hardware implementation: The physical realization of the representation
and algorithm.
This dissertation describes a theory of ambiguity resolution and error recovery
at the level of Marr's computational theory, and a computer model called ATLAST
which corresponds to Marr's representation and algorithm level. There is no attempt
here to speculate on how the representation and algorithm might be implemented in
the hardware of the human brain.
ATLAST is only one of a number of representations and algorithms that could
serve as functional realizations of the theory described herein, so some separation
between the two levels has been maintained throughout this dissertation in order
to avoid any confusion that might be caused when the program diverges from the
theory. Maintaining this separation has led to an organization in which chapters that
concentrate on theory alternate with chapters emphasizing the program.
I
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Chapter 2 introduces four constraints which a model oflanguage understanding
should take into account. These constraints have been derived primarily from the
results of psychological experiments on human subjects. Many previous models have
accounted for a subset of these constraints, and a number of these models are reviewed
in this chapter. ATLAST, however, is the only model which accounts for all four
constraints. Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of ATLAST's architecture,
which is directly influenced by these four constraints.
Chapter 4 explains the theory of conditional retention. Conditional retention
extends widely-accepted theories of multiple access of word meanings to account for
a human understander's ability to recover from an incorrect choice of word mean
ing without reprocessing the input. Chapter 5 illustrates how conditional retention
enables error recovery through a detailed example in which ATLAST processes a
misleading text.
Chapter 6 discusses how the theory oflexical disambiguation and error recovery
described in Chapters 4 and 5 can be extended to account for pragmatic inference
decisions. This chapter also shows how conditional retention offers an explanation of
some individual differences in pragmatic inference behavior. Examples of ATLAST
in operation using this extended theory are presented in Appendix A.
Up to this point the dissertation emphasizes how well ATLAST accounts for
experimental data on human language understanding. Chapter 7 looks at ATLAST
from another viewpoint, that ofcomputational efficiency. There have been challenges
to models using spreading activation or marker-passing suggesting that these search
mechanisms are computationally inefficient. The analysis in Chapter 7 demonstrates
that the use of computational resources can be held to an acceptable level through
the application of appropriate constraints.
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The dissertation concludes with Chapter 8. This chapter summarizes the key
points of the model, discusses someopen questions, and suggests directions for further
research within the ATLAST framework.
IChapter 2
Constraints on Understanding
2.1 Perspectives
The artificial intelligence (AI) literaturecontains numerous examples ofdifferent
research paradigms. One informative effort to find order in this confusing assortment
of differing methodological approaches is offered by Hall and Kibler (1985). They di
vide AI research into two broad classes based on the intent of the researcher. Within
one class, called the artificial perspective, researchers are concerned with studies of
intelligent function regardless of the underlying mechanism. The other class of re
search, the natural perspective, is characterized by the investigation of human (or an
imal) cognitive phenomena. This dissertation follows the natural perspective, which
is further subdivided along methodological lines into the empirical and speculative
perspectives.^ In the empirical perspective, researchers offer explicit evidence of the
correspondence between the behavior of their models and the natural subjects being
modeled. Researchers who follow the speculative approach make less rigorous efforts
to provide empirical evidence supporting their models. Hall and Kibler are careful to
note, however, that the empirical and speculative perspectives do not correspond to
^The artificial perspective is also further subdivided, but the results are less relevant to the
current discussion.
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"careful" and "reckless" approaches. Instead, these two perspectives represent differ
ences in problem choice (narrowly-constrained, well-defined problems as opposed to
representative examplesof loosely-defined behavior), method of solution (experimen
tation and incremental modification of the model versus introspection and informal
observation), and criteria for evaluation (experimentally obtained evidence of corre
spondence between the model and the human subject versus working programs that
mimic human behavior on the examples).
Hall and Kibler also note that the different perspectives they describe are
not mutually exclusive: ideas may be shared across perspectives, and individual
researchers may freely shift between perspectives. The empirical and speculative ap
proaches can be viewed as extremes on opposite poles of a continuum of perspectives.
Thus, while ATLAST leans toward the speculative perspective, it borrows from the
empirical perspective in that constraints on the model come not only from informal
observations of human language behavior on both normal and aberrant texts but also
from the results of psycholinguistic experiments.
The observations which have been made, both formal and informal, on the be
havior of the human language understanding system are innumerable, the conclusions
drawn from many of these observations conflict with other conclusions, and no com
putational model of language understanding can be expected to account for them
all. It is not difficult, however, to construct a small subset of compatible, reasonably
well-founded observations that provide constraints on the design of natural language
understanding (NLU) models—phenomena that any computational model should be
able to explain. This chapter presents one such set of constraints, describes a number
of different language processing systems, and discusses how they fare in meeting these
constraints. These constraints are:
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• Functional independence of syntactic and semantic processing.
• Interaction between lexical and pragmatic processing.
• Multiple access of word meanings.
• Recovery from erroneous inferences.
Most of the systems presented have been offered at one time or another as models of
the human language processor, but some have not. These latter systems are included
because they occasionally provide a more accurate account of the psychological data
than their cognitively-motivated counterparts.
2.2 Independence of syntax and semantics
Chomsky (1957) has noted that people are able to judge the syntactic correct
ness of sentences that are semantically anomalous, such as:
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
Conversely, both Charniak and Winograd have noted that people can assign
meaning to agrammatical strings of semantically related words, such eis:
Skid crash hospital. (Winograd, 1973)
Fire match arson hotel. (Charniak, 1983)
Given thesesimple observations, it would be difficult to argue against the propo
sition that syntactic and semantic processing can function independently of each
other. This is not to say that these processes must function independently or that
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they never interact. Both processes contribute to an accurate interpretation of the
input, but ifone process is unable to perform, the other proceeds on its own. Despite
theongoing debate over the degree ofinteraction between syntax and semantics (e.g.,
Garfield, 1987), an issue which will be avoided here as much as possible, the previous
examples strongly suggest that neither process need be dependent on the other.
Additional support for this proposition comes from the behavior of people with
language deficits called aphasias. Broca's aphasics, who have sustained damage to an
area in the frontal lobe ofthe left hemisphere ofthe brain (Broca's Area), demonstrate
an inability to produce a syntactically correct string of words. Wernicke's aphasics,
who suffer from damage in the temporal lobe of the left hemisphere, are able to put
together long sequences of words in many syntactic constructions, but the sequences
have no informational content (i.e., no semantic value). Because deficits in overt
speech behavior are most immediately obvious, studies of language use in aphasics
have focused on production, but a survey of the literature on language comprehen
sion in aphasics by Caramazza and Berndt (1978) finds that Broca's and Wernicke's
aphasics exhibit corresponding deficits in comprehension as well. Caramazza and
Berndt conclude that the studies they reviewed support the "functional and neuro
logical independence ofsyntacticand semantic processing in sentence comprehension"
(p. 916). Caramazza and Berndt also say the studies show that "although these pro
cesses interact with other cognitive operations (e.g., memory), they can be selectively
affected by brain damage" (p. 916). In other words, while there may be interaction
between processes, they can be forced to function independently.
Despite this evidence, many computational models of language understanding
seem to ignore the simple but important constraint offunctional independence ofsyn
tax and semantics. Many NLU systems, such as LUNAR (Woods, 1970), SHRDLU
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(Winograd, 1973), and PARSIFAL (Marcus, 1980), can be described as syntax-first
models: the system first performs a syntactic parse, followed by a semantic analysis.
While these systems separated syntactic and semantic processing, semantic analysis
wcLS dependent upon a correct syntactic parse.^
Another group of models are the conceptually-based language understanders
such as SAM (Cullingford, 1978), PAM (Wilensky, 1978), Ms. Malaprop (Charniak,
1978), and ARTHUR (Granger, 1980a). These systems also employed a two-stage
approach to text processing. The first stage was a conceptual analyzer that con
verted the input text into an intermediate representation based on low-level semantic
(i.e., lexical) and syntactic knowledge stored as word definitions. The intermedi
ate representation was then processed by a second stage using pragmatic knowledge
structures to fill out the final representation of the input. The theory behind these
conceptually-based front ends such as ELI (Riesbeck, 1975) and CA (Birnbaum k
Selfridge, 1981) is that "a separate syntactic analysis phase is unnecessary in lan
guage understanding" (Birnbaum k Selfridge, 1981, p. 325). Syntactic knowledge is
used in these systems, but it is subservient to semantic knowledge. While systems
like SAM and PAM demonstrate that some texts can be effectively processed under
this assumption, these systems are unable to determine syntactic correctness without
a viable semantic evaluation of the input. Humans, on the other hand, demonstrate
no such lack of ability.^
The assumption of no separate syntactic analysis is carried on in the integrated
understanding models such as IPP (Lebowitz, 1980) and BORIS (Dyer, 1983). In
^SHRDLU actually interleaved syntactic and semantic processing, but the dependence ofone
process on another was there nevertheless.
^Small and Rieger's (1982) Word Expert Parser and Wilks's (1975b) Preference Semantics also
make similar assumptions about combining syntactic and low-level semantic knowledge in word
definitions, although they do not address therole ofpragmatic knowledge inlanguage understanding.
Lytinen (1984) and Marcus (1984) present additional arguments against such assumptions.
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these systems, the two stages are fused into one process, and lexical and pragmatic
analysis is performed incrementally as the individualwords of the input text are read.
Still, syntax plays a subservient role in these models.
A different realization of the "no separate syntax" assumption is seen in an in
tegrated model of human language understanding called DMAP (Riesbeck & Martin,
1986). DMAP (Direct Memory Access Parsing) uses marker-passing to search an as
sociative network for semantic relations between the words of an input text. Unlike
ATLAST, however, DMAP's syntactic knowledge is embedded in its semantic net
work. Thus, marker-passing in DMAP finds syntactic as well as semantic relation
ships, and the distinction between syntactic correctness and semantic validity is lost.
Riesbeck and Martin acknowledge that DMAP "cannot do something [they] think
is very important for it to do, namely, recognize conceptual structures given a few
scattered key clues" (p. 223), but they offer no solution to the problem.
Another NLU system which uses marker-passing in a semantic network but de
parts from theintegrated understanding paradigm is Hirst's ABSITY (1988a, 1988b).
ABSITY (A Better Semantic Interpreter Than Yours) is a semantic interpreter which
employs an individual process or demon attached to each word of a sentence to find
that word's correct meaning and case. Ambiguity resolution is aided by selectional
restrictions, syntactic cues, or the discovery of aissociations with other words in the
sentence via marker-passing. ABSITY runs concurrently with a PARSIFAL-like syn
tactic parser (Marcus, 1980) and Hirst's design enforces modularity of the respective
knowledge sources. ABSITY diverges from our set of constraints, however, in that
it is dependent upon its parser for input and cannot make an independent semantic
evaluation of an input string.
II
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An attempt to merge conceptually-based understanding with modularity of syn
tactic and semantic knowledge sources is offered by MOPTRANS (Lytinen, 1984;
1986). MOPTRANS uses an autonomous set of rules that specify how sequences of
syntactic constituents can be attached to each other. However, while the knowledge
sources are independent, once again the processing is not. Syntactic rules are applied
only "if the syntactic attachments that they make are judged by the parser's seman
tic analyzer to be semantically appropriate." (Lytinen, 1986, p. 576). MOPTRANS
finds possible semantic connections between concepts, chooses the best one, then
looks at the syntactic knowledge bcise for a rule that supports this choice. If no
syntactic rule supports the choice, that choice is removed from the list of possi
ble connections, and the process repeats. This sequence continues until no possible
semantic connections remain. At this point, a syntactic rule for making syntactic at
tachments is selected by making an informed guess. Consequently, despite the mod
ularity of knowledge sources, there is a processing dependency established: semantic
connections cannot be inferred if no syntactic rule exists to support them. What hap
pens when MOPTRANS is presented with the agrammatical but conceptually-related
string of words? It cannot make sense of it syntactically, which is desirable, nor can it
make sense of it semantically, which is undesirable since humans do appear to make
those inferences despite the lack of syntactic correctness.'* To be fair, Lytinen makes
no claims about MOPTRANS's relevance as a cognitive model of human language
understanding. Yet from a cognitive perspective, MOPTRANS is interesting because
it addresses some of the problems of the conceptually-based understanders.
''Lytinen (1984) briefly describes a solution to this problem, inspired by Charniak's PARAGRAM
parser (Charniak, 1981), in which the satisfaction constraints on syntactic rule selection are relaxed.
The choice of a syntactic rule then is no longer based on the result of a yes/no test, but the degree
to which one rule supports the proposed semantic connection better than the other rules.
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2.3 Lexical and pragmatic processes interact
A second constraint suggested by experimental evidence is that lexical inference
decisions immediately influence pragmatic inference decisions, and that pragmatic de
cisions in turn immediately influence lexical ones. Researchers would appear to be
in general agreement that there is a dependent relationship between the two lev
els of processing: most if not all models of language understanding that deal with
pragmatic inference decisions base those decisions either directly or indirectly on de
cisions at the lexical level. Infact, it is difficult to imagine a useful model of language
understanding which did not make that assumption. However, many models of lan
guage understanding have ignored theeffect that thechoice of higher-level knowledge
structures has on word sense disambiguation.
Another aspect of the interaction between lexical and pragmatic inference pro
cessing is that the effects of decisions at one level are immediately felt at the other
level. Amore general description of this phenomenon is offered by Just and Carpenter
(1980). They call it the immediacy assumption:
... a reader tries to interpret each content word of a text as it is encoun
tered, even at the expense of making guesses that sometimes turn out
to be wrong. Interpretation refers to processing at several levels such as
encoding the word, choosing one meaning of it, assigning it to its ref
erent, and determining its status in the sentence and in the discourse.
The immediacy assumption posits that the interpretations at all levels of
processing are not deferred; they occur as soon as possible (p. 330)
The immediacy assumption is supported by investigations of eye movements
of human readers, as is the assumption of pragmatic influence on lexical decisions.
These studies show that a reader's eyes will fixate longer on ambiguous words than on
unambiguous words (Carpenter & Daneman, 1981), that a reader's eyes will regress
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or backtrack immediately when the reader encounters text that contradicts a previ
ous lexical decision instead of continuing through the text (Carpenter & Daneman,
1981), and that gaze duration will increase on a word that can be integrated into
the context established by a previously read sentence (Just & Carpenter, 1978). The
increased gaze duration on an ambiguous word suggests that the language processor
has stopped to resolve the ambiguity before processing further text. Similarly, the
regression caused by the contradiction and the increased fixation on a word that can
be integrated into the existing context both support the contention that the human
language processor tries to complete current processing tasks before moving on to
new ones.
The strength of this supporting evidence is questionable, however, as it rests
on another assumption, the eye-mind assumption. According to Just and Carpenter
(1980), the eye-mind assumption is that the gaze duration on a newly fixated word
is directly proportional to the amount of time required to process that word. Some
researchers argue that the connection between eye movements and language processes
is less direct than Just and Carpenter suggest: the relationship between eye move
ments and language processes may be mediated by the filling and emptying of an
input buffer (Shebilske & Fisher, 1983).
Further independent support for both the immediacy assumption and the eye-
mind assumption comes from a number ofstudies oflexical access and disambiguation
which indicate that reading an ambiguous word triggers the retrieval ofall meanings
of that word, regardless of the context, after which the meaning most appropriate to
the context is selected very quickly, possibly within 200 milliseconds of reading the
ambiguous word (Lucas, 1983; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, k Bienkowski, 1982;
Simpson, 1981; Tanenhaus, Leiman, k Seidenberg, 1979).
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The immediacy assumption implies that human language understanding is per
formed in one pass of the input. On the other hand, the two-stage models, whether
syntax-first or conceptually-based, require the equivalent of two passes of the text.
With the syntax-first models, the first pass is a syntactic parse and the second pass
is a semantic analysis. In the two-stage conceptually-based models, the two passes
correspond to lexical inference processing in the first stage and pragmatic inference
processing in the second stage, as discussed above. Builders of integrated understand
ing models such as IPP and BORIS have successfully incorporated the immediacy
assumption but, as noted above and will be discussed further below, the integrated
models suffer from other problems.
2.4 Multiple access of word meanings
In his comprehensive survey of research regarding the processing of ambiguous
words, Simpson (1984) states that the main issue in this research has been the nature
of interaction between the component processes of word recognition: does context
directly influence lexical access or does it influence a postaccess decision process?
Accordingly, approaches to lexical access and disambiguation can be divided into two
classes: selective-access models and exhaustive-access models.
2.4.1 Selective-access models
Selective-access models follow the premise that the existing context predeter
mines to some extent which meanings of an ambiguous word will be retrieved when
that word is processed. Some psychological models use a terminating ordered search
in which a list of the meanings of a word is examined serially in an order determined
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by their frequencies of use (Forster, 1976; Hogaboam & Perfetti, 1975). That is, the
most frequently used meaning is recalled first and evaluated against the context. If
this meaning is appropriate, the search terminates; otherwise the next most frequently
used meaning is recalled and evaluated, and so on until an appropriate meaning is
found. Simpson calls these ordered-access models. Another type of selective-access
model is exemplified by Morton's logogen model (Morton, 1969; 1979). In this model,
each meaning of an ambiguous word is represented by a collection of attributes called
a logogen. Each logogen is sensitive to contextual influence in that it may be primed
indirectly by the processing of previous words. When the ambiguous word is pro
cessed, only those meanings whose logogens exhibit a greater degree of priming will
be recalled. Simpson refers to this type of model as a context-dependent model.
Many AI models have adopted the selective-access approach. For example,
each meaning of an ambiguous word in Riesbeck's ELI is represented by one or more
selectional restrictions called requests (Riesbeck, 1975; see also Birnbaum k Selfridge,
1981). These requests check the local context for the existence of specific words or
phrases and are executed in sequential order. If the requests for one meaning are
sufficiently satisfied, all requests representing competing meanings are de-activated,
including those not yet executed. Small and Rieger's Word Expert Parser uses a
similar technique (Small k Rieger, 1982). Wilks uses a relaxed form of selectional
restrictions in his Preference Semantics model (Wilks, 1975a). In this model, a word
meaning is represented by a set of semantic preferences. Semantic preferences are like
selectional restrictions in that they test for specific attributes in the local context,
but they need not be completely satisfied. When aji ambiguous word is processed,
the meaning with the greatest number of satisfied preferences is chosen.
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Other AI models rely on a more global context, employing contextual or scriptal
lexica in which special-purpose dictionaries are associated with pragmatic knowledge
structures (e.g., Charniak, 1981; Cullingford, 1978). Each lexicon contains only the
contextually appropriate meaning for ambiguous words that might be encountered
while processing language with that script or other pragmatic knowledge structure.
When a word is encountered by an understander, the lexica associated with the active
scripts are examined for the word and its appropriate meaning. If an appropriate
meaning is not found in the scriptal lexica, the search proceeds to a default lexicon
which contains only standard definitions.
2.4.2 Exhaustive-access models
The variations of the selective-access model suffer from the limitation that in
some situations the most appropriate meaning of an ambiguous word is never con
sidered. The ordered-access model incorrectlyassumes that the most frequently used
context-appropriate meaning will always be the correct meaning. Birnbaum (1985)
points out that the assumptions of the context-dependent model are similarly mis
guided. An ambiguous word used within a script will not always refer to the pre
determined script-specific sense of the word, and restrictions attached to individual
words select the appropriate meaning in some cases but they inevitably lead to the
selection of inappropriate meanings in other ca^es. This limitation is overcome if all
meanings of an ambiguous word are considered, as in the exhaustive-access model.
With the exhaustive-access model, all meanings of an ambiguous word are acti
vated regardless of context, after which the meaning most consistent with the context
is selected. This model is strongly supported by the results of recent experiments
(Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al..
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1979). There is evidence that this exhaustive-access process is sensitive to the relative
frequency of the word meanings (Lucas, 1983; Simpson & Burgess, 1985) and in some
cases is influenced by local context (Seidenberg et al., 1982), so the ordered-access
H and context-dependent models are not unfounded. Still, the exhaustive-access model
appears to be the best explanation of human lexical processing offered to date and
has been incorporated in a few computational models of language understanding.
m Charniak (1983) proposed amodel of language understanding that adheres to
the constraint of multiple access of word meanings. This model consists in part of a
marker-passer that searches for explanatory connections in a relational memory, and
a syntactic analyzer that runs in parallel with the marker-passer. These two modules
feed a semantic analyzer that constructs a representation of the input with the help
of a "path-checker" that evaluates the connections found by the marker-passer.
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Information about objects and actions is stored in memory as predicates. Any
given predicate can pass markers to other predicates that represent objects and ac
tions directly related to the first predicate. The marker-passing scheme provides
for multiple access of word meanings in that markers are passed to the predicates
I associated with all senses of agiven word. These word sense suggestions are sent
to the semantic analyzer at the same time that the syntactic analyzer is sending it
structural information. The semantic analyzer, assisted by the path-checker, uses
this information to make final decisions about word meanings.
In sepaxating syntactic analysis from marker-passing, Charniak imposes a re
lationship of functional independence between syntactic and semantic processing,
thereby meeting another of the constraints presented earlier in this chapter. The
architecture clearly allows for the successful processing of an agrammatical string of
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semantically related words such as "fire match arson hotel." Charniak does not di
rectly address the issue of semantically anomalous sentences such as "Colorless green
ideas sleep furiously," but there is nothing in Charniak's proposed architecture to
suggest that such strings could not be processed. In addition, Charniak's proposal
meets the constraint of interaction of lexical and pragmatic processing in that lexical
and pragmatic information are represented in a single relational memory and all rel
evant inference decisions are made by the combined action of the semantic analyzer
and path-checker.
As Charniak's theory evolved into a working program (Charniak, 1986), his
proposed architecture had changed somewhat, and the system is now called Wimp
(Wholly integrated marker passer). He describes the path checker as a resolution-
based theorem prover. A path, which consists of terms for nodes and first order
predicate calculus formulas for links, is now considered to be the basis of a proof
that the terms or words at either end of the path actually exist in the story being
processed. The only resolvents used by the theorem prover are those contained in
paths found by the marker-passer. This constrains the search for resolvents and
avoids the combinatorial explosion which is typically associated with resolution-based
theorem provers. All semantic processing is done by the marker-passer and the path
checker, and the separate component which built a semantic representation of the
text in the earlier version of the theory is now eliminated. The syntactic component
is still functionally independent of the semantic processes, so Wimp still conforms to
that constraint as well as those of lexical/pragmatic interaction and multiple access
of word meanings.
In describing Wimp, Charniak professed some doubt about how well a lan
guage understanding system based on marker-passing would perform with a much
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larger knowledge base (Charniak, 1986). Accordingly, Wimp's successor, Wimp2,
has no marker-passing component; all semantic processing is driven by a formal logic
(Charniak & Goldman, 1988). Another evolutionary change is that the semantic
processor is now dependent upon parse trees provided by the syntactic processor.
Consequently, Wimp2 looks very much like the traditional syntax-first language un
derstanding systems whose faults inspired the original Wimp theory (Charniak, 1983).
While improving performance and simplifying the representation, Charniak appears
to have sacrificed cognitive modeling accuracy.
Pollack and Waltz's connectionist model of language understanding (Pollack,
1987; Pollack k Waltz, 1982; Waltz &: Pollack, 1984; 1985) also employs spreading
activation but does not use the marker-passing style found in ATLAST, ABSITY,
DMAP, or Wimp. Instead, Pollackand Waltz's modelemploys a quantitative spread
ing activation network which works through the iterative adjustment of the strength
of activation at the individual nodes. The network is similar to those described
in detail by Feldman (1981) and McClelland and Rumelhart (1981; Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1982). In Pollack and Waltz's model, a given set of nodes in memory
and the connections between them can represent all or part of an interpretation of
some input text; the same holds true for the marker-passing models discussed earlier.
What distinguishes Pollack and Waltz's approach from more traditional symbolic-
processing models is that their model chooses correct interpretations strictly through
the iterative adjustment of activation strengths, without the use of a separate rule-
based decision-making process.
Pollack and Waltz's model operates by first constructing a network of weighted
nodes and links from an input sentence. This network is divided into four inter
connected levels, with each level representing a modular linguistic knowledge source.
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The first level is the input level, which is nothing more than the words of the input
text. The input level is connected via activation links to the lexical level which con
sists of clusters of meanings and syntactic categories for each of the words. Within
a meaning cluster, there are mutual inhibition links between all the meanings, and
some combination of activation and inhibition links between the meanings and the
lexical categories.
The lexical level is connected by activation links to two other levels. One of
these levels, the syntactic level, is a subnetwork of the possible syntactic parses of the
input text. This network, which is constructed by a chart parser which preprocesses
the input text, has activation links between phrase markers and their constituents,
and inhibition links between pairs of phrases that have common constituents. The
other level is the contextual level, which is made up ofcase frames whose purpose is
to direct word sense selection. The syntactic and contextual levels are not directly
connected to each other; they are only connected indirectly through the lexical level.
Once the network has been constructed, the iterative weight adjustment process
is applied. Words at the input level are activated in the order that they appear in
the input stream, and activation begins to spread throughout the network. Over
several iterations, a subnetwork of well-connected nodes across different levels will
emerge. Those nodes which are negatively connected to this subnetwork will be
suppressed. Putting inhibitory links between nodes which represent, for example,
well-formed phrases with mutually-exclusive shared constituents ensures that only
one of the possibilities will survive. This same principle is used to disambiguate
between competing lexical categories for the same word, competing word senses, and
conflicting thematic role assignments.
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From a broader perspective, Pollack and Waltz's model is a system "in which
the knowledge sources are modular, but the processing is fully integrated" (Pollack
and Waltz, 1982, p. 50).® This scheme elfectively gives equal importance to all sources
of language knowledge.
Another connectionist model of language processing is offered by Cottrell and
Small (1983; Cottrell, 1985). Their model attempts .to form some correspondence
between the elements of a theory of language processing based on psychological data
and the mechanisms involved in carrying out those processes. Cottrell and Small's
model is strongly influenced by the experimental evidence for multiple access of word
meanings. In addition, their model is further influenced by the data on language pro
cessing deficits in aphasics supporting modularity, and they suggest that an accurate
model ofhuman language comprehension should be "lesionable"; in other words, the
model should exhibit similar aphasic behavior if the appropriate linguistic module is
artificially damaged in some way.
Cottrell and Small's model is an active semantic network scheme based on the
work of McClelland and Rumelhart, as is the Pollack and Waltz model. Their network
is also divided into four components. The lexical level is comprised of a unit for every
word in the language. The lexical level is connected to the word sense level which
consists ofmeaning nodes for the words in the lexical level. Different noun meanings
for the same word inhibit each other, as do different verb meanings for thesame word,
but there are no inhibitory connections between competing noun and verb meanings.
Nominal concepts and verbal concepts are stored in separate subnetworks at the
word sense level, based in part on differences between nouns and verbs reported by
®Some readers may dispute the claim of full integration of processing because of Pollack and
Waltz's use of a chart parser in a stage prior to the iterative weight adjustment stage. Note that
once the network is constructed, however, the various syntactic alternatives are evaluated at the
same time as the competing semantic interpretations.
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Centner (1981). In addition, function or closed class words are maintained in a third
subnetwork at this level because, say Cottrell and Small, Broca's aphasics usually
show an inability to use functor information (though this may not account entirely
for their comprehension deficits, they say). This behavior indicates that function
words are in a class distinct from nouns and verbs.
The case level consists of nodes representing the possible relationships between
the predicates and objects. This representation uses several hundred roles that are
more specific than agent and object, for example, but fall into those classes. (This
representation was inspired by Fahlman (1979).) These nodes are then connected
to fewer word senses than agent and object would be, and carry much more infor
mation directly. The numerous thematic relations at this level help to build specific
expectations for role assignments. These specific expectations help to resolve lexical
ambiguities.
The syntax level is connected to both the word sense and case levels in order
to constrain which bindings may be made based on sentence structure. Cottrell and
Small state that they have given the syntax level less attention than the other levels.
As lexical items are activated in sequence, so axe their word senses. The word
senses in turn activate the nodes at the case level. The relation which best fits
the input will be a stable group of connected nodes in which the overall excitation
exceeds the overall inhibition. Cottrell and Small acknowledge that higher levels in
the network are needed for making general inferences and for long term memory but
leave the work on these levels for the future. In the meantime, these contextual
knowledge sources are simulated by pre-biasing the network.
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Of all the language understanding models reviewed so far, only the three dis
cussed immediately above satisfy the constraints of functional independence of syntax
and semantics, interaction between lexical and pragmatic processing, and multiple
access of word meanings. On the other hand, none of these models addresses the
problem of error recovery. The following section describes the few models of lan
guage understanding that have been concerned with error recovery.
2.5 Recovery from erroneous inferences
Researchers in natural language understanding have often assumed that al
though text may be ambiguous, it is not misleading. This assumption is usually
made for the sake of convenience, not because of belief. Nevertheless, the question of
how a text understander can correct its mistakes in interpretation is seldom asked.
Of course, text is often misleading, either intentionally or accidentally, and humans
frequently appear to be able to recover from mistakes in interpretation quite grace
fully. One well-known exampleof misleading text is due to Lashley (1951), who used
the following spoken sentence to illustrate the shortcomings of the behaviorist school
of psychology:
Rapid righting with his uninjured hand saved from loss the contents of
the capsized canoe.
People will often hear the second word as "writing" and realize their mistake
only when they hear "the capsized canoe." Lashley argued that the behaviorist
explanation of simple associative chains between a stimulus and a response failed to
account for this serially ordered behavior (Gardner, 1985).
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Sadly, cognitive science has devoted little effort to finding an explanation of
how the understander detects the error or what the understander does once it is de
tected. Artificial intelligence researchers occasionally mention the need for an ability
to recover from errors in their models but then postpone the issue as a topic for
further research (e.g., Birnbaum & Selfridge, 1981; Lebowitz, 1980; Lytinen, 1984).
Psycholinguistics is similarly marked by a scarcity of investigation into error recovery
processes during text understanding. There are, fortunately, some exceptions in each
field.
One exception is McDermott's TOPLE (1974). TOPLE is a computer program
which understands simple declarative sentences describing the action of a monkey
in a room with objects such as a ball, a table, or a bunch of bananas. TOPLE
does not see the actual English sentences; instead, its input is a set of semantic
propositions in a modified predicate calculus formalism which represent the output
of a natural language front-end. As TOPLE processes the propositions, it makes
plausible inferences and adds them, in the form of assertions, to its limited model
of the world. When TOPLE encounters an ambiguity, it builds multiple models of
the world to be considered simultaneously. A decision is made when TOPLE finds
confirming evidence for one of its competing world models. At that time the alternate
models are discarded and are no longer accessible to the system.
For example, assume TOPLE knows that there is a monkey and a table in a
room, and that a ball and a banana are under the table. If TOPLE is told that the
monkey went to the table, TOPLE will build two models of the future: one in which
the monkey plays with the ball, and another in which the monkey eats the banana.
(TOPLE assumes that the monkey has goals such as wanting to play and wanting
I
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to eat.) If TOPLE is then told that the monkey picked up the banana, TOPLE will
discard the model in which the monkey plays with the ball.
TOPLE's predictions about future events are limited by what it assumes to be
true about its limited world. If TOPLE knows only that the room contains only
a monkey and a bunch of bananas suspended from the ceiling out of the monkey's
reach, TOPLE will make the predictive inference that the monkey will jump up, grab
the bananas, fall back to the floor and eat thern. This seems perfectly reasonable.
What seems unrea.sonable is what happens when TOPLE is then told that there is
also a box in the room. TOPLE now predicts that the monkey will go to the box,
move the box to the spot beneath the bananas, climb the box, grab the bananas
and eat them. Based on the example with the monkey, ball, and banana, one might
well expect that TOPLE will now have two competing models of the future. What
TOPLE actually does, however, is adopt only the model in which the monkey uses
the box; TOPLE discards the model in which the monkey jumps for the bananas.
TOPLE does this because it assumes that objects added to its model of the world
are to be used by the monkey, so it no longer believes the prediction that does not
include the box. McDermott does not say what will happen if TOPLE is now told
that the monkey jumps for the bananas, but presumably TOPLE will regenerate the
world model that it has just discarded and discard the model in which the monkey
uses the box. If TOPLE had retained both models and waited to see which was
confirmed, it could have saved itself some work.
TOPLE's inferential and error recovery abilities are limited to predictions about
future states and events. It cannot undo incorrect inferences generated from propo
sitions that it processed well before the one it has just read. One model which can
correct old erroneous inferences is Granger's ARTHUR (1980a, 1980b). ARTHUR
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follows from SAM (Cullingford, 1978) and PAM (Wilensky, 1978), but is designed to
understand the misleading stories which SAM and PAM could not. ARTHUR gener
ates tentative initial inferences using pragmatic knowledge structures (i.e., scriptsand
plans) and then re-evaluates those inferences in light of subsequent story information
by applying evaluation metrics. The re-evaluation is made possible because ARTHUR
maintains an inference-fate graph which contains all the plausible inferences gener
ated during story processing, whether or not they appear in the final representation,
along with information about the current status of each inference. ARTHUR is able
to revise both tentative inferences about future events and accepted inferences about
previously processed events without reprocessing the story or recomputing discarded
inferences because it retains all possible interpretations of the text.
This approach to error recovery has a drawback, however; when ARTHUR pro
cesses increasingly longer stories, the number ofplausible inferences to be maintained,
the memory required to maintain them, and the bookkeeping required to keep track of
them becomes prohibitive. A possible solution to this problem is to limit the number
of plausible but unused inferences to be retained, as in an early version of Norvig's
FAUSTUS (1983). FAUSTUS uses a marker-passing system to locate relevant prag
matic memory structures, called frames, to explain an input text. A frame can be
either inactive, active and currently used as an explanation for the text, or previously
active and not currently used as an explanation. These previously-active frames are
temporarily stored in a separate data base in case a currently-active frame proves
to be a poor explanation. In this event, a competing, previously-active frame can
be reactivated to supplant the incorrect initial choice. If a previously-active frame is
not reactivated, it quickly reverts to an inactive state. The method of error recov
ery used in this initial version of FAUSTUS is very much like that implemented in
ATLAST. As FAUSTUS has evolved, however, its error recovery capability has not.
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and FAUSTUS no longer has the ability to recover from erroneous inferences (Norvig,
1987).
Another method for correcting old erroneous inferences is to use dependency-
directed backtracking in a non-monotonic reasoning system, as O'Rorke (1983) pro
posed for a model called RESUND. This method was later implemented in a sys
tem called WATSON (Orejel-Opisso, 1984). The idea behind dependency-directed
backtracking is that when a new belief or assertion is inferred from old ones, the
understander records that the new assertion is made only because the old assertions
are assumed to be true. If one or more of the old assertions are later proven to be
false, any newer assertions that depend on the presumed truth of the old assertions
must be retracted, as must be the old, false assertions. In this way, the understander
is able to undo old erroneous inferences.
Thereare some appealing features ofa language understanding system based on
dependency-directed backtracking. One such feature is that the system can explain
its reasoning; the dependency relations enable the system to justify any assertion
in its knowledge base by describing the chain of inferences that led to the assertion
in question. Another attractive feature is that the dependency relations can be
maintained indefinitely, offering the potential for error recovery regardless of the
length of input processed or the amount of time passed since the erroneous inference
was made. These features, though, are not without their costs.
The disadvantage of dependency-directed backtracking in a model of human
language understanding is that it makes the understander perform too well. Imagine
a reader who makes an erroneous inference while reading the first paragraph of a
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short mystery story but finds nothing to contradict the inference until many para
graphs later. A computer program such as RESUND or WATSON using dependency-
directed backtracking should have no problem in correcting its mistake and revising
its interpretation of the story. A human reader, on the other hand, probably will be
confused and possibly will hunt through previously-read text to find the source of
the conflict. The human reader might in fact be using dependency relations of some
sort in constructing an interpretation of the story. Yet it is unlikely that the human
reader is able to maintain a very large number of such relations for an indefinite time
without substantial degradation in his or her ability to retrieve and revise those re
lations. Systems using dependency-directed backtracking might be made to perform
more like human understanders through the application of constraints on the num
ber or duration of maintained relations; constraints along these lines are employed
by both FAUSTUS and ATLAST.
TOPLE, ARTHUR, FAUSTUS, and RESUND represent four different methods
for recovering from erroneous pragmatic inferences, all utilizing a two-stage archi
tecture. Because of the two-stage architecture, however, these systems violate the
immediacy assumption: each requires complete propositions before any pragmatic
processing begins, yet the immediacy assumption asserts that inferencing in humans
is done with incomplete information, as in the case of Lashley's example above.
One model which does adhere to the immediacy assumption and also appears to
address the problem of error recovery is proposed by Thibadeau, Just, and Carpenter
(1982). This model, called READER, is based on the eye-movement studies cited
previously as experimental evidence supporting the immediacy assumption (Just Sz,
Carpenter, 1980). READER is a model of human text understanding whose process
ing cycles bear some correspondence to human gaze durations on the individual words
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of the text. READER tries to interpret each successive word as soon as possible by
applying separate but communicating processes at several levels of analysis without
relying entirely on any single level. READER'S memory is a semantic network in
which relationships between concepts from the text are found by directed activation
as opposed to spreading activation. With directed activation, both the depth and
breadth of propagation is controlled by READER'S procedural knowledge about lan
guage. In other words, directed activation means that the analytical processes tell
READERwhich nodes it should activate at any given time, while spreading activation
propagates outward in all directions until some limit is reached.
It was stated above that READER appears to address the error recovery prob
lem. Thibadeau et al. say that the principle of immediacy causes READER to choose
meanings which are occasionally contradicted by later text, but that their model
"has other heuristics that make error recovery relatively straightforward" (Thibadeau
et al., 1982, p. 180). Unfortunately, they do not provide any details about READER'S
error recovery heuristics, but they do state that their approach to lexical disambigua
tion is influenced by theeye fixation studies of Carpenter and Daneman (1981) which,
as noted earlier, show that a reader's eyes will backtrack when he or she reads text
contradicting a previous lexical decision.® Assuming that READER uses backtrack
ing and reprocessing in these situations, it can be said that the model meets three
of the four constraints: functional independence of syntax and semantics, interaction
of lexical and pragmatic processing, and error recovery. READER fails to meet the
constraint of multiple access of word meanings, however: READER'S lexical access
process is similar to Morton's (1969) logogen model in which the meaning of an am
biguous word is chosen through the accumulation of contextual (both syntactic and
semantic) information. When the logogen ha^ accumulated a specified amount of
®The implications ofCarpenter and Daneman's findings for ATLAST are discussed inChapter 4.
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inforinstion. r6d.cli€(l 3- threshold), the cLSsocicited word rn.ecLn.ing is mcide ctvctil-
able to other linguistic processes. The logogen model therefore represents a form of
selective access in which context predetermines the meanings that will be considered.
Although there is little experimental data on recovery from incorrect decisions
during text understanding in human subjects, what data there is suggests that error
recovery is an integral part of language understanding, not something to be added on
to existing models as an afterthought. Providing an adequate explanation of human
error recovery behavior places a constraint on the architecture of a computational
model of language understanding that few existing models would be able to meet
without drastic revision.
2.6 Conclusion
Different constraints can be applied in the development and evaluation of any
model. The constraints presented herein are important because they cut across
the traditional partitionings of lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic inference processes.
Those models meeting more of these constraints offer more plausible explanations of
human language processing than those which meet fewer constraints. This chapter
has discussed how some of these models fare in meeting the important constraints.
(Thisdiscussion is summarized in Table 2.1.) As will be demonstrated in the chapters
to follow, ATLAST is the first model to meet all these constraints.
41
System
functional
independence
of syntactic
and semantic
processing
interaction
between
lexical and
pragmatic
knowledge
exhaustive
access
of word
meanings
recovery
from
erroneous
inferences
Quillian, 1969 (TLC) no yes yes no
Woods, 1970 (LUNAR) no no no no
Winograd, 1973 (SHRDLU) no no no no
McDermott, 1974 (TOPLE) no no no yes
Riesbeck, 1975 (ELI) no no no no
Wilks, 1975
(Preference Semantics) no no no no
Charniak, 1978 (Ms. Malaprop) no no no no
CuUingford, 1978 (SAM) no no no no
Wilensky, 1978 (PAM) no no no no
Granger, 1980 (ARTHUR) no no no yes
Lebowitz, 1980 (IPP) no yes no no
Marcus, 1980 (PARSIFAL) no no no no
Birnbaum & Selfridge, 1981
(CA) no no no no
Pollack & Waltz, 1982 yes yes yes no
Small & Rieger, 1982
(Word Expert Parser) no no no no
Thibadeau, Just, &
Carpenter, 1982 (READER) yes yes no yes
Charniak, 1983 yes yes yes no
Cottrell & Small, 1983 yes
. yes yes no
Dyer, 1983 (BORIS) no yes no no
Norvig, 1983 (early FAUSTUS) no no no yes
G'Rorke, 1983 (RESUND) no no no yes
Hirst, 1984 (ABSITY) no no yes no
Lytinen, 1984 (MOPTRANS) no yes no no
Orejel-Opisso, 1984 (WATSON) no no no yes
Riesbeck & Martin, 1985
(DMAP) no yes yes no
Charniak, 1986 (Wimp) yes yes yes no
Norvig, 1987 (late FAUSTUS) no no no no
Charniak & Goldman, 1988
(Wimp2) no yes yes no
Table 2.1: Representative NLU systems and how they fare in meeting the four con
straints on understanding.
Chapter 3
How ATLAST Works
3.1 Constraints revisited
The previous chapter introduced four important constraints on computationaJ
models of natural language understanding drawn from the psycholinguistic literature:
• Functional independence of syntactic and semantic processing.
• Interaction between lexical and pragmatic processing.
• Multiple access of word meanings.
• Recovery from erroneous inferences.
The importanceof thesefour constraints rests in how they guidethe development of a
theory of language understanding in humans and the construction of the correspond
ing model. As a theory is pushed to explain a greater diversity of phenomena, the
number of ways in which that theory may take shape is narrowed. This is illustrated
in the previous chapter: just the simple observation that people seem to make some
sense of syntactically anomalous strings of words casts doubt on the psychological
validityof many integrated understanders and thereby eliminatesone set of potential
answers to the question, "How does the human language processor work?"
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The constraints also provide a context within which to evaluate this work.
While ther.e is no universal agreement on any of these constraints, more is gained by
making strong specific assumptions for one's model and testing them than by making
weaker all-encompassing assumptions, inevitably resulting in a nebulous model which
is difficult to evaluate and therefore uninformative. This chapter describes in detail
the architecture of the ATLAST model, whose design was guided by the constraints
listed above.
3.2 Architecture
ATLAST consists of three independent processing components, the capsulizer,
the proposer, and the filter, that operate concurrently on a relational memory net
work. The common goal of these components is to find the parts of memory that
best represent the intended meaning of some input text. ATLAST pursues this goal
by using marker-passing to search the network for paths that connect senses of open
class words from the text. A single path is a chain of nodes and the links which join
them. The nodes represent objects, events, or states, and the links correspond to
the relationships which may exist between the nodes. Any nodes or links in a path
which are not explicitly mentioned in the text are inferred; therefore, these paths
are called inference paths. A set of inference paths which joins all of the words in
the text into a connected graph represents one possible interpretation of the text.
In this respect ATLAST resembles a number of other models of text understanding
that utilize marker-passing or spreading activation, many of which were discussed in
Chapter 2.
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The paths that form the current interpretation are called active paths. For any
given text, however, there may be a great number of possible interpretations, many
of which are nonsensical. The problem then is determining which of the possible
interpretations provides the best explanation of the text. ATLAST deals with this
problem by applying heuristics called inference evaluation metrics. These metrics are
used to compare two competing inference paths and select the more appropriate one.
Two inference paths compete when they connect the same two nodes in the relational
network via different combinations of links and nodes. The path that fits better with
the current interpretation is activated (i.e., it becomes part of the interpretation).
The other path is de-activated but not discarded. Instead, information about that
path is retained in order to facilitate error recovery; these paths are called retained
paths. The choice of one inference path over another is made as soon as ATLAST
discovers that the two paths compete.^ As the marker-passing search mechanism finds
more paths, ATLAST constructs an interpretation consisting of those paths which
survive the evaluation process. When the marker-passing and evaluation processes
end, the surviving active paths make up the final interpretation of the text.^
3.2.1 Memory
At the core of ATLAST is a simple memory structure organized as a relational
network. The network consists of nodes and links. The nodes represent events,
objects, and states; the links represent relationships between the nodes. Many of
^An exception to this principle is introduced in Chapter 6.
^In theory, the search for inference paths and their evaluation take place simultaneously. In
practice, however, ATLAST simulates this concurrency by alternating between marker-passing and
path evaluation. During each of these cycles, a new word is read from the input, its meanings are
recalled and marked, and all markers in the network are passed a fixed distance. Any path discovered
in this way is then examined to see if it competes with an active path in the interpretation as it
stands at that time. If so, the evaluation metrics are applied and a choice between the twocompeting
paths is made.
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these nodes correspond to meanings of words in ATLAST's vocabulary, and it is
from these nodes that the search for inference paths begins.
Unlike other systems which place restrictions on the direction in which links can
be traversed (e.g., Riesbeck & Martin, 1986), ATLAST employs two uni-directional
links between related nodes, giving the equivalent of a bi-directional link. This al
lows the search for inference paths to spread from one node to all directly related
nodes. Each uni-directional link represents one-half of the relationship between two
nodes and is is labeled accordingly. Thus, if there is a link representing the has-part
relationship connecting one node to another, there is a corresponding part-of link in
the opposite direction.
The relationships described by the links themselves can be divided roughly into
four categories: composition, causality, intentionality, and abstraction. ATLAST's
composition relations include has-part, has-instance, has-attribute, and has-role-filler.
The causality relation is has-result, and the intentionality relations are has-goal, has-
plan, has-planstep, and has-precondition. The one abstraction relation is viewed-as (its
corresponding relation in the opposite direction is also viewed-as). ATLAST's viewed-
as relation is inspired by the view relation in Wilensky's (1984) KODIAK knowledge
representation language, although viewed-as relates only two concepts while view is
a three-part relation. For example, in KODIAK, a view relation can be used to de
clare that the concept SELL is a COMMERCIAL-TRANSACTION viewed as an ACTION.
If we wanted to describe the same relationship in ATLAST, we might say that a
COMMERCIAL-TRANSACTION can be viewed-as an ACTION, and that SELL is an instance-
of a COMMERCIAL-TRANSACTION. In comparison, ATLAST's minimal representation
language is perhaps less elegant and less precise than KODIAK, but the two rep
resentations exist to solve different problems: KODIAK is a robust framework for
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defining a wide range of semantic relations while ATLAST's representation language
is a vehicle to facilitate the demonstration of ATLAST's processes. There is no rea
son to believe, however, that ATLAST's processes could not be adapted to a more
sophisticated representation scheme like KODIAK.
3.2.2 Capsulizer
The capsulizer is essentially a syntactic parser based on a simple augmented
transition network (ATN) grammar and is the only process that sees the actual in
put text. As the capsulizer reads the input text one word at a time, it retrieves the
syntactic category information (e.g., noun or verb) associated with that word and ac
tivates any word senses associated with that word by placing markers at those word
senses. The activated word senses serve as a starting point for the search for inference
paths, which is discussed below. The word senses are not used in any decisions made
by the capsulizer, although pointers to the word senses are retained. As ATLAST
accumulates syntactic category information, it uses the ATN grammar to make de
cisions about syntactic relationships within the phrases of the input text. These
intra-phrasal decisions, along with the pointers to the word senses which comprise
the phrases, are packaged and passed along to the filter as capsules of information.
In addition, for any input word that has more than one word sense (i.e., a word sense
ambiguity), a capsule containing the pointers to the different word senses is sent to
the filter, which will eventually select the correct word sense.
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3.2.3 Proposer
The proposer suggests possible inference paths that might explain ,the input
text. Essentially, the proposer employs a simple marker-passing process to perform
a breadth-first intersection search of the relational network for connections between
word senses that have been activated by the capsulizer. The proposer extends the
frontiers of the search space by traversing the links leading away from the origins of
the search (i.e., the word senses directly marked by the capsulizer) and placing new
markers at the nodes it encounters as it goes. This searchprocess is roughly analogous
to wavefronts of activation spreading outward from different sources. Each marker
carries with it enough information to describe the path that extends from the node
where the marker resides to the node that represents the source of the activation.
Thus, two markers from different origins arriving at one node represent a potential
inference path to be considered for inclusion in ATLAST's interpretation of the text.
How markers are passed
The extent of the search as it radiates outward from a given origin is represented
by a set markers. Each marker is uniquely identified and contains information that
aids in controlling the search and reporting paths which connect two origins. The
information associated with each marker includes:
• Origin node: A pointer to the node from which this marker began its search.
• Parent: A pointer to the marker which spawned this marker (i.e., the marker
that is one link closer to the origin).
• Host node: The name of the node marked by this marker.
• Distance: This value is roughly equivalent to the number of links that were
traversed from the origin in order to place this marker at its host node. The
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reason that these values are not exactly equal is that some of the links may be
preferred links which, as described below, do not incur any cost when traversed.
ATLAST keeps track of the markers that make up the frontier of the search from
each origin (i.e., the most recently placed markers). When the proposer is invoked,
each of these markers spawns children which are placed at the nodes immediately
adjacent to their parent's host node. (A marker does not pass a child marker to its
parent's host node as this would only create a cycle to be ignored later.) These child
markers are copies of their parent. The child carries the same origin information
as its parent, the child's parent and host node information is updated accordingly,
and its distance value is its parent's distance value increased by one (unless the link
separating the child and parent is a preferred link).
Without some means of limiting the spread of markers throughout memory,
ATLAST would be overwhelmed by the number of inference paths proposed for eval
uation. To avoid this problem, the depthofthe proposer's search iscontrolled through
a parameter that imposes a global upper limit on the markers' distance value. If a
given marker's distance value has reached the limit, that marker cannot spawn child
markers. This method of accounting for the decay of activation is certainly more
simplistic than other marker-passing schemes, such as Hendler's SCRAPS (1986) or
Anderson's ACT* (1983), in that the markers are not assigned continuously variable
activation energies which are depleted by both link traversal and fan-out, and there
are no complicated formulas for calculating the decay rate or the cost of link traver
sal. Instead, ATLAST's distance values can be viewed as integer-valued activation
energies that are depleted only by the cost of traversing links. When copies of a
marker at a given node are passed to adjacent nodes, each new marker is given an
activation energy equal to that of its parent marker less the cost of traversing the
link to the adjacent node; the parent's activation energy is not divided among the
49
new markers according to the number of links leading away from the node as it is
with other systems.
The limit on the depth of search places an upper bound on the length of the
paths that the proposer will find, although some paths may in fact exceed that limit.
These exceptions can occur when the path in question contains one or more preferred
links. While the traversal of most links in ATLAST's memory is assumed to incur
some cost, traversal of those links that are designated as preferred links does not
incur any cost and is not included in determining the extent of the search. The use
of preferred links will be discussed in Chapter 6.
How paths are proposed
When a marker is placed at a node, the proposer checks to see if there are other
markers at the same node. If so, the pairing of the newly-arrived marker with each of
the other markers represents a potential inference path betweenthe twoorigins ofeach
pair of markers. These potential inference paths must meet minimum acceptability
requirements before they are considered by the filter's evaluation process. A path
that connects an origin to itself will not be passed to the filter for evaluation, nor
will any path that contains a cycle, regardless of its origins. A path connecting two
different sentences (which ATLAST naively assumes to represent different states or
events) must meet more stringent requirements: the path must contain at least one
link denoting a causal or intentional relationship between the sentences (cf. Schank &
Abelson, 1977), and the path's endpoints must be nodes representing actions or states.
These constraints, along with the limit on the spread of marker-passing described
above, serve to limit combinatorial growth of the number of paths that could be
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discovered and evaluated. The combinatorial growth problem is discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 7.
3.2.4 Filter
The filter performs two functions; the first is that of inter-phrasal syntax. As
capsules are passed from the capsulizer to the filter, the filter makes decisions about
the relationships between the phrases represented by the capsules. Inter-phrasal
syntax rules enable the filter to make thematic role assignments. The filter's second
function is the evaluation of inference paths. When two competing inference paths
are proposed, the filter attempts to select the more appropriate path through the
application of inference evaluation metrics.
Inter-phrasal syntax
In performing inter-phrasal syntactic analysis, the filter's goal is to construct
a framework of causally-connected event descriptions that correspond to the events
described by the input text. The framework that is built is very much like the
framework that results from parsers using Schank's Conceptual Dependency (CD)
representation scheme (Schank, 1975; Schank &: Riesbeck, 1981). Like the CD frame
work, every event in ATLAST's representation consists of an actor, an action, an
object, a direction, and a causal or intentional relationship between this event and
others. The difference between the two approaches is in how these slots are filled.
Parsers based on CD, such as MARGIE (Riesbeck, 1975), took advantage of an
integrated procedural representation ofbothsemantic andsyntactic knowledge. Rules
attachedto word meanings enabled these parsers to construct the correct relationships
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between the components of an event and between the different events themselves.
ATLAST's semantic knowledge is primarily declarative and distributed throughout
its memory network, and its syntactic knowledge is a separate set of rules. ATLAST's
semantic relationships within and between events are explicitly defined in memory
before processing begins. The proposer suggests possible relationships and the filter
decides which relationships best represent the input. The syntactic relationships are
determined by the syntactic processes of the capsulizer and the filter. Rules in the
capsulizer guide the decomposition of the input text into syntactic components. The
capsulizer then sends this information to the filter which in turn uses other rules to
assign the components to various thematic roles. The filter also looks for cues that
alter the normal temporal flow of the text so as to maintain a correct ordering of the
events. The result is a framework of pointers leading to nodes that belong to active
paths in ATLAST's memory as shown previously in Figure 1.1.
This dissertation concentrates on how ATLAST finds the correct active paths,
but the importance of the syntactic component of ATLAST's interpretation, the
framework of pointers, should not be underestimated. While the nodes and links
of the active paths represent objects, events, states, and some of the functional re
lationships between them, it is the syntactic component that imposes order on the
otherwise nebulous set of active paths. Without this component it would be difficult
to know which of the events depicted by the active paths occurred first, or even who
did what to whom. This deficit would become more apparent as texts became more
structurally complex.
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Inference evaluation
As the proposer parses information to the filter about inference paths it hcis
discovered, the filter evaluates each path to determine if that path should be incor
porated into ATLAST's changing interpretation of the input text. Because marker-
passing is begun at different nodes at different times, as determined by the order
of the words in the text, the same path may be discovered many times. It might
be argued that this redundancy is computationally inefficient but it is essential to
ATLAST's error recovery capability as described in Chapters 4 and 5. Thus, the
filter's first task is to see if the proposed path is already part of the current inter
pretation. If so, no evaluation need be done and the filter can move on to the next
proposed path.
On the other hand, if the proposed path is not a component of the interpreta
tion, one of two things may occur. The filter will check to see if the proposed path
competes with any path in the current interpretation (i.e., they share the same two
origin nodes). If there is no competing path, then the proposed path is the only
path found so far that connects the nodes at either end of the path. In this case, the
filter adds the proposed path to the interpretation, making this path an active path.
Should the filter find a path in the current interpretation that does compete with
the proposed path, the filter will apply the inference evaluation metrics to determine
which of the two paths fits better with the existing context (i.e., the set of all active
paths other than the path competing with the proposed path).
ATLAST employs five different metrics or rules for selecting the more appropri
ate inference path.^ All but one of these metrics represent attempts to embody the
principle of parsimony. This principle can be defined as explaining the most input
^There is also a sixth metric, but its introduction is postponed until Chapter 6.
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with the most efficient or economical representation. The concept of representing
the most with the least hcis been incorporated into many models and theories of
language understanding through the years, although the word "parsimony" may not
have been used to describe it. (See for example the work of Grain and Steedman
(1985), Granger (1980b), Kay (1983), McDermott (1974), Quillian (1969), Wilensky
(1983), or Wilks (1978).)
The first of the evaluation metrics, the activation metric, relies on the assump
tion that the endpoints of the competing paths are always origins of marker-passing.
These nodes are activated or marked directly by the capsulizer as it processes the
words from the input text. Any of these nodes may be activated by the capsulizer
more than once; in the example of Chapter 5, a node labeled "insect" will be marked
twice by the capsulizer if the text contains both the words "bugs" and "roaches." The
activation metric favors the path whose endpoints have been activated the greater
number of times by the capsulizer, thus giving preference to the path that explains
the greater number of different words from the input text.
The length metric favors the path that contains fewer links connecting the two
origin nodes, thus embodying the concept of using the more concise representation
to explain the relationship between two words from the text. The principle of giv
ing preference to the shorter path is cissumed by most, if not all, models based on
spreading activation.
Inference paths in ATLAST's memory often share nodes with other inference
paths. The reinforcement metric attempts to make a judgment as to how well each of
two competing paths fits with the existing context by counting the number of nodes
that each path shares with the other active paths (excluding the two paths being
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evaluated). The metric prefers the path that has greater reinforcement from, or has
more shared nodes with,,the other active paths.
Another aspect of the principle of parsimony is to make the most specific inter
pretation possible ofa text. (Wilensky (1983) calls this the Principle of Concretion).
ATLAST's memory uses viewed-as links to denote relationships of abstraction be
tween two nodes. ATLAST's viewed-as link is adapted from the view link used
in the KODIAK knowledge representation language (Wilensky, 1984). For exam
ple, a viewed-as link between a node labeled GOVERNMENT-AGENCY and a node la
beled GENERIC-EMPLOYER says that GENERIC-EMPLOYER is another way of looking at
GOVERNMENT-AGENCY or vice versa. Because a path containing a viewed-as link de
scribes a more abstract relationship between two nodes than a path not containing
such a link, the specificity metric favors the path containing fewer viewed-as links.
The viewed-as link also has a special property in that is has no length as far
as the length metric is concerned. The viewed-as link does not represent a hierarchi
cal relationship; instead it represents a relation of abstraction and, to some extent,
equality, as in "here is a different but perfectly reasonable way to look at this node."
Because the two nodes on either end of a viewed-as link are in some sense equal,
and because the presence of the viewed-as node is already measured by the specificity
metric, the length metric ignores the viewed-as link when computing the length of a
path containing that link.
To evaluate competing paths, the filter applies the metrics in the order given
above. That is, the filter first uses the activation metric to compare the two paths.
If the activation metric favors one path over the other, the evaluation is complete.
Otherwise, the filter employs the length metric, followed by the reinforcement metric
and the specificity metric. This ordering of the metrics is obviously not the only
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ordering possible, but it has been determined through trial and error to be the only
ordering which enables ATLAST to arrive at correct interpretations for the sample
texts on which it has been tested. This should not be construed to mean that the
set of metrics is necessarily correct or complete. It is likely that testing ATLAST on
additional texts would reveal the need for additional metrics as well as revisions to
both the order and the content of the existing metrics, as has been the case so far.
The four metrics listed above do not guarantee the selection of one of the two
competing paths; it is possible that the two paths will fare equally well in all four
comparisons. In this case a fifth metric, the no-decision metric, is invoked. As the
name indicates, this rule makes no decision about the competing paths. Instead,
it retains both paths, expecting that the processing of more text will change the
existing context sufficiently that a decision can be made and that the subsequent
evaluation of other paths will remind ATLAST of the tied paths and instigate their
re-evaluation. To prevent a situation in which ATLAST is reminded to re-evaluate
one tied path and not the other, thus giving the former path a chance to be activated
and influence later changes to the active interpretation without considering the latter
path, ATLAST records the fact that the two paths are tied. When one of the two
tied and retained paths is re-evaluated, the other will be recalled immediately for
re-evaluation.
When a decision has been made as to which of the two competing paths pro
vides a better explanation of the input, ATLAST's ongoing interpretation may be
altered. If the evaluation metrics selected the path that was already a part of the
interpretation, no change is necessary. However, if the previously-active path is not
selected by the metrics, it is de-activated and removed from the interpretation, while
the selected path is added to the interpretation and becomes an active path. In either
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case, th.e less appropriate path is not discarded; instead it becomes a retained path.
That is, it is remembered as having been a candidate for inclusion in the interpreta
tion. This is done in order to facilitate recovery from incorrect inference decisions,
which is also discussed in great detail in the next two chapters.
3.3 Why marker-passing?
The marker-passing search mechanism described above is a very simple com
putational metaphor for the concept of spreading activation. Waltz and Pollack
(1985) divide spreading activation schemes into two categories: digital spreading
activation and analog spreading activation."^ Digital spreading activation includes
marker-passing algorithms which perform a breadth-first search for shortest paths
in a relational network, while analog spreading activation takes place on a weighted
network of associations, where "activation energy" is distributed over the network
based on some mathematical function of the strength of connections.
This categorization is further supported by Fahlman (cited in Fahlman, Hinton,
&: Sejnowski, 1983), who divides massively parallel architectures into three classes,
two of which correspond to Waltz and Pollack's categories of spreading activation.®
Fahlman classifies systems by the type of signal that is passed between theprocessing
elements which make up the system: messages, markers, and values. Message-passing
systems pass arbitrarily complex messages between elements and perform complex
operations on those messages. An example of message-passing applied to language
''An earlier paper by the same authors (Pollack k Waltz, 1982) makes the same distinction but
gives different names to the categories.
®A massively parallel architecture is defined by Fahlman, Hinton, and Sejnowski (1983) as a
machine with a very large number of(possibly very simple) processing elements working on a single
task.
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understanding is given by Phillips and Hendler (1981). Because message-passing sys
tems are not necessarily spreading activation systems, they will not be discussed fur
ther. Marker-passing systems, which pass simple discrete markers between processing
elements along dedicated links, correspond to Waltz and Pollack's digital spreading
activation systems. Fahlman places his own NETL system (Fahlman, 1979) into this
class.® Besides their role as marker-passing mechanisms, these nodes or elements
also represent concepts in memory. Finally, value-passing systems pass continuously-
variable quantities among the elements, which in turn perform arithmetic operations
on these values. Value-passing systems are equivalent to what Waltz and Pollack call
analog spreading activation systems.
The role of spreading activation in AI has been inconsistent at best. Spreading
activation was introduced into the AI literature through Quillian's work with semantic
memory (see Quillian (1968), for example) but, as Charniak (1983) has observed,
this work appears to have been largely ignored by AI researchers through the next
decade. Despite this lukewarm reception, the 1970's did produce two noteworthy
systems based on spreading activation: ACT, Anderson's general purpose model of
human cognition (Anderson, 1976) which has since evolved into ACT* (Anderson,
1983), and NETL, Fahlman's deductive knowledge-base system (Fahlman, 1979).
During the past few years, though, there has been a marked increase in the
popularity of spreading activation among AI researchers, especially those building
cognitive models of language understanding. There are several reasons why spread
ing activation schemes are growing in popularity among these researchers; some of
®While Fahlman says that markers are passed between processing elements, Waltz and Pollack's
definition mentions markers being passed between nodes in a relational network. For the purposes
of this dissertation, this distinction will be ignored and the nodes described by Waltz and Pollack's
definition are assumed to be the simplest of marker-passing processing elements.
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the reasons apply because of the advantages inherent in any kind of parallel process
ing, while others are relevant because of specific attributes of spreading activation
algorithms.
Neuropsychological evidence
The decision to base ATLAST's architecture on a spreading activation mech
anism was motivated primarily by recent psycholinguistic studies of the lexical dis
ambiguation process, discussed previously in Chapter 2. These studies led to the
conclusion that when an ambiguous word is read or heard in context, all meanings
(or senses) of the word are initially primed or recalled, with context then being con
sulted to select the correct meaning. Spreading activation proves to be an excellent
computational mechanism for modeling the lexical access process just described; fur-
ther, it readily serves as the foundation for a higher-level, modular, parallel-process
model of language understanding.
In addition, lower-level neural network models of cognition that rely on analog
spreading activation have recently grown in popularity among artificial intelligence
and cognitive science researchers because it is generally accepted that, whatever it is
that the brain does at its lowest levels, the brain does it in parallel. As Feldman and
Ballard (1982) point out, the computational speed of neurons is a few milliseconds,
but the action of these neurons must account for complex behaviors that are carried
out in a few hundred milliseconds, indicating that these slow, simple neurons must be
acting in parallel. A review of the neuropsychological evidence favoring parallelisni
in the brain is given by Anderson and Hinton (1981).
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Shifting the focus to processing
Another advantage of the spreading activation paradigm is that it encourages
the researcher to shift the emphasis from knowledge representation to processing
mechanisms. Many NLU models concentrate on issues of representation while ignor
ing issues of processing. Moyne and Kaniklidis (1981, p. 268) offer this assessment of
the state of the art in 1981:
We cannot fail to observe that a rather alarming number of models of
comprehension have virtually nothing specific to say about processing
mechanisms. Furthermore, what they do have to say, as for example in
some vague theorizing about knowledge being stored in the form of labeled
graphs, often amounts to little more than the claim that the relevant
knowledge is organized (surely an innocuous enough claim) without any
precise specification of how it is organized beyond the indication that the
units of knowledge are interconnected somehow and that certain broad
relations obtain among them.
Adding to the criticism of these same models, Norvig (1983, p. 284) says: "This
preoccupation with knowledge structures can sometimes lead to programs with im
poverished, redundant, or inconsistent processing mechanisms."
A spreading activation model essentially prevents the researcher from entirely
ignoring processing issues, though it is still possible to pay them less attention than
they deserve. Thus, spreading activation models may help bring about a change in
methodology which is long overdue in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
Speed of processing
One of the benefits which derives from any form of parallel processing is an
increase in the number of computations which can be performed in a given amount
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of time. Spreading activation provides the ability to explore a number of alterna
tives (e.g., word senses, syntactic structures, semantic interpretations) at the same
time, instead of exploring one at a time, thereby increasing the processing speed of
the system. The speed advantage of spreading activation systems over their serial
counterparts should be great, so long as there are massively-parallel computer archi
tectures around to support the algorithms. Unfortunately, with few exceptions (e.g.,
Hillis, 1985) such machines are not yet widely available.
Opening new doors
The tools which a researcher brings to bear on a problem directly influence his
or her thinking about the problem. Spreading activation, viewed as one ofthese tools,
enables NLU researchers to propose new, and potentially better, models of language
processing. This conclusion is a subjective one, but it is shared by other AI and
cognitive science researchers.
One perspective comes from Rieger, Trigg, and Bane (1981, p. 955), who argue
the need for parallel computing architectures in AI research. Though the focus of
the argument is on actual hardware, the relevance of the argument becomes obvious
if one merely substitutes the word "tools" for "computing hardware":
Beliefs about the nature of [the] computing hardware [which is] available
influence a researcher's ability to conceptualize data and process mod
els of intelligence. While a researcher can certainly imagine methods of
modeling which require unusual hardware, he may never discover the in
teresting issues because of his inability to see beyond the first round of
ideas. Like it or not, AI is an experimental science which relies heavily
on feedback from the implementation level to the conceptual model level.
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Closer to the issue at hand are the observations of Pylyshyn (1980, p. 124):
Now, what is typically overlooked when we [use a computational system as
a cognitive model] is the extent to which the class of algorithms that can
even be considered is conditioned by the assumptions we make regarding
what basic operations are possible, how these may interact, how opera
tions are sequenced, what data structures are possible, and so on. Such
assumptions are an intrinsic part of our choice of descriptive formalism.
Finally, Feldmaii and Ballard (1982, pp. 206-207) offer similar justification for
research specifically into analog spreading activation models, but which may be just
as relevant to digital spreading activation models:
The most important reason for a serious concern in cognitive science for
[connectionist models] is that they might lead to better science. It is
obvious that the choice of technical language that is used for expressing
hypotheses has a profound influence on the form in which theories are
formulated and experiments undertaken. Artificial intelligence and artic
ulating cognitive sciences have made great progress by employing models
based on conventional digital computers as theories of intelligent behavior.
But a number of crucial phenomena such as associative memory, priming,
perceptual rivalry, and the remarkable recovery ability of animals have
not yet yielded to this treatment.
Paraphrasing these researchers, it seems that without new tools and the new
ways of thinking that go with them, interesting issues go unexplored, and important
answers go undiscovered. If for no other reason than this, the different spreading
activation techniques are tools which deserve careful consideration.
3.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the fundamental principles of
ATLAST's various components: the relational memory, the syntactic parsing element
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in the capsulizer, the spreading activation search carried out by the proposer, and
the thematic role filling and inference evaluation capabilities of the filter. In other
words, this chapter focused on the "how" of ATLAST; Chapter 4 takes an in-depth
look at the "why."
Chapter 4
Lexical Inference Processing;
Theory
4.1 An unanswered question
The inference processing mechanism implemented in ATLAST is based on a the
ory of lexical disambiguation called conditional retention. The theory of conditional
retention was developed in response to questions that are not answered by prevailing
psycholinguistic theories of lexical disambiguation. This chapter describes the theory
of conditional retention in detail and discusses the arguments for and against this
theory.
The active suppression theory of lexical access and disambiguation, introduced
in Chapter 2, proposes that when an ambiguous word is read, all meanings are ac
cessed at once and shortly thereafter the meaning which best fits with the existing
context is chosen and the alternate meanings are forgotten or suppressed (Seidenberg
et ah, 1982; Tanenhaus et ah, 1979). Although the active suppression theory has
been well received by some psycholinguists and has influenced several AI models of
language understanding (e.g., Charniak, 1983; Cottrell Sz Small, 1983; Gigley, 1983;
Hirst, 1984; Waltz & Pollack, 1985), the theory is not without its shortcomings.
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The active suppression theory suggests that no information about previously
recalled meanings is preserved once those word meanings have been suppressed. This
raises at least one important and unanswered question: if inappropriate meanings are
actively suppressed, how is a reader able to find a correct meaning when later text
shows that the initial choice of word meaning is incorrect?^ Without some means to
remember these candidate meanings, the active suppression theory seems to imply
that recovery from an incorrect choice of word meaning must involve reprocessing of
the text and reactivation of all meanings of the ambiguous word.
4.2 Conditional retention offers an answer
One theory which specifically addresses the problem offinding the correct word
sense after previously selecting an incorrect word sense is called conditional retention
(Granger, Holbrook, &Eiselt, 1984). The conditional retention theory proposes that
lexical disambiguation is an automatic process inwhich all meanings of an ambiguous
word are retrieved, the meaning most appropriate to the preceding context is chosen,
and the other, less appropriate meanings are temporarily deactivated but retained.
In the case where the ambiguous word appears within a short text, the meanings are
retained until the end of the text. Should later text contradict the initially chosen
meaning, the retained meanings for that word are reconsidered in light ofthe updated
context, and a new meaning is selected without repeating the lexical retrieval process.
When there is no further text, a meaning is chosen based on previous context and
the other meanings are actively suppressed. The theory of conditional retention does
not contradict active suppression; instead, conditional retention merely supplements
^This referred to by some as garden path recovery. That designation is not used here because
of its associations with syntactic problems; this dissertation is concerned primarilywith lexical and
pragmatic problems.
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active suppression by proposing that those word meanings which are not selected
may be deactivated but are not immediately forgotten.
The combined deactivation and retention of the meanings not chosen accom
plishes two goals for the language understander. First, it permits the processing at
the lexical level to continue to make immediate decisions about the meanings of sub
sequent words in the context ofa single, plausible interpretation of the preceding text
instead of multiple interpretations of varying plausibility. If the unchosen meanings
were not completely deactivated, there could be resulting confusion in making deci
sions about new word meanings. Second, it allows the retained meanings to be used
by other processes in correcting wrong decisions made by the original process with
out reprocessing the original input text, at least for a short time. Tracking retained
meanings allows the error recovery to be done without maintaining separate copies
of all possible interpretations of the text processed so far, thus reducing both storage
and processing overhead.
The inadequacy of the active suppression theory by itself is illustrated by the
following text:
Text 4: The instructor made the medical students examine the tiny cell so that
they would be aware of the consequences of Medicaid fraud.
The reader may find this text to be awkwardly contrived; this is done to highlight
phenomena which occur frequently but go unnoticed because of their subtlety. In
this example, the ambiguous word "cell" is embedded in a text in which the previous
context biases for a "biology" meaning and the later context biases for a "prison"
meaning. The active suppression account of this text would have all but the "biol
ogy" reading of "cell" suppressed well before the end of the text. However, at the
end of the text, the "prison" reading is more appropriate. If the "prison" meaning is
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no longer active, there is no way to make this interpretation, yet it is obvious that
the interpretation is possible. Conditional retention permits this interpretation: after
"cell" is encountered, the "biology" meaning is active, but the other meaning is re
tained until the end of the text. In this case, the final word requires a reinterpretation
of the early text and the word meaning as well, so the retained meaning ("prison")
supplants the initially selected meaning ("biology") and the reinterpretation is com
pleted. Because no text follows the disambiguating word, the other meanings are
then actively suppressed.
The key assumption of conditional retention is that there is a simple binary
mechanism for temporarily remembering that a meaning was activated, even if activa
tion has since ceaised, and that this memory canbe erased when necessary. Combining
this two-state memory for a given meaning with two levels of activation for that mean
ing (i.e., "active" and "inactive") theoretically gives four possible states in which any
meaning can exist: (1) the meaning is inactive and there is no memory of its having
been recently active; (2) the meaning is inactive but there is memory of its having
been recently active; (3) the meaning is active and there is memory of its having
been active; and (4) the meaning is active but there is no memory ofits having been
active.
While it is conceivable that a meaning could be active with no record of recent
activation, this notion serves no useful purpose in the conditional retention theory.
Thus, there are three states in which word meanings exist:
• Active: The meaning is active and there is some memory of its having been
active. The meaning shows facilitation (i.e., shorter response times and lower
error rates on experimental tasks).
• Inactive: The meaning is not active and there is no memory of its having
been active. This could be the initial state of the meaning, or could result
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from either active suppression or gradual loss of activation. In this state, the
meaning shows no facilitation.
Retained: The meaning is not active but there is some memory of its having
been active, thereby distinguishing it from an inactive meaning and making it
readily available for reconsideration if necessary. The meaning does not show
facilitation, thus preventing it from being confused with an active meaning.
A theory of different states of activity in memory is by no means unprecedented.
For example, Wagner's (1981) model of learning and automatic memory in animals
distinguishes between a state of inactivity (I), a primary state of activity (Al), and a
secondary state of activity (A2). Nodes in memory make the transition from I to Al
upon being directly activated by some stimulus, then decay to A2, and finally back
to I. If an inactive node is indirectly activated through the spread of activation the
node can make the transition from I to A2, but spreading activation cannot push a
node from I to Al or from A2 to Al (Figure 4.1). Wagner also notes that several
other theorists discriminate between two different states of activity in memory, dating
at least as far back as the previous century (Morgan, 1894/1977).
The various processes involved in lexical disambiguation can be defined easily
in terms of transitions between the three states (Figure 4.2). These processes are:
• Spreading Activation: The process ofchanging inactive or retainedmeanings
to active meanings.
• Active Suppression: The process of changing active or retained meanings to
inactive meanings.
• Conditional Retention: The process of changing active meanings to retained
meanings. Note that inactive meanings cannot be directly changed to retained
meanings.
Thus, in conditional retention theory, terms such as "retained" or "retention" have
very specific meanings with respect to word meanings, lexical disambiguation, and
related higher-level memory structures and processes.
(inactive)
A2
(active 2)
A1
(active 1)
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Figure 4.1: Transition network for multiple states of activity in Wagner's (1981)
model of learning and automatic memory in animals.
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Retained
suppression retention
activation
Inactive Active
suppression
activation
Figure 4.2: Transition network for multiple states of inactivity in the conditional
retention theory.
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The conditional retention theory extends the active suppression theory by of
fering an explanation of how early, misleading text can be reinterpreted without
conscious reprocessing. Neither active suppression nor any other theory of lexical
disambiguation accounts for this phenomenon.
4.3 The controversy
The theory of conditional retention is by no means widely accepted, and the
criticisms of conditional retention should be considered when evaluating ATLAST's
utility as a cognitive model. One argument against conditional retention is the exis
tence of a large body ofexperimental evidence which shows that, almost immediately
after a meaningof an ambiguous word has been selected, the alternate meanings seem
as if they had never been recalled (Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg et ah, 1982;
Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et ah, 1979). This has been interpreted by some crit
ics as proof that retention does not occur (e.g., G. Hirst, personal communication,
March 26, 1986). What seems to be overlooked by the critics, however, is that these
experiments simply do not ask the right questions.
4.3.1 Lexical access data: fact and fiction
Critics have argued that the theory of conditional retention runs counter to
the data obtained through numerous experiments. The evidence, they say, supports
an extreme interpretation of active suppression: that the unchosen meanings of an
ambiguous word are immediately deactivated and discarded when one meaning is
selected. There is, however, a problem with this interpretation. While they do in
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fact demonstrate that unselected word meanings are very quickly deactivated, these
experiments do not test whether the meanings have been completely forgotten.
The experimental technique used in making on-line measurements of the rel
ative activation levels of word meanings during language comprehension is called
cross-modal lexical priming (CMLP). In CMLP, the subject is presented aurally with
a text containing an ambiguous word. At some controlled interval after hearing the
ambiguous word (called the stimulus onset asynchrony or SOA), the subject is pre
sented with a visual task which indirectly measures the degree of activation of the
ambiguous word's different meanings. In some experiments the visual task may be a
lexical decision task in which the subject must determine whether the visual stimulus
is a word or a non-word. Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) found that it is easier to
decide if a visually-presented target string of letters is a word if a semantically re
lated word is presented prior to the target; this is called priming. Other experiments
use a naming task in which the subject must read the target string aloud. In either
case, the fundamental assumption is that the extent to which the decision or naming
is facilitated corresponds to the degree of activation of the target string's internal
representation. The facilitation is measured as the amount of time required for the
subject to correctly complete the task (also called the latency). Thus a target word
which is semantically related to the ambiguous priming word will be recognized more
quickly than a target word which is unrelated to the prime. In turn, an unrelated
target word will be easier to recognize than a non-word.
Tanenhaus et al. (1979) used CMLP with a lexical naming task in an investi
gation of the processing of noun-verb lexical ambiguities in syntactic contexts which
biased for either the noun reading or the verb reading (e.g., "1 bought the watch" or
"I will watch."). They found that naming latencies were facilitated for both readings
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immediately after presentation ofthe ambiguous word (0 msec) regardless of the bias
ing context, but that only the reading appropriate to the context was facilitated 200
msec later. They concluded that the inappropriate reading was actively suppressed.
Seidenberg et al. (1982) used semantically-biasing contexts as well as syntactically-
biasing ones and studied noun-noun ambiguities in addition to noun-verb ambiguities.
Again the ambiguous word was the final word of the auditory stimulus. With the
exception that they found some evidence of selective access in the case of noun-noun
ambiguities with strong lexical priming for one interpretation, their results supported
the conclusion of Tanenhaus et al. The active suppression hypothesis is further sup
ported by the experiments of Swinney (1979) and Onifer and Swinney (1981), who
also employed CMLP but with a lexical decision task. The ambiguous word was
embedded within a semantically-biasing text and visual targets were presented three
syllables after the ambiguous word (750-1000 msec; Swinney, 1979) and at 1500 msec
(Onifer Swinney, 1981). In both cases only the context-appropriate reading was
facilitated at the presentation of the target.
Obviously there is substantial cause to conclude that the inappropriate mean
ings of an ambiguous word in context are deactivated soon after they are initially
accessed. This conclusion in no way disagrees with the conditional retention theory.
Conditional retention conflicts with active suppression only when the experimental
data described above areinterpreted asevidence that thereisabsolutely nomemory of
the newly-inactive meanings everhaving been active. This assumption is unfounded,
and the theory of conditional retention specifically states that retained word mean
ings will exhibit no facilitation. None of the experiments above address the question
of how recently deactivated word meanings might differ from those which have been
inactive for a much longer duration. This difference might appear as different degrees
of sensitivity to re-activation while processing additional input, or some other quality
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As a simple example of how one might easily be led to the wrong conclusion
J by asking relevant questions but never asking the right question, consider the simple
incandescent light bulb. Ostensibly, the bulb is either "on" (emitting light) or "off"
(no light). A bulb which has just been turned offdoes not appear to be different from
one which has been off for days. In both cases, measuring radiation in the visible light
spectrum (i.e., looking at the bulb) shows that neither bulb is giving off radiation,
m Similarly, measuring electrical current in the power cord shows no flow of electrons.
Two entirely different tests reveal no difference between the bulbs. However, if we
run a third test on the bulbs, say by using a thermometer to measure the respective
temperatures of the two light bulbs, we find a substantial difference: one is warm but
the other is cool.
Of course, word meanings are not light bulbs, nor is conditional retention nec
essarily related to the dissipation of heat from a light bulb. The point of the light
bulb example is that the data from an experiment depends on the measurements
made and the tools used to make those measurements. Those choices in turn may
depend on the questions being asked. Previous experiments in lexical access were
not designed to address questions about conditional retention, so it is premature to
dismiss the theory on the basis of those experiments.
4.3.2 The challenge of reprocessing
An apparent challenge to the theory of conditional retention comes from the
study of human readers' eye fixations during the reading of misleading texts. While
I
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that does not correspond to the relative activation level and is therefore immeasurable
by the lexical access experiments performed to date.
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the data do not refute the existence of conditional retention itself, they appear to
cast some doubt on one of the fundamental assumptions of the conditional retention
theory: the assumption that error recovery is done without reprocessing the input.
The following passage was used in an experiment by Carpenter and Daneman
(1981, p. 137):
The young man turned his back on the
rock concert stage and looked across the
resort lake. Tomorrow was the annual one-day
fishing contest and fishermen would invade
the place. Some of the best bass
guitarists in the country would come to this
spot. The usual routine of the fishing resort
would be disrupted by the festivities.
Subjects in this experiment were asked to read passages such as the one above while
the duration and location of their eye fixations were automatically recorded. In the
example above, most readers initially interpreted the word "bass" as a kind of fish
because the preceding text is biased toward this interpretation. The interpretation is
contradicted, however, by the next word, "guitarists," which forces a reinterpretation
of "bass" as a low-frequency musical note.^
According to the conditional retention theory, this detection of an incorrect
lexical inference and subsequent correction should be performed without reprocessing
the passage. Yet Carpenter and Daneman found that most readers' eyes fixated on
"bass," then moved forwaxd to and fixated on "guitarists," then regressed back to
^The experimenters intentionally placed the ambiguous word at the end of a lineof text, as with
the word "bass" in the passage above. It may be the case that this positioning of the ambiguous
word plays a role in eliciting the backtracking effect observed by Carpenter and Dum man, although
this is not clear.
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"bass," moved forward to "guitarists" again and continued reading the remainder of
the pcLSsage.
At first, Carpenter and Daneman's conclusion that readers reprocess the text
when they encounter contradictions seems to indicate that the assumption of error
recovery without reprocessing is incorrect and, consequently, that the conditional
retention theory is superfluous. The reprocessing heuristic is just one of several error
recovery heuristics proposed by Carpenter and Daneman, however. Another heuristic
involves making a larger-than-normal inference encompassing both the inconsistent
concept with the preceding text. This is done, they say, if the contradiction is only
"mildly semantically inconsistent" and does not involve a syntactic inconsistency
(Carpenter & Daneman, 1981, p. 141).^ This description appears to fit the conflict
generated by either Text 3 or Text 4, which are repeated below:
Text 3: Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow have called for a specialist to
rid the new building of bugs. Secretaries there have reported seeing
cockroaches in the employees' cafeteria.
Text 4: The instructor made the medical students examine the tiny cell so that
they would be aware of the consequences of Medicaid fraud.
Intuitively, both texts seem much less likely to cause the degree of confusion ob
served by Carpenter and Daneman (as reflected by the duration of regressive fixa
tions). These texts are therefore more suited to error recovery by making a more
encompassing inference. Error recovery in the conditional retention framework may
also be viewed as the making ofmore encompassing inferences to integrate conflicting
concepts; the difference is that Carpenter and Daneman theorize that the more re
cent text is reinterpreted in such a way as to permit the original misinterpretation to
^Still another error recovery heuristic is to continue reading the text with the expectation that
later information will resolve the inconsistency. This is similar to the recency inference strategy
discussed in Chapter 6.
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be maintained, while the conditional retention theory allows for previously retained
inference possibilities to be re-evaluated without reprocessing the actual text so that
the obvious interpretation of the recent text is upheld.
In addition to permitting error recovery without reprocessing, Carpenter and
Daneman's theory also demonstrates the need for retention of some sort. Their
proposed heuristic of checking the previous text for words that caused processing
difficulties, such as ambiguous words, does not specifically address how the reader
knows which word or words to reread, but Carpenter and Daneman theorize that
difficulties encountered during processing may leave a memory trace which makes
finding the ambiguous word much easier. The Carpenter and Daneman model follows
the premise that the activation levels of those concepts not selected for use in the
interpretation either decay or are actively dampened to a base level, which would
preclude the possibility that the memory trace is represented as activation, so this
model strongly suggests a retention mechanism which is related to but distinct from
the activation mechanism.
4.4 Evidence for conditional retention
4.4.1 Holbrook and Eiselt
A study was designed to test explicitly for conditional retention. This exper
iment, by Holbrook and Eiselt (in preparation), uses a variable-delay forced-choice
task to study the selection and retention of meanings of ambiguous words embedded
in texts with variable biasing information before and after the ambiguous word.
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Most recent studies, of meaning selection have used either lexical decision tasks
or lexical naming tasks within a cross-modal lexical priming paradigm, as described
earlier in this chapter. The forced-choice paradigm used by Holbrook and Eiselt is
an unusual design for a psycholinguistic experiment, although it is frequently used in
perception experiments. Lexical decision tasks and lexical naming tasks are good for
acquiring data about subjects' response times, which in turn correlate to the degreeof
facilitation of the individual word meanings. One aspect of the conditional retention
theory, however, is that retained meanings may not exhibit any measurable amount
of facilitation. This suggests the need for an experimental methodology other than
the lexical decision or lexical naming task. The forced-choice task offers the ability
to detect indirectly the existence of conditional retention by studying the subjects'
decisions instead of their response times.
In this experiment, subjects were asked to read short texts of one to three
sentences in length. Experimental texts were two sentences in length, and the others
were filler texts. There were two types of experimental texts that are important to
the current discussion:''
• Consistent bias surrounds ambiguous word: The context which precedes
the ambiguous word biases toward one of its meanings, but does not preclude
the possibility of its other meaning. The second sentence contains information
which disambiguates the ambiguous word with information that is consistent
with the context of the first sentence, agrees with the originalmeaning selection,
and precludes the other meaning.
Example: Mary realized that she had examined the wrong bat. She took it
back and got one that was aluminum.
• Conflicting bias surrounds ambiguous word: The context which precedes
the ambiguous word biases toward one of its meanings, but does not preclude
the possibility of its other meaning. The second sentence contains information
which disambiguates the ambiguous word with information that is consistent
''This experiment is discussed in much greater detail by Holbrook and Eiselt (in preparation)
and Holbrook (in preparation).
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with the context of the first sentence but disagrees with the original meaning
selection and requires that the unselected meaning be integrated into the text,
precluding the original meaning selection.
Example: Mary realized that she had examined the wrong bat. She took it
back and got one that was male.
The texts were presented on a computer monitor a few words at a time, with
each group of words replacing the group before it. An information probe was displayed
on the monitor at one of two points in the text: either between the ambiguous word
and the disambiguating text or after the disambiguating text. The probe consisted of
a pair of words, and the subject's task was to decide which of the two words was more
related to the text. The choice was indicated by pressing one of two buttons, each
corresponding to one of the two probe words. An example of materials presentation
is shown below:
Mary realized
that she had examined
the wrong bat. She took
it back and got
CAVE PITCH
one that was
male.
The first line would appear, centered on the monitor, for 640 msec. The second line
would then replace the first line for 640 msec, and so on. When the two capitalized
probe words appeared on the screen, the subject would press a designated key on
the left side of the computer keyboard if he or she thought the word on the left was
more appropriate to the text than the word on the right, or would press a designated
key on the right side of the keyboard if the word on the right was thought to be
more appropriate. Presentation of additional text did not continue until the subject
pressed one of the two keys.
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An early probe point and a late probe point were used for each text in a between-
subjects design. The early probe point occurred some time after the ambiguous
word but before the disambiguating information in the second sentence. The late
probe point occurred at the end of the second sentence, after the disambiguating
information had been presented. The probe word pairs were rotated between three
types of words; a word related to the meaning of the ambiguous word that Wcis correct
at the end of the text, a word related to the incorrect meaning at the end of the text,
and a word unrelated to either meaning or to the text as a whole. In the example
above, the three words used were "PITCH," "CAVE," and "FRUIT." "PITCH" is
related to the baseball meaning of "bat," and is more appropriate at the early probe
point.® "CAVE" is related to the animal meaning of "bat," and is more appropriate
to the text at the late probe point. "FRUIT" is unrelated to either meaning of the
ambiguous word or the text.
Case I: Consistent bias at the early probe point
In this experiment, the theories of conditional retention and active suppression
are set up as opposing theories, so it is useful to compare the two theories' predictions
of the outcomes for the different conditions of this experiment. The predictions of the
subjects' responses at the early probe point, and the data gathered at this point are
summarized in Table 4.1. This table refers to three types of word stimuli. Correct
word stimuli are words related to the meaning of the ambiguous word that could
be integrated with context at the conclusion of the text. Incorrect word stimuli are
®An independent group of informants read the first sentence ofeach experimental text, which was
followed by the two target words that were semantically related to the ambiguous word at the end of
the sentence. The informants were asked to choose the word that was more related to the meaning
of the sentence, or to indicate that both words were equally related. A sentence was considered to
bias toward one of the target words if that word was chosen by the informants more than 80% of
the time.
consistent
bias
surrounds
(n=18)
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3
correct incorrect correct unrelated incorrect unrelated
CR 75 25 100 0 100 0
AS 100 0 100 0 50 50
data 61 39 89 11 94 6
conflicting
bias
surrounds
(n=27)
Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6
correct incorrect correct unrelated incorrect unrelated
CR 25 75 100 0 100 0
AS 0 100 50 50 100 0
data 33 67 70 30 85 15
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Table 4.1: Predictions and results at early probe point during forced choice task.
words related to the meaning of the ambiguous word that could not be integrated
with context at the conclusion of the text. Unrelated word stimuli are words that
were unrelated to either meaning of the ambiguous word at any point in the text.
The tables give predicted choices cis percentages of the total number of responses.
The first type of text reported in Table 4.1, called "consistent bias surrounds,"
was designed so that the context which occurs before the ambiguous word is encoun
tered biases towards one meaning of the ambiguous word. Thus, the reader will have
enough information from the text on which to base a decision, and will choose the
meaning which is more related to the previous context. The context which follows the
ambiguous words for these texts agrees with the context that precedes the ambiguous
words, so the meaning choice that was made remains correct throughout the text.
Conditional retention (CR) predicts that the unselected meaning of the ambigu
ous word will be retained throughout the text. Retention of the unselected meaning
will cause interference in the forced-choice task between the correct and incorrect
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probe words (Cell 1): the retained meaning will give the incorrect probe word some
non-zero probability of being selected, although the probability is less than that of the
correct probe word being selected. The simplest prediction about this interference
is that it will be reflected in 25% of the responses (the intermediate point between
a prediction of no interference, which would be reflected in 0% of the choices, and
complete interference, which would be reflected in 50% of the choices). However,
when the correct word is paired with the unrelated word (Cell 2), there is no reason
to select the unrelated word over the correct word; the unrelated word was never
considered and is not being retained. Therefore, the correct word should always be
chosen in this condition. When the incorrect word is paired with an unrelated word
(Cell 3), the incorrect word will always be chosen by virtue of its relationship to the
retained meaning of the ambiguous word.
Active suppression (AS) makes a different set of predictions. When a meaning
for the ambiguous word is selected, the unselected meaning will be actively sup
pressed. At the point of the forced-choice task, the suppressed meaning should have
no effect on the word chosen in the task. Thus, when the choice is between correct
and incorrect probe words (Cell 1), active suppression predicts that the correct word
will be chosen 100% of the time. There is no tendency to choose the incorrect word
because it is associated with the unselected meaning of the ambiguous word, which
was previously suppressed and causes no interference. When the choice is between
the correct probe word and the unrelated word (Cell 2), the subject again will always
choose the correct word. When the incorrect word is paired with the unrelated word
(Cell 3), there is no reason to suppose that the incorrect word is chosen with more
probability than the unrelated word.
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Sign tests were performed on individual cells to determine the significance of
the differences between the two stimuli presented to the subjects in each condition.
A sign test is a nonparametric statistical test that is useful when the data can be
defined eis the difference between a pair of qualitative measurements. The sign test
simply determines whether two population distributions are identical; in this case,
the population distributions are the proportion of one answer to the other in each
cell.
In these data, there are some cells that have statistically insignificant results,
according to the sign test, which nevertheless seem better predicted by one theory
or the other. To confirm such trends in the data, a binomial probability distribution
model of the data was used to compare the predictions of each theory to the data.
This was done by taking the data in a cell and finding the probability that the
prediction made by a theory is matched by the data.
For Cell 1, the sign test of the data did not show a significant difference be
tween the null hypothesis that there is no effect of context and stimulus type and
the theories' predictions that there will be some difference. However, the raw data
and predictions of each theory seem to favor the conditional retention theory. Using
the binomial probability distribution model to compare the two theories to the data,
it was determined that the conditional retention theory's prediction for Cell 1 ap
proaches significance, while the active suppression theory's prediction for this cell
does not.
In Cells 2 and 3, the sign test found significant differences in the proportions of
subjects' responses to the stimuli. The predicted proportion for Cell 2 was the same
for both theories, so the results in this cell do not support one theory over another.
However, for Cell 3, the predicted proportion for conditional retention was almost
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exactly matched. The prediction made by active suppression was not supported at
all.
Case II: Conflicting bias at the early probe point
The other type of text reported in Table 4.1, called "conflicting bias surrounds,"
was designed so that the context which occurs before the ambiguous word is encoun
tered biases towards one meaning of the ambiguous word. During the meaning deci
sion process for the ambiguous word, the meaning that fits better with the previous
context will be chosen. The context which follows the ambiguous words for these
texts disagrees with the context that precedes the ambiguous words, so the meaning
that is contextually appropriate at the early probe point will be inappropriate at the
end of the text. Correspondingly, the probe word that is correct at the end of the
text in in "consistent bias" texts is incorrect at the end of "conflicting bias" texts,
and the probe word that is incorrect in the former case is correct in the latter.
Because the forced-choice task is presented before the contradiction is encoun
tered, the two theories' predictions of the subjects' choices are exactly the same as
those in Case I above, but the designations of "correct" and "incorrect" are reversed.
Thus, the predictions in Cell 4 are the reverse of Cell 1, the predictions of Cell 5 are
the same as those of Cell 3, and the predictions in Cell 6 are the same as in Cell 2.
In Cell 4, conditional retention and active suppression both predict a significant
effect of context type and target type. The null hypothesis predicts that no such ef
fect will obtain. The sign test performed did not yield results that make it possible
to reject the null hypothesis. However, a binomial probability model used for anal
ysis indicates that the probability of the conditional retention theory matching the
observed data because of effect rather than chance is far greater than for the active
consistent
bias
surrounds
(n=18)
Cell 7 Cell 8 Cell 9
correct incorrect correct unrelated incorrect unrelated
CR 100 0 100 0 50 50
AS 100 0 100 0 50 50
data 100 0 94 6 61 39
conflicting
bias
surrounds
(n=27)
Cell 10 Cell 11 Cell 12
correct incorrect correct unrelated incorrect unrelated
CR 100 0 100 0 100 0
AS 0 100 50 50 100 0
data 59 41 89 11 78 22
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Table 4.2: Predictions and results at late probe point during forced choice task.
suppression theory. In other words, although the sign test does not show a significant
effect, the conditional retention theory provides a far better match to the data than
does the active suppression theory.
In Cells 5 and 6, the sign test found a significant difference between the pro
portions of the subjects' responses to the different stimuli. Conditional retention
predicted this difference in Cell 5, but active suppression did not. In Cell 6, both
theories predicted this difference.
Case III: Consistent bias at the late probe point
The predictions for the subjects' responses at the end of the experimental texts,
and the subjects' responses at that point are shown in Table 4.2. In the case of the
"consistent bias surrounds" texts, the ambiguous word is encountered at the end of
the first sentence, but the forced-choice task is not presented until the end of the
second sentence, which reinforces the contextual bias of the first sentence.
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One question that remains unanswered by the conditional retention theory is,
"For how long are unselected meanings retained?" As described in the following
chapter, ATLAST places a limit on the number of times that a retained inference
path, and the word sense contained within that path, can be re-evaluated. ATLAST
also suppresses all retained paths at the end of the text it is processing. However,
recent experimental data suggests that the duration of retention may be affected by
confirming or disconfirming evidence which follows the ambiguous word (Holbrook,
in preparation). The predictions for conditional retention in Table 4.2 reflects the
latter idea about retention duration. Thus, for "consistent bias surrounds" texts,
conditional retention predicts that retained meanings will be suppressed by the late
probe point because of the confirming evidence of the second sentence. Active sup
pression predicts that unselected meanings will be suppressed at the end of the first
sentence. Consequently, the conditional retention and active suppression theories pre
dict the same results for all three experimental conditions in the case of "consistent
bias surrounds" texts, as explained below.
Given a choice between the correct probe word and the incorrect probe word
(Cell 7), both theories predict that the subject will always choose the correct word.
The active suppression theory predicts this result because the unselected meaning
of the ambiguous word, which is related to the incorrect probe word, will have been
suppressed shortly after the ambiguity was encountered. The conditional retention
theory proposes a different course of events with the same result. The unselected
meaning is retained for a period of time during the reading of the second sentence.
The second sentence reaflBrms the subject's decision about the meaning of the am
biguous word and forces suppression of the retained meaning. Both theories predict
that the subject will select the correct word over the unrelated word (Cell 8). Given
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a choice between the incorrect word and the unrelated word (Cell 9), both theories
predict that there is an equal probability of choosing either word.
The data supported the predictions in Cells 7 and 8 that there would be sig
nificant differences in the subjects' responses. The data also seem to support the
prediction in Cell 9 that there would be no significant difference in this condition,
but the analysis of the data did not reject the possibility that a significant difference
does exist.
Case rV: Conflicting bias at the late probe point
In the case of "conflicting bias surrounds" texts with the forced-choice task
presented at the end of the text (Table 4.2), the differences between the two the
ories become apparent once more. Here, as in Case II above, the second sentence
contradicts the subject's meaning selection for the ambiguous word at the end of the
first sentence. In order to interpret the text correctly, the subject must revise his
or her original meaning selection for the ambiguous word. Unlike Case II, however,
the forced-choice task is presented after the subject has read the contradictory text.
This contradiction discourages suppression of the unselected but retained meanings,
which in turn allows the subject to revise the meaning selection. The effects of this
revision should be apparent in the data if the conditional retention theory is correct,
but the revision should not be reflected in the data if the active suppression theory
is correct.
When presented with a choice between the correct probe word and the incorrect
probe word (Cell 10), the conditional retention theory predicts that the subject will
choose the correct word at the late probe point. The active suppression theory, on
the other hand, predicts that the subject will choose the incorrect word, because
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this word is related to the only meaning of the ambiguous word that is available to
the subject at this point: the meaning that was appropriate at the end of the first
sentence but is now inappropriate.
Conditional retention predicts that the subject will choose the correct word over
an unrelated word (Cell 11). Active suppression, however, predicts that there will be
an equal probability of choosing either the correct word or the unrelated word. This
should occur, if the active suppression theory is correct, because the probe word that
is correct at the end of the second sentence is semantically related to the meaning of
the ambiguous word that was not selected at the end of the first sentence and has
now been suppressed. From an active suppression standpoint, a word that is related
to a suppressed meaning is no more likely to be chosen than a word which is not
related to the text.
Finally, both theories predict that the subject will select the incorrect probe
word over the unrelated word (Cell 12). The conditional retention theory makes
this prediction because the incorrect word is semantically related to the meaning of
the ambiguous word that was originally selected but is now retained. The active
suppression theory makes this prediction because the incorrect word is semantically
related to the ambiguous word meaning that was first selected and is still active, all
other meanings having been suppressed.
Although the raw data in Cell 10 lean toward the conditional retention theory,
the data are not sufficient to reject the hypothesis that there is no significant differ
ence between the choice of the correct and incorrect probe words. Using a binomial
probability model, neither theory provided a good fit with the data.
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Cells 11 and 12 provided a better fit with the existing theories. For Cell 11,
a significant difference between the word choices obtained. Conditional retention
predicted that there would be such a significant difference, but active suppression
predicted that there would be no significant difference. For Cell 12, a significant dif
ference between the word choices also obtained. This Wcis predicted by both theories.
Discussion of the results
The two theories predicted different results in six of the twelve different test
conditions shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2: Cells 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11. Analysis of the
data showed that the conditional retention theory predicted the results better than
the active suppression theory did in five of the six cells. The analysis of the data in
Cell 10 provided no support for either theory. It is not surprising, however, that this
was so, because the forced-choice t<isk in this condition should have been the most
difficult for the subjects. This was the only condition in which the forced-choice task
came after the contradictory text and both probe words were related to meanings of
the ambiguous word. Consequently, the processing load here would be greater than
in any other condition.
Overall, the weight of the evidence from this experiment clearly supports the
conditional retention theory. The evidence from another experiment, which is dis
cussed next, also lends support to conditional retention, although it suggests a mech
anism which differs from the one proposed in this dissertation.
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4.4.2 Burgess and Simpson
A different view of retention in language understanding is offered by Burgess
and Simpson (1988). They studied the contribution of each hemisphere of the brain
to lexical ambiguity resolution. While it is well accepted that the left hemisphere
has a major role in language processing, the role of the right hemisphere is unclear.
Burgess and Simpson found that the time course of activation of the meanings of an
ambiguous word differed profoundly between the two hemispheres.
Subjects in Burgess and Simpson's experiment were presented with lexical de
cision tasks using a divided visual field methodology. Subjects were visually primed
with an ambiguous word displayed on a computer terminal for 35 msec. The priming
word was masked for either 0 or 715 msec, after which the target word was displayed,
on the terminal. The target was visible for 185 msec, then was masked for 50 msec,
and then the screen went blank. The targets were related to the prime through the
dominant or subordinate meaning of the prime. The twist to this experiment is that
the target word was randomly presented either 2 degrees to the left or right of the
point where the prime appeared. The duration of the target word's appearance on
the screen is too briefto permit the eyes to move to the target, so a target presented
on the left side of the screen appears only in the left visual field and is projected to
the right hemisphere. Conversely, a target on the right side of the screen appears
only in the right visual field and is projected to the left hemisphere.
Burgess and Simpson found that the time course of activation for the different
meanings in the left hemisphere agreed with the results of another study in which
the targets were presented to both visual fields simultaneously (Simpson & Burgess,
1985): the dominant or more frequently used meaning was facilitated at both 35 and
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750 msec, while the subordinate or less frequently used meaning showed less facili
tation at 35 msec and no facilitation at 750 msec. In fact, at 750 msec the subjects'
responses to related subordinate targets were slower than their responses to unre
lated trials, leading to the conclusion that the subordinate meaning was inhibited or
actively suppressed by that time. In the right hemisphere, on the other hand, facilita
tion for the dominant meaning decreased between 35 and 750 msec while facilitation
for the subordinate meaning increased significantly over that same time period.
These results, say Burgess and Simpson, suggest a mechanism in which the
left hemisphere calls upon the right hemisphere to access memory information when
necessary. But when would such a mechanism be needed? Burgess and Simpson spec
ulate that when an ambiguous word is embedded in a sentence but the choice of mean
ing is not constrained by the preceding context, it would be costly for the lajiguage
understander to allow the subordinate meaning become inactiveeither through decay
or suppression. For example, consider the following sentence (Burgess &: Simpson,
1988, p. 419):
The man stood by the bank for the better part of an hour before catching a
fish worth taking home.
The text following the ambiguous word "bank" supports the choice of the subordi
nate meaning (i.e., land at the edge of a body of water) instead of the dominant
meaning (i.e., a place where money is kept). If the subordinate meaning is inactive
when the word "fish" is read, that meaning must be reactivated for processing to
continue successfully. If, however, that meaning maintains activation in the right
hemisphere, the understander could access the correct meaning at the appropriate
time without incurring the cost of reactivating the meaning. In short. Burgess and
Simpson propose that "the role of the right hemisphere is to provide the less frequent
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meaning when needed by context after inhibitory processes in the left hemisphere
have caused activation for the subordinate meaning to decline" (p. 421).
ATLAST does not specifically account for potential processing differences be
tween hemispheres of the brain. Nevertheless, ATLAST's premise that retention of a
word meaning is distinct from its activation is certainly compatible with Burgess and
Simpson's theory that activation and retention are fundamentally the same process
carried out by different hemispheres. Their finding that the time course of activa
tion when materials are presented to the left hemisphere looks very much like the
time course obtained when materials are presented simultaneously to both hemi
spheres indicates that the right hemisphere's behavior is obscured by that of the left
hemisphere; this would explain why retention hcis gone undetected by lexical access
experiments in which the targets are presented to both visual fields simultaneously.
4.5 Conclusion
The theory of conditional retention offers an explanation for psycholinguistic
phenomena which most theories of lexical disambiguation fail to address: recovery
from erroneous lexical inferences. The one other theory which addresses this is
sue, that of Carpenter and Daneman (1981), relies on a retention-like mechanism
to recover from mistakes while using reprocessing and concedes a non-reprocessing
heuristic which also shares some features with conditional retention. As we have
seen, the experiments often cited in support of the active suppression theory, and
which sorhe might view as arguments against conditional retention, do not test for
conditional retention. Neither do the actual results of those experiments contradict
any assumptions of the conditional retention theory. Furthermore, the results of two
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other experiments lend support to the theory of conditional retention. These facts
lead to the conclusion that the theory of conditional retention is currently the best
available explanation of lexical ambiguity resolution and error recovery in human
language understanding.
Chapter 5
Lexical Inference Processing:
Implementation
5.1 Lexical disambiguation and recovery
This chapter describes at length the operation of ATLAST as it processes this
shortened version of Text 3:
Text 5: The embassy searched for bugs.
The secretaries had seen roaches.
Text 5 is similar to those used in the experiment to test the conditional retention
theory (Holbrook Eiselt, in preparation), which was described in the previous
chapter. The texts in this experiment were designed to establish a context that
strongly biases for one meaning of a target ambiguous word and then contradicts that
meaning, thus forcing the understander to supplant its original choice ofmeaning with
a new one. In the case of Text 5, the context invoked by the reading of "embassy"
forces the understander, ATLAST, to choose the "hidden microphones" meaning of
the word "bugs." After reading the word "roaches" at the end of the second sentence,
however, ATLAST recognizes that its initial choice of meaning is incorrect and that
"insects" is the correct interpretation of "bugs."
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Text 5 IS the subjGct of considGrs-blG discussion throughout this dissortsition
(it appears again in Chapter 7), as it provides a good illustration of ATLAST's
capabilities. It is not, however, the only text on which ATLAST has been tested.
Additional examples are shown at the end of this chapter and in Appendix A. As of
this writing, ATLAST has been tested successfully on more than sixty texts of one
to four sentences in length, based on six different scenarios. What follows is actual
run-time output generated by ATLAST during the processing of Text 5. For the sake
of brevity, much of the output has been deleted, leaving only the more interesting
parts. A diagram of the corresponding memory structure for Text 5 is shown in
Figure 5.1.
5.2 ATLAST is fooled
5.2.1 Metrics and parameters
ATLAST is designed to serve as a framework for testing theories of lexical
disambiguation and error recovery, not as a robust language processing system. As
such, ATLAST has a number of parameters that can be adjusted to manipulate its
processing behavior. ATLAST presents a summary of its parameter settings before
beginning work on the input text.
Input text is:
The embassy searched for bugs.
The secretaries had seen roaches.
Ordering of inference evaluation metrics in force:
MORE-ACTIVATION-METRIC
SHORTER-PATH-METRIC
'embassy
embassy
instance
goal
A-secrets
plan
find-
secrets
role
filler
secret
'secrets'
gov't-
agency
goal
P-security
plan
/"^Tind^
( security-
instance V L J
vJiazar^
instance
role
filler
microphone
'microphones'
'searched'
viewed as
search
plan step
^stance
instance
find-
object
role
object
'seen'
see
plan step
instance
nstance
Figure 5.1: Memory network for Text 5.
'secretaries'
secretary
part
generic-
employer
goal
P-health
plan
find-
health-
Jiazard
role
filler
insect
'roaches
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MORE-REINFORCEMENT-METRIC
MORE-SPECIFIC-METRIC
NO-DECISION-METRIC
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The inference evaluation metrics are used by ATLAST's filter to compare two
competing inference paths and select the better one, as described in Chapter 3. The
order in which the metrics are applied directly affects ATLAST's interpretation of
a given text; the ordering is determined by the user. The ordering of the first four
metrics listed above is the only ordering of those metrics that results in acceptable
interpretations for the texts on which ATLAST has been tested, but this is not
necessarily the one true ordering of evaluation metrics. As ATLAST is tested on
more examples, the need for additional metrics or changes to the existing ones will
most likely become apparent. As these new or revised metrics are added, different
orderings of the metrics may also be required.
The last metric in the list, the no-decision metric, is invoked only when the
previously applied metrics fail to select one of the competing paths. Therefore, the
no-decision metric, which selects neither competing path but retains them both for
later re-evaluation, is always the la^t metric in the ordering.
Maximum distance of marker-passing: 3
Distance to pass markers per cycle: 3
The two parameters above pertain to ATLAST's proposer. The first parameter
indicates that the spread of activation via marker-passing will be limited to a distance
of three nodes away from the point of origin. If this limit were decreased, ATLAST
would be unable to correctly interpret Text 5 because one of the inference paths
essential to understanding this text consists of six links. On the other hand, if this
limit were increased, ATLAST would still find the correct interpretation but at the
expense of doing a significantly greater amount of work.
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The second parameter indicates that markers will be parsed a distance of three
nodes away from the origin each time that the proposer is invoked (i.e., whenever
an open class word is processed). In other words, the values of the two parameters
taken together mean that all marker-passing for a given open class word will be done
before the next word is processed. While ATLAST works very well when the marker-
passing for an input word is performed over multiple cycles while other words are
being processed, eye-movement studies have resulted in the conclusion that all the
processing for an input word is completed before the next word is read (Carpenter Sz
Daneman, 1981), so ATLAST is working under that constraint.
Are rejected paths being retained?: t
Max. no. of unsuccessful evaluations: 5
Min. no. of shared nodes to force re-evaluation: 4
This set of parameters controls the retention process that gives ATLAST its
error correction ability. The first of these says that inference paths which are eval
uated, but not incorporated into ATLAST's interpretation, are to be retained. The
second parameter sets a limit on the retention of inference paths. In this case, a re
tained path may be re-evaluated no more than five consecutive times without being
activated. If the path is re-evaluated a sixth time with no success, it is suppressed.
The third parameter determines how retained paths will be chosen for re-
evaluation. When the proposer suggests a path to the filter for evaluation, the filter
examines the set of retained paths to find those paths that are sufficiently related to
the path suggested by the proposer. These related, retained paths then will also be
evaluated by the filter. For this example, a retained path must share a subpath of at
least four nodes with the path suggested by the proposer to qualify for re-evaluation.
(If either path has fewer nodes than the limit, the shorter path must be entirely
contained within the longer path for re-evaluation to occur.)
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Are function words being allocated processing cycles?: nil
Is inference processing forced to complete at periods?: t
The last two parameters control how the processing cycles of the proposer and
the filter are allocated. The value of the first parameter above means that marker-
passing and path evaluation are not performed when function, or closed class, words
are processed. The value of the second parameter means that all processing of a
sentence is forced to completion at the end of the sentence. In other words, any
"loose ends" are resolved as much as possible.
5.2.2 ATLAST begins work
After ATLAST displays the constraints under which it is working, it begins
processing the input text. ATLAST attaches a *START* symbol to the beginning of
a text. Processing this symbol initializes ATLAST.
Processing begins
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *START*
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (start)
Filter:
Received capsule: (start)
Begin processing of eventO
ATLAST then reads the first word of the input. No nodes are activated, no
markers are passed, and there are no paths to evaluate. The capsulizer's intra-phrasal
syntactic analysis suggests that a noun phrase is coming.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: The
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No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Begin sentence
Begin noun phrase
ATLAST now processes embassy, the first open class word. The corresponding
node in memory is activated and the proposer begins passing markers from there.
Because no other open class words have been processed, the proposer cannot find
any potential inference paths at this time.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: embassy
Proposer:
Initializing EMBASSY
Passing markerO from EMBASSY to GOVT-AGENCY as markerl
Passing markerl from GOVT-AGENCY to A-SECRETS as marker2
Passing markerl from GOVT-AGENCY to P-SECURITY as markers
Passing markerl from GOVT-AGENCY to GENERIC-EMPLOYER as marker4
Passing marker2 from A-SECRETS to FIND-SECRETS as markerS
markers too old to be passed further
Passing markers from P-SECURITY to FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
as markers
markers too old to be passed further
Passing marker4 from GENERIC-EMPLOYER to P-HEALTH as marker/
marker/ too old to be passed further
Passing marker4 from GENERIC-EMPLOYER to SECRETARY as markers
markers too old to be passed further
5.2.3 Proposing possible inference paths
The next word, searched, is a verb. This tells the capsulizer that it has reached
the end of the noun phrase it was parsing. The capsulizer informs the filter that it has
parsed a noun phrase and that the head noun activated the node labeled EMBASSY.
The capuslizer now expects a verb phrase.
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The proposer passes markers outward from the node SEARCH and finds intersec
tions with the markers passed previously from EMBASSY. These intersections represent
paths to be evaluated by the filter.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: searched
Sending capsule: (nphrase (EMBASSY))
End noun phrase
Begin verb phrase
Proposer:
Initializing SEARCH
Passing markers from SEARCH to FIND-OBJECT as markerlO
Passing markerlO from FIND-GBJECT to OBJECT as markerll
Passing markerlO from FIND-OBJECT to SEE as markerl2
Passing markerlO from FIND-OBJECT to FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
as markerlS
Proposing path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
Passing markerlO from FIND-OBJECT to FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
as markerl4
Passing markerlO from FIND-OBJECT to FIND-SECRETS as markerlS
Proposing path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
Passing markerll from OBJECT to MICROPHONE as markerlS
markerlS too old to be passed further
Passing markerll from OBJECT to INSECT as markerlT
markerl? too old to be passed further
Passing markerll from OBJECT to SECRET as markerlS
markerlS too old to be passed further
Passing markerll from OBJECT to LAMP as markerlS
markerlS too old to be passed further
Passing markerll from OBJECT to WEAPON as marker20
marker20 too old to be passed further
Passing markerll from OBJECT to POSSESS-OBJECT as marker21
marker21 too old to be passed further
Passing markerlS from FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD to P-SECURITY
as maxker22
Proposing path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
marker22 too old to be passed further
Passing markerlS from FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD to MICROPHONE
as marker2S
marker2S too old to be passed further
Passing markerl4 from FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD to P-HEALTH as marker24
Proposing path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
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marker24 too old to be passed further
Passing markerl4 from FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD to INSECT as marker25
marker25 too old to be passed further
Passing markerlS from FIND-SECRETS to A-SECRETS as marker26
Proposing path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
marker26 too old to be passed further
Passing markerlS from FIND-SECRETS to SECRET as marker27
marker27 too old to be passed further
The proposer is a relatively boring process. From this point on, everything that
the proposer does will look just like what it has done so far, except that different nodes
and different markers will be involved, so the remainder of the proposer's output has
been omitted.
5.2.4 Evaluating proposed paths
The filter expects that the first noun phrase ATLAST encounters will probably
represent the actor in the sentence being processed, so the filter assigns the node
labeled EMBASSY to the actor role. The filter also evaluates the paths that werefound
by the proposer.
Filter:
Received capsule: (nphrase (EMBASSY))
Filling actor slot in eventO with EMBASSY
The first inference path that the filter evaluates is given the name pathO. Since
no other paths are currently active, pathO has no competitors. Thus, pathO is
ATLAST's first addition to the set of active paths.
New path discovered: pathO
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
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P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Activating pathO
The next path, pathl, has the same endpoints as pathO. Therefore, it competes
with the active pathO as a possible explanation of the relationship between the nodes
EMBASSY and SEARCH. The filter compares the two paths but its metrics do not prefer
one over the other. The no-decision metric is invoked, leaving both paths de-activated
but retained. Again, there are no active paths. This is done with the expectation
that evaluating other paths during this cycle will alter the context provided by the
set of active paths such that a later comparison between pathO and pathl will result
in a decision.
New path discovered: pathl
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plaui step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECRETS
FIND-SECRETS is a plan of A-SECRETS
A-SECRETS is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
No-decision metric — pathO and pathl are retained
De-activating pathO
De-activating pathl
The filter now evaluates path2, which also joins SEARCH and EMBASSY. Although
pathO and pathl share the same endpoints as path2, they are not currently active
and therefore do not compete with path2. Path 2 is activated, but only briefly as
the proposer has rediscovered pathl. Now pathl is evaluated against path2, and the
filter finds that pathl is more specific than path2. That is, path2 requires that the
embassy be viewed abstractly as a generic employer for its explanation of the text
to be plausible while pathl requires no such abstraction. Pathl is now added to
ATLAST's active interpretation and path2 is de-activated and retained.
103
New path discovered: path2
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEA'LTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER can be viewed as GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Activating path2
However, in the process of re-evaluating pathl, the filter is also reminded that
an earlier comparison between pathl and pathO resulted in a tie or split decision.
Attempting to verify that pathl should be active now, the filter compares it to pathO
and again finds that it cannot make a decision between the two.
Old path rediscovered: pathl
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to tie with pathl
More-specific metric — pathl more specific than path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathl
No-decision metric — pathl and pathO are retained
De-activating pathl
De-activating pathO
ATLAST then moves on to the next word, the preposition for, which has no
semantic representation in ATLAST's memory. As a result, no marker-pa.ssing is
initiated and no new paths are proposed. This function word does tell the capsulizer
that it is now processing a modifying phrase, so the capsulizer informs the filter that
it has seen a verb, and that the node labeled SEARCH was activated by that verb. The
filter then fills the action role with a pointer to that node.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: for
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (vphrase (SEARCH))
Begin prepositional phrase
Filter;
Received capsule: (vphrase (SEARCH))
Filling action slot in eventO with SEARCH
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5.2.5 Encounter with an ambiguous word
Now, ATLAST reads the word bugs. The capsulizer recognizes two different
meanings for the word, so the proposer begins searching for possible inference paths
from the nodes representing both meanings.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: bugs
Ambiguous word senses noted: (INSECT MICROPHONE)
The filter then begins to evaluate the paths found by the proposer. The first
path, paths, has no competing path in ATLAST's interpretation so it is activated.
New path discovered: pathS
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
INSECT is sin instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Activating pathS
The next path evaluated, path4, competes with pathS. The filter's evaluation
metrics cannot determine which path offers the better explanation of the input, so
paths and path4 axe both de-activated and retained.
New path discovered: path4
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is am instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
No-decision metric — pathS and path4 are retained
De-activating pathS
De-activating path4
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The filter now evaluates two paths which connect MICROPHONE to SEARCH. There
is no active path competing with pathS so it is added to the interpretation. Path5 now
provides competition for the next path to be evaluated, path6. Again the comparison
ends in a split decision.
New path discovered: pathS
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Activating pathS
New path discovered: path6
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plain step SEARCH
No-decision metric — pathS and pathS are retained
De-activating pathS
De-activating path6
The filter finds no active path to compete with the next new path, path?,
and adds it to the interpretation of the text. The previously retained pathO shares
at least four nodes with path? so it is re-evaluated. Finding no active competing
path, the filter activates pathO. As before, the filter re-evaluates pathl because of its
previous tie with pathO and is still unable to choose one. PathO and pathl are again
de-activated and retained and path? is the only active path.
New path discovered: path?
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to shared nodes with path?
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to tie with pathO ^
Activating path?
Activating pathO
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No-decision metric — pathO aind pathl are retained
De-activating pathO
De-activating pathl
The next new path, pathS, connects the nodes INSECT and EMBASSY, but it
competes with path?, which connects MICROPHONE and EMBASSY, because the filter
knows that the differing endpoints were activated by the same word, although it
does not know what that word was. Thus, the filter regards path? and pathS as
different explanations for the same two words from the input text and evaluates them
accordingly. The filter determines that the relationship described by path? is more
specific than that described by pathS, so pathS is de-activated and retained. Also,
path2 is found to share the requisite number of nodes is path? and is re-evaluated.
Because it has no active competing paths, path2 is activated.
New path discovered: pathS
Path from INSECT to EMBASSY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER can be viewed as GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with pathS
More-specific metric — path? more specific than pathS
De-activating pathS
Activating path2
At this point, ATLAST's interpretation is inconsistent in that path? views the
embassy as a government agency with a goal of preserving its security but path2 sees
the embassy as an employer with a goal of preserving the health of its employees.
This inconsistency will be resolved as more retained paths are re-evaluated.
The filter evaluates path9, connecting INSECT to SEARCH, and, finding no active
competing path, proceeds to add it to the active interpretation. In evaluating path9,
the filter finds that path6 is sufficiently similar to path9 and re-evaluates that path.
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Path6 also competes with path9, and the filter determines that path6 is a better
choice than path9 because path6 is shorter than path9.
Path5 is re-evaluated because of its earlier tie with path6. Path6 shares more
nodes with the other active paths than does path5, so pathS is de-activated and
retained. In other words, the combination of path6, path?, and path2 provides a more
parsimonious interpretation of the text than path5, path?, and path2 (cf. Granger,
1980b). The active paths are now path2, pathO, and path?, but the interpretation is
still inconsistent because of the conflicting explanations of the embcissy and its goals
represented by paths 2 and 7.
New path discovered: path9
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
INSECT is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance MICROPHONE
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to shared nodes with path9
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to tie with path6
Activating path9
Shorter-path metric — path6 shorter than path9
De-activating path9
Activating path6
More-reinforcement metric — path6 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
5.2.6 An is-a intersection
Path9 is notable also because it contains what others have called an is-a inter
section (Charniak, 1983) or is-a plateau (Hendler, 1986). An is-a intersection exists
when two nodes are joined to a third node by is-a links, indicating that the first two
nodes represent different instantiations of the concept denoted by the third node.
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For example, an is-a intersection would occur in a network which represented that a
canary and a robin are two different instantiations of a bird. ATLAST's is-a links are
pairs of has-instance and instance-of links. The is-a intersection in path9 occurs at
the node OBJECT. Such intersections may be uninformative, especially if they occur
near the top of an is-a hierarchy where nodes may be linked to many other nodes.
Marker-passing systems which allow markers to travel in only one direction along
is-a links, such as DMAP (Riesbeck & Martin, 1986), are not bothered by paths with
is-a intersections because they never find them. Hirst's ABSITY (1988b) protects
itself from being swamped by an overabundance of these paths through the use of an
anti-promiscuity rule which prevents markers from propagating from nodes with more
than some small number of links; this allows is-a intersections to occur only in the
lower portions of an is-a hierarchy where they will be more specific and more infor
mative. Hendler (1986) recognizes that these intersections may be useful in language
understanding, but he says they serve no useful purpose in problem solving, and his
SCRAPS problem solving system rejects any path containing an is-a intersection. At
this time, ATLAST gives no special attention to paths with is-a intersections because
the evaluation metrics so far have eliminated such paths from the interpretation when
appropriate. Also, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, a path with an is-a
intersection is sometimes the only path which makes any sense of the input.
5.2.7 Finding consistency
As the filter processes pathlS, it is reminded of the retained pathO because of its
similarity to pathl3. PathO is evaluated against its competing active path, path2, and
is found to provide a better explanation of the text than path2. Subsequently, pathl
is re-evaluated because of its earlier tie with pathO but is found to be less explanatory
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than pathO. The active interpretation is now pathO, path6, and path?, and is entirely
consistent in its representation: the embassy is a government agency with the inferred
goal of preserving security, and the action of searching for microphones is part of a
plan for achieving that goal.
New path discovered: pathl3
Path from INSECT to EMBASSY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to shared nodes with pathiS
Also reconsidering (pathi) due to tie with pathO
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathl3
De-activating pathi3
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
than path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathO
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
than pathl
De-activating pathl
5.2.8 A retained path is suppressed
As processing continues, the filter evaluates several new paths and a few redis
covered paths. The evaluation of these new and rediscovered paths in turn results
in the re-evaluation of a number of related retained paths. These evaluations do
not cause any changes in ATLAST's interpretation. They do, however, allow the fil
ter reduce its overhead by suppressing or eliminating retained paths. When the filter
evaluates the rediscovered path20, it also re-evaluates the related pathl. Because this
is the sixth time that pathl has been re-evaluated, and because ATLAST's relevant
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parameter says that a retained path can "lose" a maximum of five evaluations, pathl
is suppressed. This means that ATLAST no longer ha.s any memory of this particular
path being discovered. If the proposer later finds the same sequence of nodes and
links in memory, it will be treated 85 an entirely new path. The benefit gained by
eliminating pathl is that ATLAST's workload is reduced: memory requirements are
reduced because ATLAST no longer keeps track of pathl, and processing require
ments are reduced because fewer retained paths means fewer possible re-evaluations
of retained paths. Of course, the trick is to eliminate cis many retained paths as
possible without eliminating too many. If the wrong path is eliminated, ATLAST
will be unable to recover from its inference error.
New path discovered: path20
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance SECRET
SECRET is a role-filler of FIND-SECRETS
FIND-SECRETS is a plan of A-SECRETS
A-SECRETS is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instaince EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (pathlB pathlS pathl4 pathl pathl9 pathl2) due
to shared nodes with path20
Shorter-path metric — pathT shorter than path20
De-activating path20
Shorter-path metric — path7 shorter than pathlS
De-activating pathlS
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathlS
De-activating pathlS
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathl4
De-activating path14
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
them pathl
De-activating pathl
Suppressing pathl
Shorter-path metric ~ path? shorter thain pathl9
De-activating pathl9
Shorter-path metric — pathS shorter than pathl2
De-activating pathl2
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5.2.9 Wrapping up the first sentence
The capsulizer reads the period that indicates the end of the first sentence, as
well as the prepositional phrase and the verb phrase that the capsulizer was parsing.
The capsule that tells the filter about the prepositional phrase also informs the filter
that the object of the preposition is ambiguous.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *PERIOD»
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (pphrase (INSECT MICROPHONE))
End prepositional phrase
End verb phrase
End sentence
Sending capsule: (term)
The filter assigns the ambiguous object of theprepositional phrase to the object
slot of the event being processed. The filter attempts to resolve the ambiguity by
examining the active paths to determine if one of the meanings can be eliminated.
In this case, no active paths include the INSECT node, so the corresponding meaning
for the ambiguous word bugs is removed from the object slot of the event frame.
Filter:
Received capsule: (pphrase (INSECT MICROPHONE))
Filling object slot in eventO with INSECT vs. MICROPHONE
Received capsule: (term)
End processing of eventO
Begin processing of event1
No active paths exist through INSECT
Removing INSECT from object slot in eventO
ATLAST has now completed processing of the first sentence of the text. The
interpretation for this sentence consists of two parts: three paths in ATLAST's mem
ory network, which result from the semanticanalysis and are displayed in Figure 5.2,
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Figure 5.2: Active memory network after processing the first sentence of Text 5.
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and the assignment of three of the nodes in those paths to thematic roles, which
is done through the syntactic analysis. This independence of semantic and syntac
tic processing gives ATLAST the ability to process text strings that appear to have
meaning but no structure, as well as sentences that have structure but no meaning.
TJiis capability will be demonstrated later in this chapter. In order to select the three
paths that make up the active interpretation, ATLAST has examined a total of 23
paths, of which 17 have been retained and 3 have been suppressed.
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathO path6 path7)
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instaince FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURin' is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (EMBASSY)
Action: (SEARCH)
Object: (MICROPHONE)
Direction: nil
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5.3 Intermission
Despite the pages of output, what has happened so far is actually very simple.
Essentially, the competition between path? and pathS was decided by ATLAST's
preference for specific over abstract relationships. This decision established a context
in which other paths were evaluated, creating an expectation that the embassy's
search had more to do with espionage than more mundane, management-related
goals. Consequently, the word bugs was interpreted as hidden microphones instead
of insects.
With regard to what has been demonstrated so far, it is accurate to say that
ATLAST is quite similar to other recent NLU systems that employ spreading acti
vation. While the implementation differs greatly, the philosophy remains the same:
use spreading activation techniques to search a relational memory network for con
nections between the words from a text, and then select the connections that best
represent the intended meaning of the text. The resolution of ambiguity is simply a
by-product of the selection mechanism. However, the selection mechanism may be
misled and make incorrect choices. The ability to recover from these errors is what
distinguishes ATLAST from other spreading activation systems.
5.4 ATLAST recovers
5.4.1 Beginning the second sentence
The processing of the second sentence is very much like the processing of the
first sentence, at least until the end of the sentence. As before, the capsulizer begins
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by reading the first word, The, which is processed in exactly the same way as it was
previously. Because The is a function word, no marker-passing is initiated. ATLAST
interprets this word as carrying only syntactic information.^
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: The
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Begin sentence
Begin noun phrase
The next word, secretaries, initiates marker-passing and several paths are
proposed. The filter, however, does not evaluate any of them because of the con
straints on what constitutes an acceptable path. Before the filter evaluates a pro
posed path, the path is examined to see if its endpoints represent words from two
different sentences which, as described previously in Chapter 3, ATLAST assumes
to represent two different events or states. If the endpoints represent words from a
single sentence, the filter evaluates the path. If the endpoints come from different
sentences, the path must contain a causal or intentional link, and its endpoints must
be nodes representing actions or states if the path is to be evaluated. This constraint
enforces the assumption that the primary semantic relationship between two events
or states is a causal or intentional relationship (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977). The
paths found by the proposer at this point do not meet this constraint; for example, a
proposed path between SECRETARY and SEARCH is not evaluated because SECRETARY
is neither an action nor a state. Consequently, the filter is idle and there are no
changes to the interpretation.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: secretaries
^Actually, the word "the" does have semantic content. For example, "the" can denote a par
ticular person, thing, or group that was previously referred to in the text or, as in this case, it
can denote something which was not previously mentioned but is not unexpected in the current
context. ATLAST is not yet sophisticated enough to handle the semantic subtleties involved here,
so it ignores them.
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5.4.2 Connecting to the previous sentence
Now the capsulizer encounters the word had, which is is syntactically ambigu
ous. For example, it can be a verb indicating possession or it can be an auxiliary
verb used in conjunction with another verb. The former interpretation requires that
had be treated as an open class word triggering additional marker-passing, while the
latter interpretation requires only that it be regarded as a function word. This re
search concentrates on the resolution of semantic ambiguity, so ATLAST does not
know how to resolve syntactic ambiguity. For this example, ATLAST has been in
structed to treat had as a function word. Meanwhile, the filter assigns the node
labeled SECRETARY to the actor role in eventl.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: had
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (nphrase (SECRETARY))
End noun phrase
Begin verb phrase
Filter:
Received capsule: (nphrase (SECRETARY))
Filling actor slot in eventl with SECRETARY
The capsulizer now processes the verb seen. Having previously determined
that had is an auxiliary verb, the capsulizer tells the filter that the sequence of events
intended by the text does not correspond to the order in which they have been stated
in the text. The capsulizer interprets the construct had followed by a verb as an
indicator that the event currently being processed actually occurred prior to the
event previously processed. The filter postpones changing the temporal order of the
chain of events until the processing of eventl is completed. The filter also activates
the one path, path23, that connects the two events via intentional links. In this
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case, the two events, SEE and SEARCH, are interpreted as components of a single plan,
FIND-OBJECT.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: seen
Sending reorder message; current frame is event 1
Filter:
New path discovered: path23
Path from SEE to SEARCH
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plam step SEARCH
Activating path23
5.4.3 Continuing with the second sentence
The next two paths represent possible relationships between the words, see and
secretaries. The first one, path24, is activated because it is the only path so far
that connects these two words. Path24 is quickly de-activated in favor of path25,
however, as the latter path fits better with the other active paths.
New path discovered: path24
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instauice FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with path24
Activating path24
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
them path2
De-activating path2
New path discovered; path25
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
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FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Also reconsidering (pathl7 pathlS path21) due to shared nodes
with path25
More-reinforcement metric — path25 has more shared nodes
than path24
De-activating path24
Activating path25
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathl?
De-activating pathl?
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathl3
De-activating pathl3
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than path21
De-activating path21
By the time ATLAST has finished processing seen, a total of 27 paths have
been discovered and evaluated. ATLAST's active interpretation includes 5 paths and
is consistent in its assumption of the espionage theme. Of the remaining 22 paths,
19 are still retained and 3 have been suppressed.
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path25 path23 pathO path6 path?)
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-QBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from SEE to SEARCH
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plain step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is am instsmce of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plam step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
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5.4.4 A contradiction forces a new interpretation
The last word of the second sentence, roaches, is a noun and indicates that
the capsulizer is no longer processing a verb phrase. The capsulizer so informs the
filter, and the filter assigns the node labeled SEE to the action role of the current
event frame.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: roaches
Sending capsule: (vphrase (SEE))
Begin noun phrase
Filter:
Received capsule: (vphrase (SEE))
Filling action slot in eventl with SEE
More importantly, the word roaches reveals that ATLAST's interpretation of
the text is incorrect; the embassy is looking for insects insteadofhidden microphones.
The marker-passing that is initiated by the proposer in response to this word results
in the re-evaluation of several retained paths. The first of these retained paths to
be re-evaluated, path3, joins INSECT to SEARCH. Path3 is compared to its active
competitor, pathfi, which joins MICROPHONE to SEARCH. Because the node INSECT has
now been activated by two words from the input text, bugs and roaches, and the
node MICROPHONE has been activated only by the word bugs, path3 is selected as
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the better path and path6 is de-activated and retained. The filter then re-evaluates
path4, which also joins the nodes INSECT and SEARCH, and is again unable to make
a decision between these two paths, so both paths are de-activated and retained.
Old path rediscovered: pathS
Also reconsidering (path4) due to tie with pathS
More-activation metric — pathS has more activation than path6
De-activating pathS
Activating pathS
No-decision metric — pathS and path4 are retained
De-activating pathS
De-activating path4
The filter evaluates two new paths that connect INSECT to SEE. The first of
these, path27, has no active competitor and is immediately activated. The next
path, path28, is evaluated against path27, but no decision is made. Both paths are
de-activated and retained.
New path discovered: path27
Path from INSECT to SEE
INSECT is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEE
Activating path27
New path discovered: path28
Path from INSECT to SEE
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEE
No-decision metric — path27 and path28 are retained
De-activating path27
De-activating path28
Path29, the first path connecting INSECT to SECRETARY, is discovered and is
added to the active interpretation. This new path is related to the retained pathS,
which is now re-evaluated against the active path7. The filter chooses to replace
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path? with paths, again because the latter has INSECT as one of its endpoints while
the former has MICROPHONE as its corresponding endpoint.
New path discovered: path29
Path from INSECT to SECRETARY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Also reconsidering (path24 pathS) due to shared nodes with path29
Activating path29
More-reinforcement metric — path25 has more shared nodes
than path24
De-activating path24
More-activation metric — pathS has more activation than path/
De-activating path?
Activating pathS
The filter rediscovers path28, which earlier had been de-activated and retained
in the tie with path27. Because it has no currently active competing path, path28 is
activated. Path27 is again re-evaluated against path28, but the activation of path29
has changed the context enough so that path28 is favored over path27 in the compe
tition.
Old path rediscovered: path28
Also reconsidering (path27) due to tie with path28
Activating path28
More-reinforcement metric — path28 has more shared nodes
than path27
De-activating path27
Paths is discovered again and compared to path4 because of an earlier tie
between the two paths. This time, the context has changed sufficiently so that a
decision is made: path4 fits better with the existing context and is chosen over
paths, which is now suppressed.
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Old path rediscovered: pathS
Also reconsidering (path4) due to tie with path3
Activating path3
More-reinforcement metric — path4 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating path3
Suppressing path3
Activating path4
A few new paths are discovered and evaluated, and a number of retained paths
are re-evaluated, but there are no changes to the interpretation. This activity does
result in more retained paths being suppressed. The Icist new path to be discov
ered, path32, is not incorporated into ATLAST's interpretation. On the other hand,
path32's two related retained paths, path24 and path2, are re-evaluated and replace
their competing paths, path25 and pathO respectively because they support the in
terpretation of bugs as insects.
New path discovered: path32
Path from INSECT to SECRETARY
INSECT is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Also reconsidering (path24 path2) due to shared nodes with path32
Shorter-path metric — path29 shorter than path32
De-activating path32
More-reinforcement metric — path24 has more shared nodes
than path25
De-activating path25
Activating path24
More-reinforcement metric — path2 has more shared nodes
them pathO
De-activating pathO
Activating path2
Again examining the active paths, the filter determines that its original as
signment of the MICROPHONE node to the object role in the previous event frame is
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incorrect because several of the active paths include the INSECT node but no active
paths include the MICROPHONE node. To correct its mistake, the filter now aissigns
INSECT to the object role.
No active paths exist through MICROPHONE
Removing MICROPHONE from object slot in eventO
Active paths exist through INSECT again
Adding INSECT to object slot in eventO
5.4.5 The light at the end of the tunnel
Finally, ATLAST finds the end of the text. The capsulizer tells the filter that
it has finished processing both the noun phrase, the verb phrase in which it was
embedded, and the sentence.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *PERIOD*
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (nphrase (INSECT))
End noun phrase
End verb phrase
End sentence
Sending capsule: (term)
The filter assigns the node INSECT to the object role in event 1, then reverses
the temporal order of eventO and event 1 as discussed previously.
Filter:
Received capsule: (nphrase (INSECT))
Filling object slot in eventl with INSECT
Received capsule: (term)
End processing of eventl
Reversing order of last two events
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ATLAST has now completed its processing of the text. It has found 33 different
inference paths and has settled on 7 of them as the best interpretation of the text.
These paths are displayed in Figure 5.3. Of the remaining 26 paths, only 16 are
retained when processing is completed. Because there is no more text to be processed,
all retained paths are suppressed.
Suppressing 16 retained paths
Processing completed
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path2 path24 path4 path28 pathS path29 path23)
Path from SEARCH to EMBASSY
SEARCH is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER can be viewed as GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from INSECT to SEE
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEE
Path from INSECT to EMBASSY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER can be viewed as GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
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Figure 5.3: Active memory network after processing both sentences of Text 5.
Path from INSECT to SECRETARY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from SEE to SEARCH
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event 1
Actor: (SECRETARY)
Action: (SEE)
Object: (INSECT)
Direction: nil
Event: event0
Actor: (EMBASSY)
Action: (SEARCH)
Object: (INSECT)
Direction: nil
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5.5 Life without retention
Within the ATLAST framework, conditional retention of inferences is essential
to the understanding of misleading texts such as Text 5 without reprocessing. A
prediction which follows from this claim is that processing Text 5 without retention
should result in an incorrect interpretation. This section summarizes what happens
when ATLAST processes Text 5 without the ability to retain rejected inference paths.
Here ATLAST is run with the same parameter settings as those used above with
the exception that any path which is not activated upon evaluation is immediately
suppressed.
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When ATLAST processes the first part of the first sentence, The embassy
searched, the various paths between SEARCH and EMBASSY are discovered and eval
uated. These comparisons result in a series of split decisions as before, but this
time the paths are suppressed instead of retained. As ATLAST continues processing
the remainder of the first sentence, for bugs, it finds the paths joining EMBASSY to
INSECT and EMBASSY to MICROPHONE. ATLAST again favors the more specific inter
pretation based on espionage, but the appropriate path between SEARCH and EMBASSY
has not been retained nor is it rediscovered, so it cannot be re-evaluated and added
to the interpretation. ATLAST's active interpretation at the end of the first sentence
is given below. (The path names are different from those in the previous example
because ATLAST's retention ability is disabled. The filter gives a path a new name
if it has never seen the path before, and ATLAST now has no recollection of having
previously seen any paths other than the currently active paths.)
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathl9 pathll)
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instamce of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plain step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (EMBASSY)
Action: (SEARCH)
Object: (MICROPHONE)
Direction: nil
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Two additional paths are activated during the processing of The secretaries
had seen. One path joins SEE to SEARCH and the other joins SEE to SECRETARY. The
interpretation still follows the espionage theme.
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path43 path41 pathl9 pathll)
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from SEE to SEARCH
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
When it reads the final word of the text, roaches, ATLAST activates a path
connecting INSECT to SECRETARY which infers the health-preservation goal of the
generic employer. The word roaches makes it clear that the previously inferred goal
of preserving security goal is wrong, but ATLAST cannot supplant the older inference
paths because the paths which should take their places have been suppressed. Also,
ATLAST is unable to activate the correct path between INSECT and SEE because the
evaluation of candidate paths resulted in split decisions and suppression of the paths.
The inconsistency now inherent in ATLAST's final interpretation is reflected in the
two different meanings bound to the object slot of eventO.
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Active memory structure:
Paths: (path48 path43 path4i pathl9 pathll)
Path from INSECT to SECRETARY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from SEE to SECRETARY
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the part SECRETARY
Path from SEE to SEARCH
SEE is a plan step of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plem step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plain step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event1
Actor: (SECRETARY)
Action: (SEE)
Object: (INSECT)
Direction: nil
Event: event0
Actor: (EMBASSY)
Action: (SEARCH)
Object: (INSECT MICROPHONE)
Direction: nil
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In the example immediately above, ATLAST expends less effort and finds a
solution more quickly than was the case in the previous example, but is unable
to arrive at a correct or even a semantically consistent interpretation. The only
difference between the version of ATLAST used here and the earlier one which worked
correctly is that the earlier one retained previously rejected inference paths. However,
conditional retention is only part of the story. The other necessary component to
understanding and error recovery in ATLAST is the ability to re-evaluate possibly
relevant retained paths at the appropriate times, for without a mechanism for knowing
when and how to re-evaluate the retained paths, the retention feature alone provides
no benefit.
There are two ways in which the re-evaluation of a retained path can be ini
tiated. The first is through direct rediscovery of the retained path by the search
process. Because the passing of markers begins in different places at different times
during the processing oftext, the same inference path may be discovered (or more ap
propriately, rediscovered) more than once. If a rediscovered path is not currently part
of ATLAST's interpretation of the text (i.e., the path has been discovered earlier, re
jected by the evaluation metrics, but retained), that path is re-evaluated against the
competing path which is part of the interpretation. This rediscovery process initiates
reconsideration of some of the retained paths, but it is not dependent upon retention
because these paths would be reconsidered even if they had not been retained.
Some retained paths, though, will not be rediscovered, but the inferences made
from later text may change the interpretation in such a way that these paths now
should be included. ATLAST uses a method of "piggy-backing" the re-evaluation of
these paths onto the evaluation of paths which are directly discovered or rediscovered
by the search process. If a (re)discovered path is evaluated against a competing path
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in the current interpretation, any subpaths or superpaths of the (re)ciiscovered. path
are also evaluated against the current interpretation. In this way, ATLAST attempts
to limit re-evaluation to those paths that are currently relevant. Without the ability
to force re-evaluation of paths rejectedearly in processing but not rediscovered later,
ATLAST's final interpretation probably will be incorrect. Indirectly initiating the
re-evaluation of previously rejected inference paths is essential to ATLAST's error
recovery capability and is dependent upon inference retention.
5.6 The three steps to error recovery
Another way to view error recovery is as a three-step process (Norvig, 1983).
The three steps are (1) recognizing that an error has occurred, (2) locating the source
of theerror, and (3) correcting the error. From this perspective, ATLAST's approach
to error recovery can be summarized as follows:
• Recognizing that an error has occurred: Each inference path has only
two endpoints, and for any two given endpoints there will be at most one active
inference path between them. When a new path is discovered (or an old path
is rediscovered), the set of currently active paths is searched for a path which
shares thesame endpoints. Ifsuch a path exists, it is possible that the currently
active path was incorrectly included in the representation of the text.
• Locating the source of the error: This step is effectively subsumed by
the previous one. If competition between inference paths has been detected,
the competition will always be between a path which is currently part of the
representation and one which is not. If an error has in fact occurred, the source
of the error will be the currently active path.
Correcting the error: The competing paths are evaluated in the context of
the current interpretation of the text (minus the active path being evaluated).
The path which is more appropriate to the current interpretation is added to
the interpretation, while the less appropriate path is added to the set of retained
paths. If the interpretation changed as a result, then an error has beendetected,
located, and corrected.
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5.7 Functional independence in action
Chapter 2 argued for the functional independence of syntax and semantics,
based in part on observations that human understanders are able to determine the
syntactic correctness of semantically anomalous texts and are also able to assign
meaning to agrammatical strings of semantically related words (Chomsky, 1957;
Winograd, 1973). The principle of functional independence of syntax and seman
tics has been maintained during ATLAST's development; accordingly, ATLAST is
also able to process texts which are either syntacticallyor semantically deficient with
some degree of success. The following two examples demonstrate ATLAST's ability
to process ill-formed texts. ATLAST's inference retention capability has been re
stored and all other parameters axe set to the values given at the beginning of this
chapter.
5.7.1 Syntax without semantics
In the first example, ATLAST attempts to understand a sentence which is
syntactically valid but has little semantic value. The capsulizer parses the sentence
correctly, but the proposer finds no inference paths in memory until the last word of
the text is processed.
Input text is:
The lamp proposed to the microphones.
Processing begins
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *START*
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (start)
Filter:
Received capsule: (start) '
Begin processing of eventO
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: The
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Begin sentence
Begin noun phrase
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: lamp
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: proposed
Sending capsule: (nphrase (LAMP))
End noun phrase
Begin verb phrase
Filter:
Received capsule: (nphrase (LAMP))
Filling actor slot in eventO with LAMP
Active memory structure:
Paths: nil
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: to
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (vphrase (PROPOSE-MARRIAGE))
Begin prepositional phrase
Filter:
Received capsule: (vphrase (PROPOSE-MARRIAGE))
Filling action slot in eventO with PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: the
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: microphones
133
134
The only paths found by the proposer are four paths connecting MICROPHONE
and LAMP. The filter activates the shortest path which says simply that a microphone
and a lamp are both objects. This is the only semantic content that ATLAST can
find in the sentence.
Filter:
New path discovered: pathO
Path from MICROPHONE to LAMP
MICROPHONE is am instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance LAMP
Activating pathO
New path discovered: pathl
Path from MICROPHONE to LAMP
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the role-filler OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance LAMP
Shorter-path metric — pathO shorter than pathl
De-activating pathl
New path discovered: path2
Path from MICROPHONE to LAMP
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD has the role-filler INSECT
INSECT is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance LAMP
Shorter-path metric — pathO shorter than path2
De-activating path2
New path discovered: path3
Path from MICROPHONE to LAMP
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the instance FIND-SECRETS
FIND-SECRETS has the role-filler SECRET
SECRET is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance LAMP
Shorter-path metric — pathO shorter than path3
De-activating path3
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Meanwhile, ATLAST continues its syntactic processing with the capsulizer
breaking down the sentence into its constituents and the filter binding thematic roles
to nodes in the memory. Although ATLAST can find little semantic content, it is
able to parse thesentence and build a complete event frame, thus indicating syntactic
correctness.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *PERIOD»
No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (pphrase-dir (MICROPHONE))
End prepositional phrase
End verb phrase
End sentence
Sending capsule: (term)
Filter:
Received capsule: (pphrase-dir (MICROPHONE))
Filling direction slot in eventO with MICROPHONE
Received capsule: (term)
End processing of eventO
Suppressing 3 retained paths
Processing completed
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathO)
Path from MICROPHONE to LAMP
MICROPHONE is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance LAMP
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: eventO
Actor: (LAMP)
Action: (PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
Object: nil
Direction: (MICROPHONE)
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All paths found by ATLAST in this example, including the one in the final
interpretation, contain is-a intersections. As stated earlier, ATLAST's evaluation
metrics will usually prevent a path containing an is-a intersection from appearing in
the final interpretation. In this case, however, pathO represents the only explanation
that makes any, albeit little, sense to ATLAST. Under similar circumstances it would
not be surprising for a human reader to arrive at an interpretation similar to that
suggested by pathO.^ It would be surprising, however, for that same reader to arrive
at an interpretation along the lines of either pathl, path2, or pathS, which describe
more tenuous and convoluted relationships between a lamp and a microphone than
does pathO.
5.7.2 Semantics without syntax
The next example shows ATLAST working on a semantically-related set of
words which has no sense of syntactic correctness. The words are the open class
words of the first sentence of Text 5; hence ATLAST will find the same inference
paths it found in processing that same first sentence. This time, however, there are
no syntactic cues to tell ATLAST who did what. Because the text is incomplete,
ATLAST's syntactic analysis is lamentable but its semantic analysis is not impaired.
Input text is:
search embassy bugs.
Processing begins
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *START*
^It might be argued that a human reader would be more likely to come up with metaphorical
meanings for a lamp and a microphone, as in the nursery rhyme when the dish ran away with the
spoon. This is well beyond ATLAST's abilities.
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No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (start)
Filter:
Received capsule: (start)
Begin processing of eventO
The first word of the input string, search, is a verb, so the capsulizer assumes
the beginning of a verb phrase.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: search
Begin sentence
Begin verb phrase
The next word is a noun, so the capsulizer notifies the filter that SEARCH is
the action in the event frame it is building. The capsulizer then begins processing a
noun phrase embedded in a verb phrase. The proposer discovers three paths joining
EMBASSY and SEARCH and activates one of them.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: embassy
Sending capsule: (vphrase (SEARCH))
Begin noun phrase
Filter:
Received capsule: (vphrase (SEARCH))
Filling action slot in eventO with SEARCH
New path discovered: pathO
Path from EMBASSY to SEARCH
EMBASSY is an instance of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the goal A-SECRETS
A-SECRETS has the plan FIND-SECRETS
FIND-SECRETS is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plain step SEARCH
Activating pathO
New path discovered: pathl
Path from EMBASSY to SEARCH
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EMBASSY is an instance of GOVT-AGENCY
GQVT-AGENCY has the goal P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY has the plan FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
No-decision metric — pathO and pathl are retained
De-activating pathO
De-activating pathl
New path discovered: path2
Path from EMBASSY to SEARCH
EMBASSY is an instance of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the goal P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH has the plan FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is am instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Activating path2
ATLAST reads the next word of the text, bugs, which the capsulizer treats as
part of the noun phrase it is processing. The processing of bugs generates 20 new
inference paths, but only a few of these will affect the final interpretation.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: bugs
Ambiguous word senses noted: (INSECT MICROPHONE)
Filter:
New path discovered: pathS
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Activating pathS
New path discovered: path6
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
II
I
No-decision metric — pathB and path6 are retained
De-activating pathS
De-activating path6
New path discovered: path/
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instaince EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to shared nodes with path/
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to tie with pathl
Activating path/
More-specific metric — pathl more specific than path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathl
No-decision metric — pathl and pathO are retained
De-activating pathl
De-activating pathO
New path discovered: pathS
Path from INSECT to EMBASSY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is a plan of P-HEALTH
P-HEALTH is a goal of GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER can be viewed as GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with pathS
More-specific metric — path/ more specific than pathS
De-activating pathS
Activating path2
New path discovered: path9
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
INSECT is an instance of OBJECT
OBJECT has the instance MICROPHONE
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Also reconsidering (path6) due to shared nodes with path9
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to tie with path6
Activating path9
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Shorter-path metric — path6 shorter than path9
De-activating path9
Activating path6
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
At this point the final interpretation includes path2, pathG, and path? and is
semantically inconsistent. When the filter evaluates pathl3, it supplants path2 with
pathl and the interpretation becomes consistent in its assumption of the espionage
theme.
New path discovered: pathl3
Path from INSECT to EMBASSY
INSECT is a role-filler of FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD
FIND-HEALTH-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-GBJECT has the instance FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GGVT-AGENCY
GGVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to shared nodes with pathl3
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to tie with pathl
Shorter-path metric — path? shorter than pathl3
De-activating pathl3
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
them path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathl
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
than pathO
De-activating pathO
Reaching the end of the text string, the capsulizer notes the end of the noun
phrase, the verb phrase in which it is embedded, and the sentence. The capsulizer
assumes that the last noun in the noun phrase, bugs, is the head noun. The other
noun, embassy, is treated as a modifier.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: *PERIOD*
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No nodes will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule: (nphrase (INSECT MICROPHONE) (EMBASSY))
End noun phrase
End verb phrase
End sentence
Sending capsule: (term)
The filter receives the capsule indicating the noun phrase and fills the object
role of the event frame with pointers to the nodes activated by bugs. Unfortunately,
the filter hcis no idea what to do with modifiers, so the pointer to the node EMBASSY
is ignored. Even if it did know about modifiers, the filter would still not entertain the
possibility that EMBASSY might be a better actor than modifier. On a more positive
note, ATLAST does resolve the ambiguity between INSECT and MICROPHONE.
Filter:
Received capsule: (nphrase (INSECT MICROPHONE) (EMBASSY))
Filling object slot in eventO with INSECT vs. MICROPHONE
Received capsule: (term)
End processing of event0
No active paths exist through INSECT
Removing INSECT from object slot in eventO
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathl path6 path?)
Path from EMBASSY to SEARCH
EMBASSY is an instance of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the goal P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY has the plan FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is Ein instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plan step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is an instance of FIND-OBJECT
FIND-OBJECT has the plam step SEARCH
Path from MICROPHONE to EMBASSY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of FIND-SECURlTY-HAZARD
FIND-SECURITY-HAZARD is a plan of P-SECURITY
P-SECURITY is a goal of GOVT-AGENCY
GOVT-AGENCY has the instance EMBASSY
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: nil
Action: (SEARCH)
Object: (MICROPHONE)
Direction: nil
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In summary, ATLAST has found the same active memory structure in this
example as it found after processing the first sentence of Text 5 at the beginning of
this chapter. Its syntactic processors have made the best analysis they could based on
what limited knowledge they have, but the important point is that neither the text's
agrammaticality nor ATLAST's weak syntactic processors prevented ATLAST from
finding semantic content in the text string. Similarly, the lack of semantic content
in the text used in the previous example did not prevent ATLAST from correctly
parsing that text. Very few computational models of language understanding are
able to demonstrate these human language processing characteristics.
Chapter 6
Pragmatic Inference Processing:
Theory
6.1 The problem of pragmatic inference
As defined by Seifert, Robertson, and Black (1982), pragmatic inferences are
connections between propositions conveyed bya text and world knowledge previously
stored in memory (see also Abelson & Reich, 1969).^ These inferences are plausible
but are not necessarily true. Applying this definition to the ATLAST framework,
a pragmatic inference is a decision about which inference path best represents an
implicit relationship between events or states explicitly given in a text.
At any point in the text where a pragmatic inference could be made, there is
usually more than one inference possible. However, in explaining the events in a
text, some inferences may serve better than others. For example, after reading the
following text.
^This definition is related to, but not necessarily the same as, the usage of the word pragmatics
in psycholinguistics. For many psycholinguists, the term pragmatics refers to the language user's
knowledge of the social rules underlying language use (Carroll, 1986). While the social rules are
part of a language user's world knowledge, manyclasses of inferences one can make using such rules
are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Text 6: John was poor but he owned a gun.
He went to the pawnshop.
the reader might infer that John intended to rob the pawnshop. On the other hand,
John might be intending to get money for his gun at the pawnshop. Either inter
pretation explains the explicit text events, although individual readers may ascribe
different degrees of plausibility to the two interpretations.^ As is the Ccise with lex
ical inference processing, the primary problem in pragmatic inference processing is
disambiguation: the evaluation of competing inferences and subsequent selection of
the one which best explains the events portrayed in the text.
In the example above, the pragmatic inferences that can be made do not hinge
on decisions about the meanings of the individual words that are contained in Text 6.
The words "poor," "gun," "pawnshop," and so on carry the same meaning in this
context regardless of which of the two interpretations is chosen. The ambiguity
arises because of the different plausible connections the reader can find between the
two sentences using his or her knowledge of how the world works. In terms of the
perspective described by Schank and Abelson (1977), Text 6 presents the reader with
states or conditions (lacking money and owning a gun) and an action (going to the
pawn shop). The reader then infers a corresponding goal (get money). There are a
number of plans that can be inferredfor achieving the goal; at least two are suggested
by the action of taking the gun to the pawnshop (steal money or sell gun). To resolve
the ambiguity, the reader must somehow evaluate the explanatory value of the two
plans and select the one that seems more plausible.^
^Wilensky (1978) uses a similar story: "John wanted money. He got a gun and walked into a
liquor store. He told the owner he wanted some money. The owner gave John the money and John
left." This story differs from Text 6 in that the only likely use for a gun in the liquor store scenario
is to use it to rob the liquor store. While it is undoubtedly possible that John might want to sell or
trade the gun at the liquor store, it is not very plausible.
more accurate and complex analysis of Text 6 is certainly possible, but this will suffice for
the purpose at hand.
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Let us say for the sake of argument that our hypothetical reader's inference
processing mechanism decides that the "steal money" plan is more plausible. The
possibility always exists that the reader's selection of the more plausible plan is
incorrect, and we might well wonder how that same inference processing mechanism
would resolve its decision with the presentation of explicit contradictory information
as in Text 7:
Text 7: John Wcis poor but he owned a gun.
He went to the pawnshop.
He sold the gun.
As it was with the theory of lexical inference processing, a theory of pragmatic in
ference processing should address not only how competing inferences are evaluated
and one is selected, but also how selected inferences later may be determined to be
incorrect and replaced with more appropriate ones.
That lexical and pragmatic inferences pose common problems suggests that the
problems may be answered by a common solution. One possible solution is the topic
of this chapter.
6.2 Unifying lexical and pragmatic processing
There is no widespread agreement on the relationship between word knowledge
and world knowledge. For example, participants at one recent workshop represented
both sides of the issue: some argued that lexical and pragmatic knowledge are the
same (Hobbs, 1987), or at least inextricably bound together (Wilks, 1987), while
others argued that the two types of knowledge are quite different and should be
treated as such (Israel, 1987; Kegl, 1987). The position taken here draws from both
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arguments. Knowledge about words and knowledge about the worldare inseparable in
that word meanings are pointers to relevant parts of the model's pragmatic knowledge,
and pragmatic knowledge in turn points to associated word meanings. However, the
fact that ATLAST's intra-phrasal syntactic processor makes decisions strictly on the
basis of the lexicalinformation presented to it (i.e., the syntactic categories associated
with the individual words and the order in which the words are presented) dictates
that knowledge about syntactic categories is stored with the lexical entries.'' Thus,
there is a syntactic component to ATLAST's lexical knowledge which is not included
in its pragmatic knowledge, thereby distinguishing one from the other, but that
difference does not imply that the semantic information in the lexical and pragmatic
knowledge levels should be treated differently. In fact, from a semantic processing
perspective, ATLAST treats the two levels as one.
Consider again the processing of Text 5:
Text 5: The embassy checked for bugs.
The secretaries had seen roaches.
In this example, competing paths start at one node (EMBASSY) but end at two
different nodes (INSECT and MICROPHONE) activated by one word. Early in the text,
the inferred goal of the embassy influenced the choice of one path and the associ
ated word meaning, but later text forced a change in word meaning and a shift in
the inferred goal of the embassy. In other words, calling up information about the
embassy at the lexical level also caused ATLAST to infer goals for the embassy at
the pragmatic level. The pragmatic knowledge then influenced ATLAST's choice of
meaning for the word bugs. Later, the word roaches revealed that ATLAST's initial
''An experiment by Tyler and Marslen-Wilson (1977) indicates that syntactic decisions also may
be influenced by the current semantic context. For reasons of simplicity, ATLAST does not model
this behavior, but there is nothing inherent in ATLAST's design which precludes this behavior from
being incorporated in the future. Remember that the assumption of functional dependence requires
only that syntax and semantics can work independently, not that they must.
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choice of word sense was wrong, and the system revised its inferred goals for the
embassy to find the most parsimonious interpretation of the story.
In the case of Text 6, on the other hand, we see no lexical ambiguity. What we
do notice is pragmatic ambiguity: is John going to sell his gun or use it to rob the
pawnshop? The competing inferences which represent the different interpretations
join the same word senses but follow different routes. Thus in one case our attention
is drawn to lexical ambiguity, in another case we focus on pragmatic ambiguity, but
in either case a decision is made by choosing from competing inferences. In other
words, the difference between lexical and pragmatic inferences is not so much in
the information in the corresponding paths: both types of paths may contain word
senses, related actions, plans, goals, and so on, thus no path canbe regarded as purely
lexical or purely pragmatic. The difference is in the structure of the ambiguity as
indicated by the endpoints. If different meanings of the same word are the endpoints
of two competing paths, the decision appears to be lexical; without competing word
senses at the endpoints, the decision appears to be pragmatic (see Figure 6.1). In
either case, deciding between individual paths is fundamentally the same, so a single
decision process can be used to make inferences at what are often considered to be
different levels of processing.
6.3 Retention of pragmatic inferences
Recall that according to the conditional retention theory, all meanings of an
ambiguous word are accessed when the word is processed. The individual meanings
are then evaluated in light of the existingcontext. If one meaning is more appropriate
to the context than the others and no text follows, the less appropriate meanings are
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sensela
wordl sense2 word2
senselb
wordl sensel sense2 word2
Figure 6.1: The generic structures of lexical ambiguities (above) and pragmatic am
biguities (below).
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actively suppressed. If no meaning is preferred by the existing context, or if one is
preferred but text follows the ambiguous word, the unchosen meanings are retained
until more text can be processed and a decision can be made.
Because ATLAST does not distinguish between paths representing lexical in
ferences and those that represent pragmatic inferences, the theory of conditional
retention also applies to pragmatic inferences. As a result ATLAST can recover,
without reprocessing the text, from erroneous pragmatic inference decisions (e.g..
Text 7) in the same way it recovers from erroneous lexical inference decisions (e.g..
Text 5). This leads to a uniform description of the inference decision and error re
covery process which does not distinguish between lexical and pragmatic knowledge:
• Potential inferences which explain the same input text are generated and eval
uated in parallel.
• If one inference explains the text better than the others do, and there are no
textual cues to indicate that a decision may be premature (e.g., there is still
more text to process), then the otherless-explanatory inferences aresuppressed.
• If no inference proves to be more explanatory than the others, all inferences are
retained until later text provides the information necessary to make a decision.
An example of the theory of conditional retention applied to pragmatic inference
processing is given in Appendix A, which contains output generated by ATLAST
during its processing of a simplified version of Text 7.
The extension of conditional retention theory to pragmatic inference processing
enhances ATLAST's appeal as a model of human language understanding because
it provides a single, simple mechanism for making inferences and correcting errors
at two seemingly different levels of processing. In addition, conditional retention of
pragmatic inferences permits a new and interesting perspective on what previously
has been called strategy-driven inference behavior.
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6.4 Strategy-driven inference decisions
An experiment by Granger and Holbrook (1983) revealed that certain texts
could induce different readers to arrive at different interpretations of the same story.
For example, experimental subjects were presented with the following text:
Text 8: Wilma began to cry.
Fred had just asked her to marry him.
When asked why Wilma cried, some subjects replied that Wilma was unhappy or
upset about Fred's marriage proposal, while others answered that Wilma was happy
about the proposal and was crying tears of joy. The texts which induced equally
plausible and nearly opposite interpretations were called reciprocally ambiguous texts.
Through a supplementary experiment. Granger and Holbrook eliminated the possi
bility that different groups of subjects were influenced by contradictory default ex
planations for the individual story events; in other words, it was not the case that one
group thought that a marriage proposal was a happy event and the other considered
it to be an unhappy event. When presented with the individual sentences in isolation,
subjects would uniformly conclude that Wilma was crying because she was sad or
that Fred's marriage proposal was a happy occasion.
Granger and Holbrook theorized that the difference in subjects' interpretations
of reciprocally ambiguous stories was due to the existence of different but consistent
strategies for systematically choosing between competing inference paths. They also
theorized the existence ofa variety ofdifferent strategies and described two strategies
in detail.
One proposed strategy was to make inference decisions as early as possible in
the reading and then cling to that interpretation as long as possible, fitting new
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story events into the original interpretation. These readers were called perseverers.
Another strategy was to postpone decisions until later in the processing of the text.
Any conflict in the interpretation would be decided in favor of the most recently
presented information. These readers were called recencies. Everyday texts tend to
be constructed so that any reader would arrive at the same interpretation, regardless
of the strategy that was applied, so differences in behavior would likely go unnoticed
unless one were specifically looking for such differences.
Individual differences in inference behavior have been addressed, if only briefly,
by other researchers. In several previous instances, differences in inference behavior
have been attributed to randomness (Hirst, 1988a), subjects' idiosyncracies (Schank,
Collins, Davis, Johnson, Lytinen, k Reiser, 1982), or careless reading (Rumelhart,
1981). Granger and Holbrook'sdata indicate that, at least in this case, the differences
are far more systematic and predictable than other investigators might suppose.
A computational model of the processes responsible for differences in inferential
behavior was developed soon thereafter (Granger, Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1983). This
model, called STRATEGIST, arrived at either of two interpretations of an input
text using the same component processes for making pragmatic inferences but dif
ferent rules for deciding when the processes were invoked (i.e., make the inference
now or make the inference later), resulting in different interpretations of the same
text. ATLAST followed STRATEGIST as an attempt to answer questions about
disambiguation and error recovery that STRATEGIST left unanswered, but those
unanswered questions appeaxed to have relatively little to do with the difference be
tween perseverers and recencies. As workon ATLAST progressed, however, it became
apparent that the newarchitecture could provide valuable insight into strategy-driven
inferencing.
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Within the ATLAST framework, strategy-driven inference behavior is still ex
plained as a difference between making inference decisions early in processing or
postponing them, but the different strategies are invoked only under very specific
circumstances. As described previously, ATLAST uses a set of evaluation metrics
to choose between two competing inference paths. In most cases, one of the metrics
will decide in favor of one path, but occasionally the metrics find no clear winner.
As might be expected, path competitions that end in a tie occur more frequently
in texts which have two equally plausible and nearly opposite interpretations (i.e.,
reciprocally ambiguous texts). The difference between perseverers and recencies is
how they resolve split decisions.
When a tie between competing paths occurs, both perseverers and recencies
will retain the competing paths without making a decision and continue processing
the input text. In the case of perseverers, those retained paths are immediately
available for re-evaluation should later text indicate that re-evaluation is appropriate.
Therefore, although a decision cannot immediately be made, the perseverer is always
ready to make that decision as soon as evidence becomes available which favors one
path over the other. (In the examples of Chapter 5, ATLAST uses the perseverer
strategy.) Recencies, however, will not re-evaluate those split decisions until much
later in the processing, ignoring information which possibly could enable an earlier
decision. In ATLAST, this is done by preventing re-evaluation on those paths and
retaining them until the end of the text, at which point they will be available for
re-evaluation. This postponement applies only to the inferences involved in the split
decision; all other evaluations result in one inference being activated and the other
being retained, as is the case with perseverers. Consequently, when processing texts
that generate no split decisions, perseverers and recencies will arrive at the same
interpretations. If the text is ambiguous but biased toward one interpretation, the
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differences in processing should not be obvious: the perseverer may resolve a tie
incorrectly early in the processing and then supplant as processing proceeds, while
the recency will delay the decision but make the correct one the first time. The final
interpretation is the same in either situation. Only rarely, when the equally-plausible
competing inferences are fundamental to understanding the text and the choices
result in substantially different interpretations, as in Text 8, will the differences be
conspicuous.
To aid in the interpretation of reciprocally ambiguous texts, ATLAST uses a
sixth and previously unmentioned inference evaluation metric called the preferred-link
metric. Given two competing inference paths and no winner after the application
of the activation, length, reinforcement, and specificity metrics, the preferred-link
metric selects the path which contains the greater number of preferred links. A
preferred linkis constructed in ATLAST's memory by adding the preferred designator
to any of ATLAST's link labels. Thus, has-result becomes has-preferred-result. The
preferred link is used to give ATLAST a default interpretation to use when all else
fails. For example, if ATLAST were presented with only the first sentence of Text 8,
"Wilma began to cry," the system would be unable to determine if Wilma is happy
or sad without some built-in predisposition toward one interpretation or the other.
Accordingly, a preferred link has been used in constructing ATLAST's memory so
that, in the absence of any other information, it will favor an inference path which
explains crying as a result of sadness over one which explains crying as a result of
happiness.
When modeling perseverer behavior, ATLAST adds the preferred-link metric
to its list of evaluation metrics before processing begins. The metric is then available
for use during the remainder of text processing. The availability of this metric at the
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beginning ofa text means that perseverers use default inferences early in text process
ing to establish a context for interpreting the remainder of the text. When modeling
recency behavior, conversely, ATLAST does not use the preferred-link metric until
the end of the text has been processed and the retained split decisions are ready to
be re-evaluated. The recency, therefore, first uses default inferences at the end of a
text to resolve the postponed split decisions from the more recently processed text,
and then uses that context to resolve postponed split decisions from earlier text.
In summary, the difference between the two different inference strategies is
nothing more than a difference in how the inference processor deals with ties or split
decisions. The perseverer can make use of default inferences early and tries to resolve
the ties immediately while the recency cannot use default inferences until the end of
the text and postpones the resolution of ties until that time. Any inference paths not
involved in split decisions are processed in the same way regardless of the inference
strategy in force. It is only this simple difference in processing split decisions that
results in the two entirely different interpretations of Text 8. Examples of ATLAST's
output while processing a simplified version of Text 8 using both the perseverer and
recency strategies are given in Appendix A.
ATLAST thus accounts for one aspect of strategy-driven inference behavior,
but what about other phenomena found by Granger and Holbrook that is related
to strategy-driven inferencing? For example. Granger and Holbrook found that if a
perseverer were presented with a story like Text 8 but with the events given in reverse
order, the perseverer would arrive at the interpretation usually attributed to recency
behavior. That is, if presented with the following text.
Text 9: Fred had just a^ked Wilma to marry him.
She began to cry.
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the perseverer would conclude that Wilma was crying tears of joy. Likewise, the
recency would conclude that Wilma was sad or upset. ATLAST behaves similarly
when the order of the story events is reversed. Granger and Holbrook also found that
when the individual story events were presented in isolation (i.e., only one of the two
sentences was presented), perseverers and recencies arrived at the same interpreta
tion. When ATLAST is presented with only one of the story events, it too arrives
at only one interpretation regardless of the inference strategy it is using. Finally,
Granger and Holbrook predicted that individual differences in strategy-driven infer
ence behavior would become visible only through the use of specially constructed
reciprocally ambiguous stories. Given texts that were not so constructed, recencies
and perseverers would arrive at the same interpretation. Again, ATLAST's two dif
ferent strategies find only one interpretation for stories which are not reciprocally
ambiguous, such as Text 5 and Text 7. Thus, ATLAST accounts for a wide variety
of phenomena related to strategy-driven inference processing.
Retention of inferences plays an essential role in strategy-driven inferencing.
Ignoring the issue of error recovery for the time being, the perseverer does not rely
on retention nearly as much as the recency, if at all. The inferences retained due to a
perseverer's split decision will be re-evaluated very quickly because of their similarity
to other inferences soon to be evaluated. If those inferences had not been retained,
they most likely would have been rediscovered by the inference proposer anyway.
The recency, on the other hand, requires the retention of those same inferences. As
processing of the text proceeds beyond the occurrence of the split decision and into
another sentence or two, the locus of activity within the memory changes, and the
likelihood of the tied inferences being generated again decreases considerably. If the
tied inferences are not retained for later re-evaluation, the recency has little chance
of incorporating either of the inferences into its interpretation of the input. In other
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words, without retention of competing inferences, there can be no postponement of
the inference decision, and without postponement there can be no recency behavior.
In ATLAST, the difference between perseverer and recency behavior is con
trolled by changing a parameter. Flip a switch and retained paths resulting from
split decisions cannot be re-evaluated until the end of the text; flip it back and
all retained paths can be re-evaluated on demand. Thus, all things remain con
stant between recency operation and perseverer operation except a change in rules or
strategies for dealing with split decisions. Another explanation, which may be more
plausible, is that the differences in behavior are caused by minor differences in the
underlying cognitive architecture. The behavior might then be more aptly described
as architecture-driven rather than strategy-driven.
One factor which could account for different interpretations of reciprocally am
biguous texts is a difference in the speed of the spread of activation through memory.
A simple prototype model has been built to demonstrate that a connectionist net
work can be forced to settle into two entirely different activation patterns, each one
corresponding to a unique interpretation of the same reciprocally ambiguous text,
by increasing or decreasing the individual computing units' sensitivity to activation
energy (Eiselt & Granger, 1987). Increasing sensitivity promoted the spread of acti
vation energy through the network and "decisions" were arrived at sooner, resulting
in the perseverer interpretation. Conversely, decreasing the sensitivity impeded the
spread of activation, decisions were delayed, and the network settled into the recency
interpretation.
Still another explanation is possible, one which greatly simplifies the assump
tions made in accounting for both error recovery and differences in interpreting text.
Assume that all readers share the same "strategy" for resolving split decisions: they
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retain the competing paths and do not re-evaluate them until the limit on duration of
retention is reached. At that time, the inference processor re-evaluates the retained
paths in light of whatever context has been built. The only difference between indi
vidual readers is in the duration of retention. Thus, readers with short spans will be
forced to resolve those ties early and exhibit perseverer behavior. Readers with longer
spans will not resolve the ties until much later in processing when more context has
been established and will exhibit recency behavior. We might reasonably expect that
readers do not fall nicely in to short-retention and long-retention groups; instead,
readers might represent a range of different retention spans, which would account
for the variety of inference strategies originally predicted by Granger and Holbrook
(1983). Again, differences in behavior emerge from variations in thearchitecture, not
from differences in rules.
The explanation just offered finds indirect support in experimental evidence
which suggests that reading comprehension is affected by the reader's working mem
ory capacity (Daneman k Carpenter, 1980; Just k Carpenter, 1980; Kintsch k van
Dijk, 1978), but these experiments do not directly address the differences between per
severer and recency behavior. Direct support for this explanation may soon be avail
able, however. A preliminary appraisal of experimental data obtained by Holbrook
(in preparation) indicates that human subjects exhibit different behaviors in resolv
ing lexical ambiguity. The differences appear to correspond to the relative speed with
which the subject makes a decision about an ambiguous word. This observation, yet
to be subjected to a thorough analysis of the data as of this writing, is compatible
with the explanation of error recovery and inference processing differences offered
above, and suggests the existence of perseverer and recency strategies at the lexical
processing level.
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6.5 Conclusion
The theory of pragmatic inference processing proposed in this chapter provides
a simple account of a variety of phenomena including lexical disambiguation, prag
matic disambiguation, detection and correction of errors during disambiguation at
both levels, and individual differences in strategy-driven inference behavior. The
theory has been extrapolated from experimental evidence pertaining to lexical infer
ence processing but it has not been tested at the pragmatic level, other than with the
construction of a working computer program. The latter is only a test of plausibility,
however, not of accuracy. Still, ATLAST is the only model which accounts for all
these different phenomena. Its versatility is demonstrated in Appendix A through
annotated examples of ATLAST's operation when faced with problems of pragmatic
ambiguity, recovery from an incorrect pragmatic inference, and a reciprocally am
biguous text.
The possibility that conditional retention accounts for differences in perseverer
and recency behavior, phenomena which at first glance seem to be entirely unre
lated, adds to the importance of the conditional retention theory. Just as important,
though, is the fact that this exploration of the implications of conditional retention
is greatly facilitated by the existence of the ATLAST model. This illustrates one of
the primary benefits of building computational models of psychological theories: the
model enables the researcher to explore extensions or variations of a theory before
designing and running hew experiments. Without the ATLAST framework it would
have been difficult, if at all possible, to investigate possible relationships between
conditional retention and pragmatic inference processing.
Chapter 7
ATLAST as Search
7.1 A different perspective
In the world of cognitive modeling, computer programs usually are presented as
formalizations of theories about human cognition and demonstrations of the plausi
bility of those theories. The programs are subsequently evaluated in terms of how well
they account for existing experimental data on human behavior and how well they
predict the results of future experiments. Until now, this dissertation has concen
trated on how ATLAST accounts for human behavior, but this chapter will examine
ATLAST's computational performance.
This shift in perspective is prompted by speculation that a marker-passing
search for inference paths will be swamped with unimportant paths as the relational
memory network becomes very large. For example, Charniak states:
The problem with marker passing is that it is not obvious if it can do
the job of finding important inferences in a very large and interconnected
database. Or to be more precise, can it find the important inferences
without finding so many unimportant ones that it becomes useless as an
attention focusing device? (Charniak, 1986, p. 588)
159
160
This chapter examines the assumptions and constraints relevant to ATLAST's search
processes and finds that marker-passing can be efficient and should scale up well.
7.2 Searching for inference paths
Perhaps the single most important concept in artificial intelligence is that of
search. There are two different searches being performed as ATLAST processes text:
the proposer carries out a breadth-first intersection search for individual inference
paths in ATLAST's semantic memory, and the filter uses a hill-climbing technique to
search for the combination of proposed paths which best explains the input text. In
the former case, the structure of memory defines the search space for the proposer.
In turn, the paths found by the proposer serve to define a search space for the filter.
This section deals with the first of these two components.
7.2.1 A case study
In the example of Chapter 5, ATLAST interpreted the following text using the
semantic memory network shown in Figure 7.1 (a duplicate of Figure 5.1):
Text 5: The embassy checked for bugs.
The secretaries had seen roaches.
During the processing of Text 5, the proposer discovered 33 inference paths, each
one representing a different relationship between two selected nodes in memory. The
different paths and the nodes which they connect are shown in Table 7.1. Table 7.1
shows that there are three paths connecting SEARCH to EMBASSY, eight connecting
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pathl 2 pathlS
pathlS
path20
path21
path22
Table 7.1: Inference paths discovered during the processing of Text 5.
either INSECT or MICROPHONE to SEARCH (remember that INSECT and MICROPHONE
were activated by the same word, bugs), and so on.
The number of paths found by the proposer is constrained by several variables.
First, the maximum distance that a marker may travel in memory places a limit on the
length of an acceptable path. In the example of Chapter 5, markers could be passed
at most three links away from their origin, so the proposer would find no paths longer
than twice this distance, six links.^ This constraint is implemented more elegantly
in other systems such as Anderson's ACT* (1983), Hendler's SCRAPS (1986), or
Charniak's Wimp (1986), which use a measure of energy instead of distance and
exhibit fan-out effects which ATLAST does not. Traversing a link in these systems
depletes a marker's energy, and a marker's energy is divided between links when
traversing them in paxallel. The marker is no longer passed when its energy level
drops below a certain point.
Proposed paths must also meet specific criteriaregarding the relationships they
represent. Paths which include a node more than once (i.e., cycles) are not proposed
^This discussion ignores links which effectively have no length as it will only complicate the
analysis.
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as these tend to be uninformative at best. Also considered to be uninformative
are those paths which start and end at competing word senses of the same word.
Additionally, while any two origin nodes activated during the processing of a single
event may be joined by any combination of links, two origin nodes activated during
the processing of different events may be joined only through a causal or intentional
relationship between the nodes, and only if the nodes represent either actions or states
of the two events. Thus, the proposer generally will find many more intra-event paths
than inter-event paths.
The most important constraint is the structure of the semantic memory itself.
In the example of Text 5, the semantic memory consists of 17 nodes interconnected
by only 21 (of apossible ^ j=136 )bi-directional links. Six of these nodes were
activated directly from the text and serve as the endpoints of the 33 paths found
by the proposer. A few nodes exhibit a relatively high degree of interconnectivity:
FIND-OBJECT is linked to six other nodes, OBJECT is linked to four other nodes, and
GOVT-AGENCY is also linked to four nodes. The remaining nodes are connected to only
one, two, or three other nodes, and the average interconnectivity or branching factor
for the network is approximately 2.5. Thus, some parts of the network are highly
interconnected and other parts are not; the regions of low interconnectivity act as
bottlenecks, constraining the spread of markers and limiting the numberof new paths
found. This is a reasonable and by no means unprecedented assumption about human
memory. Although no one is sure how human memory is organized, many models
of human memory reflect this assumption, with higher branching factors associated
with the organizing features of the particular model, such as goals and plans (Schank
& Abelson, 1977), verbs (Kintsch, 1974; Rumelhart & Norman, 1975), or nouns
(Kintsch, 1974; Quillian, 1968).
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The reader should not infer from this discussion that there is some commonly
accepted structural standard for models of human memory. Cognitive scientists build
different miniature memory models to illustrate solutions to different problems, and
the disparities between these models leave us with no baseline for comparison when
trying to determine what is gained by making specific assumptions about memory
organization. On the other hand, if we assume that all memory models are roughly
equivalent, we can selectone sample as representativeof the group and compare that
sample's optimal behavior to its worst-case behavior.
7.2.2 Some unavoidable mathematics
Using ATLAST's memory for Text 5 as the representative of human memory
models, we can examine how assumptions about maximum path length, acceptable
relationships between endpoints, and the organization of memory greatly constrain
the number of paths in the search space. The worst-case scenario will be the search
space generated by a network with the same number of nodes as the representative
sample: 17 nodes with each node linked to every other node (a branching factor of
16 at every node). Of course, it is not likely that in human memory every concept
would be linked to every other concept, if only because activating one node would
remind us of everything else we have stored in memory. Still, this type of network
provides a readily accessible baseline for comparison.
For a network ofn nodes in which every pair of nodes is joined by a single link
(i.e., a completely connected undirected graph on n vertices), the number of paths
(P) that join two arbitrary nodes and have length / or less is given by the following
equation:^
^The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
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In a network of n nodes, the longest path possible without a cycle has length
n —1, so the longest path in our 17-node network contains 16 links. Using the formula
above to compute the number of paths of length 16 or less between any two nodes in
this network, we find that P is very large:
16 (n _ 2V
^ = E = 3,554,627,472,076
^(17-i-lj!
Text 5 activated six nodes: EMBASSY, SEARCH, INSECT, MICROPHONE, SECRETARY, and
SEE. From these six nodes, ^^ o^r 15 different combinations of nodes can be se
lected, so without any constraints the proposer would find 15 x 3,554,627,472,076
or 53,319,412,081,140 paths. This is the worst-case scenario.
By imposing a limit of six on the path length, the number of paths that can be
found by the proposer is dramatically reduced:
6 fl7 —2V
15 X P = 15 X = 13 X 396,076 = 5,941,140
In other words, by imposing the constraint on the path length, the number of paths
that could be found by the proposer has been reduced by seven orders of magnitude.
More important, however, is a general observation based on the formula for P above.
If there is no fixed limit on path length (/), P will grow exponentially as n increases.
On the other hand, if 1 is fixed as n increases, P grows only polynomially. Thus, the
limit on path length prevents the search problem from being as bad as it could be.
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Imposing constraints on the structure of the network so that there is no longer a
single link joining each pair ofnodes will also further reduce P. Unfortunately, there
is no simple way to determine how structural constraints, realized as the removal of
links from the network, will affect P. As links are removed, the number of paths that
exist between two nodes will depend on which nodes are chosen, and this greatly
complicates matters. All we can do at this point is to postulate sample networks and
examine their behavior. One such network already has been proposed, namely the
one depicted in Figure 7.1.
If the proposer is allowed to search through the network of Figure 7.1 with the
only constraint being a limit of six on the path length, the proposer will find only
54 paths between the same 15 pairs of endpoints used above—a decrease from the
5,941,140 paths found in a fully-connected network with the same number of nodes.
Finally, applying the constraints under which the proposer normally runs (i.e., causal
orintentional relations between events, no paths between competing word senses, etc.)
as in the example of Chapter 5, the proposer finds only 33 paths between nine pairs
of nodes—12 orders of magnitude smaller than the worst-case value for P given the
same number of nodes.
This is, of course, only one case; we could generate examples in which the
numbers are worse. As networks are scaled up, the problem associated with un
controlled spreading activation or marker-passing search becomes increasingly ugly.
Nevertheless, it appears that the proposer's search problem is manageable if rea
sonable assumptions are made about the organization of memory and the depth of
search.
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7.3 Searching for the best interpretation
With all constraints in effect, the proposer finds 33 paths between nine pairs of
nodes when processing Text 5. This does not mean that the search space generated
by the proposer consists of only 33 solutions, for the possible solutions which the
filter will consider are made up of combinations of paths. Given the aforementioned
restrictions on the proposer and on memory, there are at most 2^^ = 8,589,934,592
possible combinations of paths. This large number may be reduced by considering
the structure and meaning of memory to a mere 6912 possible interpretations, an
improvement of six orders of magnitude.^ This number is computed in the following
manner. Any open class word in the text may activate one or more nodes in the
semantic memory. The proposer finds paths joining the nodes activated by one word
to the nodes activated by another word. The discovered paths are different and
competing relationships between a pair of words, and the filter can choose only one of
these paths for inclusion in its representation. The set of paths joining two words are
interchangeable and therefore represent an equivalence class of paths. As ATLAST
processes more words from the text it establishes more equivalence classes. At any
given time during the processing, ATLAST's active interpretation may include at
most one representative from each of the equivalence classes established up to that
point. After reading all of Text 5, ATLAST has established seven such equivalence
classes; these classes are depicted in Table 7.1.
Recall that Table 7.1 shows three paths connecting EMBASSY to SEARCH, eight
connecting either INSECT or MICROPHONE to SEARCH, and so on. Since ATLAST's
final interpretation must include exactly one path from each of these classes, the
'Many of these interpretations will be nonsensical, but they are still theoretically possible.
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total number of interpretations possible is the product of the number of paths in
each of the classes. In the case of Text 5, the number of possible interpretations is:
3x8x12x1x3x4x2 = 6912
The filter's task then is to find the single best combination of paths which
explains the input text. Its search space is the set of all possible combinations con
taining exactly one path from each equivalence class. When the proposer discovers a
new path and passes it to the filter, it is in effect saying, "Compare the explanation
you have now to the explanation that you would have if it included this path and
choose the better one." The evaluation of a path represents an opportunity to move
one step through the search space: the filter either can stay with the current solution
or replace it with the one containing the path being evaluated.
7.3.1 The filter's search method
The filter's styleofsearchis best characterizedas a formof hill-climbing. The fil
ter's search for an interpretation is incremental, tied to the presentation of new words
from the input. With each additional word, the filter uses heuristics to determine
which of the interpretations proposed through the processing of the new word is best.
Hill-climbing suffers from a number of problems, the most serious being the tendency
to stop at a locally optimal solution. On the other hand, hill-climbing search has
the advantage of being computationally inexpensive when compared to other search
techniques. This combination of traits makes hill-climbing a useful search technique
when modeling human behavior, as human behavior is not necessarily optimal be
havior (Langley, Gennaxi, &: Iba, 1987).
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It has been suggested that ATLAST's method of finding a solution is also a
form of backtracking. While ATLAST may reconsider interpretations it has pre
viously rejected, it maintains no record of what has been considered in the past;
ATLAST knows only the current solution state and a set of other likely solutions,
some of which have been considered and others which have not. Backtracking, un
like ATLAST, relies on a history of previous choices (Charniak & McDermott, 1985;
Nilsson, 1980). ATLAST may return to a solution it has held at someearlier time, but
it will be through a series of opportunistic moves in the search space, not by directed
backtracking. Thus, the filter's search bears at most only a superficial resemblance
to backtracking.
7.3.2 The principle of locality
The expectation that the filter's hill-climbing search will arrive at the best
interpretation of a specific text without unduly taxing ATLAST's computational
resources is based on the fact that text tends to be focused. Although this focus
changes over time, the change is gradual. At any given time, the particular piece of
text being read has a much higher probability of relating to what was just read or
will soon be read than it does of relating to what was read long ago or will be read
far in the future. This assumption is reflected in the behavior of the retained paths:
those retained paths which are subsequently suppressed after some interval represent
interpretations which might have been plausible at some earlier time but have been
deemed implausible with the passage of time and more text. The active and retained
paths therefore represent a slowly-changing window of activity in memory.
The notion of a window of activity is known elsewhere in computer science.
Virtual memory operating systems can taJce advajitage of the tendency of a computer
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prograrn to favor a subset of its instructions at any time during execution; this
tendency is known as the principle of locality (Denning, 1970). The program is
divided into units called pages. Because of the principle of locality, only a small
subset of a program's pages need be in memory for the program to be executed.
This set of pages is called the working set. When an instruction from within the
working set refers to a page not in the working set, a page from the working set
must be removed and the new page added (assuming a limit on the number of pages
in the working set). If the program is well-constructed the working set will change
gradually. Conversely, if the program is poorly-constructed and does not adhere to
the principle of locality, the working set may change so rapidly that the operating
system spends far more time swapping pages than executing the program.
As with the management of retained paths, the management of an operating
system's working set requires a heuristic for deciding which of its members should be
removed (i.e., which is least likely to be referenced in the future) when the operating
system encounters a reference to something outside the working set. A heuristic for
removing a page from the working set may be based on the length of time since
the page was last referenced, for example, with the least recently used page being
removed first. For both the operating system and ATLAST, the heuristic may be
fallible. In the operating system, removing the wrong page means extra work must
be done to bring that page back into the working set when it is referenced again. In
ATLAST, suppressing the wrong path may lead to an incorrect interpretation oftext,
but a more comprehensive model (or a human reader) might be forced into conscious
problem solving or rereading of the text at this point.
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active paths
path2 path4 paths path23 path24 path28 path29
retained paths
pathO paths path? path25 path2? path32
paths pathl? path26 pathSO
pathl 1 pathlS paths1
path20
path21
path22
suppressed paths
pathl paths pathl3
paths pathl4
pathlO pathlS
pathl2 pathlS
pathlS
Table 7.2: Inference paths discovered during the processing of Text 5, grouped by
path status at completion of processing.
7.3.3 Controlling the filter's search
By the time the processing of a text is completed, the paths found by the
proposer can be grouped into three categories: the active paths, the retained paths,
and the suppressed or inactive paths. In the example of Text 5, there are 7 active
paths, 16 retained paths, and 10 suppressed paths; these are shown in Table 7.2.
The search space of solutions or interpretations can be categorized in a similar
fashion. There is only one active interpretation at any given time; this is the set
of active paths. The set of retained interpretations consists of all interpretations
which contain no suppressed paths and at least one retained path. The number of
paths in this category can be computed by calculating the number of interpretations
represented by all active and retained paths and subtracting one for the combination
of all active paths. For Text 5 this number is 2x4x7x1x3x4x2—1 = 1343. The set
of suppressed interpretations consists of any interpretation containing a suppressed
path. This value may be computed indirectly by subtracting the number of active
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and retained interpretations from the number of all possible interpretations; there
are 6912 —1344 = 5568 suppressed interpretations at the end of Text 5.
With these idea^ in mind we can now re-examine, from a performance perspec
tive, the significance of either retaining or suppressing a path in ATLAST. Recall
that a retained path is re-evaluated by the filter whenever it shares enough nodes
with another path being evaluated—-a path which has been newly discovered by the
proposer or an older path which has been rediscovered. On the other hand, sup
pressed paths are treated as if they had never been discovered; consequently, the
filter is never reminded of them. Because suppressed paths have little probability of
being re-evaluated, any interpretation containing a suppressed path similarly has lit
tle probability of being considered by the filter.^ By comparison, the interpretations
that can be constructed by exchanging a retained path for an active path, which is
another way of describing the set of retained interpretations, should have a much
higher probability of being considered. Thus, the active, retained, and suppressed
solutions can also be viewed respectively as the interpretation currently considered
to be correct, the interpretations likely to be worth considering in the future, and the
interpretations determined to be no longer useful.
I
Referring again to the example ofText 5, the filter suppresses 10 inference paths
by the end of processing, representing only 30% of the paths found by the proposer. J
Yet by suppressing only 30% of the paths, the filter has eliminated 80% of the possi
ble interpretations from consideration. Thus conditional retention provides a useful
heuristic technique for significantly reducing ATLAST's search space, assuming the
existence of an effective metric for determining which paths are retained and which
•^A suppressed path may later be discovered and evaluated during the processing of later text. M
This could happen, for example, ifthe words corresponding to the endpoints of the suppressed path ^
were repeated in the text. Thus while the suppression of a path substantially diminishes its chances
for re-evaluation, it does not completely rule out the possibility.
I
g
1
I
1
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are suppressed. Conditional retention enables ATLAST to arrive at an interpreta
tion more efficiently than systems which hold onto all possible explanations (e.g.,
Granger's ARTHUR, 1980a) while still maintaining the ability to change its inter
pretation in the face of contradictory information, unlike systems which retain no
alternate explanations (e.g.. Hirst's ABSITY, 1988b).
Conditional retention in ATLAST requires a method to determine which paths
are retained and which paths are suppressed—in other words, a useful heuristic for
pruning the search space. Imagine, as an extreme case, a heuristic which pruned too
much and suppressed some of the paths of the correct interpretation. Such a heuristic
would be useless. At the other extreme, a heuristic which pruned too little would
improve the chances of finding the correct interpretation at the expense of making
the filter perform many more evaluations.
Some potentially plausible heuristics may also cause problems. For example,
consider a heuristic which suppressed retained paths according to how long they had
been retained, with the oldest retained paths being suppressed first. If ATLAST had
been using this heuristic while processing Text 5, path2 would be among the first to
be suppressed. Consequently, when faced with the information that the embassy staff
really was looking for insects, ATLAST would be unable to fix its interpretation. This
heuristic was used in an early version of ATLAST until this problem was discovered.
The heuristic ATLAST currently uses is based on the number of consecutive times a
retained path is re-evaluated without being activated. In a crude way, this heuristic
takes into account both the duration of retention (i.e., the number of times the path
is re-evaluated) and its demonstrated plausibility as part of an active explanation
(i.e., the retained path that is subsequently activated and then retained again starts
with a clean slate).
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As ATLAST processes a text, the search space grows very large very quickly.
The principle of inference path retention provides a means of dividing the search
space into likely solutions and unlikely solutions; this helps guide the filter's search
through the rapidly expanding search space. It seems reasonable to predict that the
size of ATLAST's search space of active and retained interpretations could be held
roughly constant if, after some start-up period, retained paths were suppressed at
the same rate at which new paths were retained; in fact, an example of this behavior
is seen in Figure 7.2 in which the growth of ATLAST's search space of possible
interpretations during the processing of Text 5 is compared to the growth of its set of
retained interpretations. At first the growth of the number ofretainedinterpretations
parallels the growth of all possible interpretations but it then drops off dramatically.
The current pruning heuristic performs well on Text 5, but it fails to give any
advantage in the processing of some other texts. For example, ATLAST finds the
correct interpretation for Text 10 in Appendix A, but the filter does not suppress
any paths along the way. No solutions are pruned from the search space, so there
is no advantage over an approach which saves all possible solutions, at least in this
case. If the heuristic is modified so that it tolerates fewer re-evaluations of a retained
path before it suppresses the path, the filter will suppress some paths but they will
be the wrong ones and ATLAST will not recover from its original misinterpretation
of Text 10.
Obviously, the heuristic currently used for path suppression is not perfect. Of
several different heuristics tested, the one described above seems to be the best, but
its performance isfar from convincing. This is not, however, an argument against con
ditional retention. ATLAST's implementation has followed a minimalist approach,
beginning with a simple and stupid model, adding "intelligence" to it as needed but
I
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Figure 7.2: The growth of the space of possible interpretations during the processing
of Text 5.
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staying within the realm of psychological validity at the same time. The goal in
building ATLAST has always been to test the plausibility of ideas about inference
decisions and error recovery, not to construct a comprehensive language processing
system. Therefore, in the course of building ATLAST, many simplifying assump
tions have been made about the representation, the processes, and the interactions
between them. It is possible that the repercussions of these assumptions are being
felt here: the suppression heuristic could probably take advantage ofboth knowledge
and processes which do not exist in this model, suggesting not the invalidity of the
conditional retention theory but merely the need for more programming.
7.3.4 Resource consumption
The point of any heuristic search is to maximize the probability of achieving
some goal while at the same time attempting to minimize the consumption of one or
more resources. These resources are typically defined in terms of computational effort
and memory usage. In the filter's search for the best interpretation ofa text, compu
tational effort can be measured as the number of path evaluations performed, which
is the filter's most computationally-intensive task. Memory usage can be measured
as the number of retained inference paths.
In processing Text 5, ATLAST selects one interpretation fromthe 6912 interpre
tations that are possible. To accomplish this task, ATLAST does not evaluate every
interpretation individually; instead it is able to eliminate potentially large groups of
interpretations each time it decides not to activate a path. On the other hand, paths
are often evaluated more than once, because the decision to retain a path is only a
temporary rejection of a set of interpretations. The number of evaluations performed
is directly related to two variables: (1) the maximum duration of path retention and
177
(2) the minimum degree of similarityrequired between two paths for the evaluation of
one to force the evaluation of the other. As implemented in ATLAST, these variables
are represented as two now familiar parameters: (1) the maximum number of con
secutive unsuccessful evaluations allowed for a retained path before it is suppressed
and (2) the minimum number of nodes shared between a path being evaluated and
another retained path. This relationship is depicted graphically in Figure 7.3. The
data points are generated by running ATLAST 147 times on Text 5, each time with
a different pair of parameter settings.
As the duration of path retention is increased, the number of retained paths
increases as well. A greater number of retained paths means a greater number of
paths subject to re-evaluation via shared nodes with other paths being evaluated.
This in turn results in an increase in the total number of path evaluations, which
appears as the surface's positive slope along the y-axis in Figure 7.3. On the other
hand, an increase in the number of shared nodes required to indirectly trigger re-
evaluation of a retained path makes it more difficult to establish sufficient similarity
between any two paths. This results in fewer path evaluations, and is reflected in the
negative slope of the surface along the x-axis in the figure.
Most of the cases shown in Figure 7.3 do not result in a correct interpretation.®
Of the 147 cases shown, only 40 resulted in a correct interpretation. These cases are
isolated in Figure 7.4. In this figure, the intersections above the "floor" indicate the
parameter settings giving a correct interpretation.
®A correct interpretation is the set ofall nodes in ATLAST's memory, and the links which join
them, that conveys the meaning intended by the author of the text. The correct interpretation
must account for all actors, actions, and objects that are explicitly represented in the text, as well
as those which can be easily inferred, but must not include other nodes. The correct interpretation
must not include contradictions or unresolved ambiguities, and it must be a single interconnected
subnetwork.
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Figure 7.3: Number of path evaluations performed during the processing of Text 5
as conditional retention parameters are varied: all interpretations.
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Figure 7.4: Number of path evaluations performed during the processing of Text 5
as conditional retention parameters are varied: correct interpretations only.
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One might be surprised by some of the parameter values that did not result in
a correct interpretation. For example, with the minimum number of shared nodes set
to three and the maximum number of unsuccessful evaluations set to twenty (point B
of Figure 7.4), ATLAST finds the correct interpretation of Text 5. Yet when the
minimum number of shared nodes is set to zero (point A), so that every retained
path is re-evaluated, ATLAST is unable to find the correct interpretation. How
could ATLAST fail in the latter case when it appears to be doing a more thorough
job of reconsidering retained paths? The problem is that decreasing the value of the
maximum number of unsuccessful evaluations will not only increase the number of
retained paths being re-evaluated on any given cycle, it will also increase the expected
frequency with which any given path will be re-evaluated. If those re-evaluations do
not result in that path being re-activated, it will be suppressed. At point B, a path
necessary for a correct interpretation was still among the retained paths when it was
needed. At point A, however, that same path was unavailable because it had been
re-evaluated unsuccessfully more than twenty times and was suppressed.
Ideally, ATLAST should arrive at a correct final interpretation using the least
number of evaluations possible. In Figure 7.4, that minimum occurs when both
the minimum number of shared nodes and the maximum number of unsuccessful
evaluations are five (point C). At the same time, however, we want to minimize the
number of paths retained by ATLAST during the processing. The number of retained
paths is also affected by changes to the two variables; the effects of such changes are
shown in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5 demonstrates that the number of retained paths not only increases
as the duration of path retention is increased, but it also grows as the number of
shared nodes is increased. Increasing the minimum degree of similarity required for
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Figure7.5:NumberofpathsretainedduringtheprocessingofText5asconditional
retentionparametersarevaried:allinterpretations.
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re-evaluation results in fewer path evaluations. As evaluations occur less frequently,
the time between a retained path's re-evaluations will grow, and the path will be
retained for a longer time period, although the number of consecutive unsuccessful
re-evaluations required for suppression of that path will not have changed.
The total number of retained paths is plotted once more in Figure 7.6, but
with only the parameter settings which result in a correct interpretation. Again, the
desired minimum occurs at the same setting of the parameter for duration of path
retention, but at a slightly different value for the number ofshared nodes required to
trigger path re-evaluation: five and four (point D), respectively, in this case versus
five and five in the previous case (point C of Figure 7.4). Thus, there is no single
parameter setting which minimizes both the number of path evaluations and the
number of retained paths, but it is apparent that the best performance is achieved
when the duration of path retention is relatively small.® Both ATLAST's compu
tational and memory resources are taxed more heavily as the set of retained paths
grows. However, the duration of path retention must not be so short that paths are
suppressed almost as soon as they are retained, else ATLAST will not be able to
recover from erroneous inference decisions.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has viewed ATLAST as a search process whose goal is to find the
best interpretation of a text. In fact, ATLAST's search process actually has two
®Figure 7.6 also contains a plateau which indicates an upper bound on the number of retained
paths. This plateau is merely an artifact of the text, the memory network, and the limitson marker-
passing. Regardless of the values of the parameters for duration of path retention and number of
shared nodes, the proposer will find only 33 paths for evaluation. Seven of these paths make up
the correct interpretation, leaving at most 26 paths that can be retained. The plateau reflects the
parameter settings which result in the retention of all 26 paths.
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Figure 7.6: Number of paths retained during the processing of Text 5 as conditional
retention parameters are varied: correct interpretations only.
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components: the proposer's search for inference paths suggested by a text, and the
filter's search for a single interpretation of the text made up of a subset of those
inference paths.
The proposer uses marker-passing in a breadth-first intersection search for in
ference paths. There has been some speculation that a marker-passing search in a
very large memory network may inundate a path evaluator with a huge number of
unimportant paths (Charniak, 1986). This chapter has demonstrated that reason
able assumptions about the organization of memory and the distance that markers
may be passed greatly reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic overload of the path
evaluator. In other words, the efficiency of marker-pcissing search is governed not by
the size of the network but by the structure of the network and the constraints on
marker-passing.^
To find theset of paths which best explains a text, thefilter uses a hill-climbing
search. Hill-climbing can lead to a locally optimal solution, which in many cases is
undesirable. Human text understanding, however, seems to benefit if the text follows
a principle of locality. Common sense tells us that a passage in which transitions
between topics axe few and gradual is far more readable than one in which the tran
sitions are numerous and abrupt. Manuals of writing style remind us that, for the
sake of readability, a paragraph should have a single topic, and that the beginning
of the paragraph should signal the transition from one topic to another. Thus, a
search process that finds a locally optimal interpretation may not be adequate for
other tasks, but it may be exactly what is needed for text understanding.
Cohen and Kjeldsen (1987) have come to a similar conclusion in their work on an information
retrieval system using constrained spreading activation, as has Jones (in preparation) in his work
on a spreading activation approach to problem solving.
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In summary, ATLAST's component search techniques, marker-passing and hill-
_ climbing, may not be ideally suited to many problems. However, one can make
j ™ assumptions about the problem of text understanding which minimize the disadvan
tages of these two search techniques. These assumptions should hold regardless of
the size of the memory network. Thus, ATLAST's processing principles should work
efficiently in large networks as well as small ones.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary
Conditional retention is a theory of how a human language understander recov
ers from an incorrect choice of word meaning. According to this theory, all meanings
of an ambiguous word are retrieved and the context-appropriate meaning is chosen.
The other meanings are not forgotten but are retained for a certain period of time.
If the choice of meaning is contradicted by later text, the retained meanings are re
considered and a new one is selected. The benefit of conditional retention is that it
enables the understander to recover from many inference errors without incurring the
cost of backtracking and reprocessing.
Conditional retention is compatible with theprevalent active suppression theory
oflexical access, and it answers questions which the active suppression theory cannot.
Retention of alternative word meanings after a choice haa been made is strongly
supported by two experiments (Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Holbrook &: Eiselt, in
preparation).
ATLAST is a computational model of language understanding which incorpo
rates a theory of recovery from erroneous lexical inference decisions based on the
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principles of conditional retention. In addition, the ATLAST framework, particu
larly the mechanism of conditional retention, has been shown to facilitate recovery
from erroneous pragmatic inference decisions, thus demonstrating that the proposed
mechanisms have both utility and generaility. Furthermore, ATLAST demonstrates
how individual differences in the conditional retention mechanism might explain in
dividual differences in pragmatic inference decisions.
Although this research offers explanations for a broad range of linguistic and
related phenomena, it by no means answers all questions about language understand
ing. Some of the more important questions raised by ATLAST are discussed in the
following sections.
8.2 Open questions
Work on ATLAST has emphasized processing issues over representation issues,
but representation issues are by no means unimportant. ATLAST uses a simple
relational memory for its representation of semantic knowledge, and its inference
evaluation process relies far more on the structure of memory (e.g., the number of
links in a path) than on the content of memory (e.g., the meaning of a path) in
arriving at an interpretation of a text.
This emphasis on the structure of memory over its content raises concerns
about ATLAST's dependence upon a particular representation scheme. For exam
ple, ATLAST's preference for shorter inference paths, regardless of the relationship
represented by those paths, is essential to finding the correct interpretation of a text.
Yet a careless insertion or deletion of a node and link while constructing ATLAST's
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memory network can have a significant effect on that interpretation. Does this ap
parent brittleness call into question ATLAST's credibility as a cognitive model? The
simple answer is that ATLAST is no more susceptible to accidents in the construction
of its memory than is a model using any other approach; it would be just eis easy to
misrepresent some important attribute in a model which relied more on memory con
tent than on structure. Therefore, ATLAST's reliance on a particular representation
scheme makes it no less credible than any other cognitive model.
The answer given above ignores a hidden but more important issue, however:
should the processing component of a language understander not be dependent upon
the representation component? Independence of this kind would certainly ease the
fears of those who might worry about memory construction accidents, and a language
processing system built under such a constraint would be extremely portable and able
to work with any vocabulary available. But these are software engineering issues, not
cognitive science issues. From the latter perspective, we must ask if it is reasonable
to expect that the human language processing component has not evolved to take
the best possible advantage of the implementation specifics of its representational
counterpart. In other words, will just any representation schemesuffice, either in the
human brain or in cognitive models? The answer to both questions is no, and this
answer is reflected in the work of many NLU researchers: the processing components
of some eaxlier language understanding models took great advantage of shorter path
effects that emerged from specific representation schemes (Quillian, 1969; Wilks,
1978), and in some more recent models the representation and processing components
are one and the same (Cottrell, 1985; Pollack, 1987).
How then is semantic knowledge represented in the human language under
stander? ATLAST might be able to shed some light on this question in the future.
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ATLAST currently processes simple examples using a semantic memory in which
lexical and pragmatic knowledge are uniformly represented, and in which the struc
ture of memory is as important to understanding as is the content of memory. More
complicated examples, however, will undoubtedly require a greater reliance on the
content of memory and the principles of its organization (e.g., scripts, themes, etc.).
H Robust relational memory schemes incorporating these and other factors could be
constructed and tested with ATLAST. The more plausible models ofhuman memory
would be those that allowed ATLAST to interpret texts of greater difficulty, main
tain adherence to the four constraints on understanding described in Chapter 2, and
explain additional linguistic phenomena. These studies might in turn lead to pre-
H dictions which could be tested through experiments with human subjects, eventually
leading to new insights into human memory.
I Another open question has to do with the functional independence of syntac-
H tic and semantic processing. The texts that ATLAST can understand are, from a
syntactic viewpoint, uninteresting. ATLAST parses only simple sentences in subject-
H verb-object order; it cannot handle interrogatives, imperatives, negatives, or passives,
for example. These deficits could be corrected through the addition ofa great deal of
syntactic knowledge, but there is perhaps more to be learned from an investigation
H into the relationship between the syntactic and semantic processors. This dissertation
has taken the position that these processors can function independently in unusual
m circumstances, but this position dodges amost important question: to what extent
do the processors interact under more normal conditions? As it is currently imple-
I mented, ATLAST permits little interaction between syntax and semantics, but it has
been constructed specifically so as not to preclude a greater degree of interaction.
Thus, ATLAST can be used as a framework for studying various methods of interac-
J tion between the syntactic and semantic processors. The results of these studies can
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then be compared to human performance on the same tasks and possibly shed new
light on the issue of functional independence.
8.3 The eonnectionist connection
Another issue that might be viewed as an open question is that of the imple
mentation of ATLAST. ATLAST was built as a rule-based symbolic processing model
with marker-passing, despite the growing popularity of eonnectionist or parallel dis
tributed processing models. In fact, one anonymous reviewer of an earlier paper on
conditional retention offered the opinion that conditional retention "cries out" for a
eonnectionist explanation.
Undoubtedly, there would be some benefits to be gained by a eonnectionist
implementation of ATLAST. First, ATLAST would be better received by those who
believe that the only good model is a eonnectionist model. Second, ATLAST would
lose the brittleness that results from its sensitivity to the ordering of the inference
evaluation metrics. Because ATLAST's inference evaluation mechanism is a serial
process, it must be told in advance the order in which it should apply the metrics to
a competing pair of inference paths. A eonnectionist implementation, in which the
functional equivalents of ATLAST's evaluation metrics are built into the architecture,
would eliminate any dependence on an arbitrary ordering of rules. A third benefit
would be the reduction ofATLAST's computational overhead: there would no longer
be a need for the centralized tracking of retained paths.
Recall, though, from the discussion in Chapter 1, that the theory described in
this dissertation was intended to correspond to Marr's (1982) computational theory
191
level, and that the ATLAST program was intended to correspond to Marr's repre
sentation and algorithm level. It was never the intent of this dissertation to address
issues at the implementation level. However, the benefits described above are to be
gained primarily at that same level.^ While these implementation level issues may
well be worth pursuing, connectionist implementations pose a unique set of prob
lems for the natural language researcher (Charniak, 1987). Time and effort spent on
solving those problems would only detract from work on the higher level issues that
ATLAST was intended to address. Consequently, a less problematic implementation
has been employed in ATLAST, and it has served well.
8.4 The end
Solving the mysteries of human language understanding inevitably requires an
answer to the question of how the language understander resolves ambiguity, for
human language is indisputably ambiguous. But ambiguity leads to choices between
possible explanations, and choice opens the door for mistakes. Unless we are willing
to believe that the human language understander makes the right choice the first
time and every time, any explanation of ambiguity resolution must be considered
incomplete if it does not also account for recovery from an incorrect decision.
Many models of natural language understanding have dealt with lexical ambi
guity resolution in some form, but ATLAST is one of the few to have addressed the
associated problem of error recovery. ATLAST's ability to recover from an erroneous
lexical decision stems from its ability to retain the word meanings not chosen for a
^The benefit ofgreater acceptance by the connectionist contingent is gained at what might best
be described as the political level, a level which Marr did not describe but is nevertheless useful in
understanding computational models of cognitive processes.
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short period after it selects the apparently context-appropriate meaning of an ambigu
ous word. The short-term retention of possible lexical inferences permits ATLAST
to recover from incorrect decisions without backtracking and reprocessing text, and
without keeping a record of possible choices indefinitely.
The principle of conditional retention provides a solution to the problem of
error recovery which is compatible with current psycholinguistic theories of lexical
disambiguation. Furthermore, the existence of some form of retention in human lex
ical processing is supported by the results of experiments with human subjects. If
we assume a uniform representation for all semantic knowledge, the theory of condi
tional retention can be extended to offer an explanation of recovery from erroneous
pragmatic inference decisions as well.
The ATLAST model has served as a platform for refining the conditional reten
tion theory, demonstrating its plausibility, andexploring its implications. In addition,
ATLAST illustrates the importance that assumptions play in building models of cog
nitiveprocesses. The constraints one chooses to adopt or ignore in building a process
model directly influence that model's architecture, its behavior, and ultimately its
usefulness as a theory of human cognition. Early models of natural language under
standing tend to address related phenomena at a single level of the understanding
process. As the models begin to address a more diverse set of linguistic phenomena
and cut across the perceived levels of processing, common themes emerge. We see
memory organized in relational networks, spreading activation search mechanisms,
and different processing components running concurrently and, when necessary, in
dependently. Certainly this approach to modeling human language understanding
may eventually prove to be wrong, but for the time being it seems to provide bet
ter coverage of existing data than other approaches. The relative ease with which
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this framework can be expanded to account for recovery from erroneous inferences,
as demonstrated with ATLAST, further reinforces the belief that this framework
represents an important step in the right direction.
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Appendix A
Pragmatic Inference Processing:
Implementation
A.l Pragmatic disambiguation and recovery
This appendix describes the operation of ATLAST as it performs several tasks
in pragmatic inference processing. Using actual output generated by ATLAST dur
ing the processing of simplified versions of the sample stories from Chapter 6, this
appendix shows how ATLAST makes pragmatic inference decisions, how it recovers
from erroneous pragmatic inference decisions, and how it can model either of the two
inference processing strategies described previously.
ATLAST resolves pragmatic ambiguity and successfully corrects its mistakes
using the same inference evaluation and error recovery mechanism that it uses at the
lexical level. These abilities are demonstrated in the processing of a variant of Text 7:
Text 7: John was poor but he owned a gun.
He went to the pawnshop.
He sold the gun.
Because ATLAST does not know about pronouns and understands only the simplest
sentences, ATLAST is given this rough approximation:
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Text 10: John was poor.
John owned a gun.
John went to the pawnshop.
John sold the gun.
Because of the enormity of the output generated by ATLAST during the pro
cessing of Text 10, this example has been edited so that nothing generated by the
capsulizer or the proposer appears, and only the more important actions of the filter
are present. A diagramof the organization of the semanticmemory used by ATLAST
in understanding Text 10 is given in Figure A.l.
Input text is:
John was poor.
John owned a gun.
John went to the pawnshop.
John sold the gun.
Ordering of inference evaluation metrics in force:
MORE-ACTIVATION-METRIC
SHORTER-PATH-METRIC
MORE-REINFORCEMENT-METRIC
MORE-SPECIFIC-METRIC
NO-DECISION-METRIC
Maximum distance of marker-passing: 3
Distaince to pass markers per cycle: 3
Are rejected paths being retained?: t
To enable ATLAST to find the correct interpretation of Text 10, two of the
parameters have been changed from their values in the examples of Chapter 5. The
maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful evaluations that a retained path can
endure before it is suppressed has been increased to 17 as anything less results in
ATLAST arriving at an inconsistent interpretation. The minimum number of nodes
a retained path must share with a path under evaluation so that the retained path
precondition
instance
instance
owned
JohnO
nstance
attribute
^ instance
precondition ^ precondition
possess
be-at- \instance
buyer
money
poor-state
^ result
money
money
instance/^ be-at-
victim
viewed as
precondition
attribute ^
business J ^ victim
instance
pawnshop
pawnshop went
Figure A.l: Memory network for Text 10.
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will be re-evaluated has been reduced to 2. Any greater value for this parameter also
will result in an inconsistent interpretation. The relationship between the parameter
settings and ATLAST's performance is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7.
Max. no. of unsuccessful evaluations: 17
Min. no. of shared nodes to force re-evaluation: 2
Are function words being allocated processing cycles?: nil
Is inference processing forced to complete at periods?: t
A.1.1 The first sentence
ATLAST's processing of the first sentence is uneventful. It finds only one path
connecting John and poor.
New path discovered: pathO
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Activating pathO
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathO)
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is am instamce of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is am attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (BE)
Object: (POOR-STATE)
Direction: nil
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A.1.2 The second sentence
ATLAST begins working on the second sentence and finds that John possesses
something. It then tries to find connections between this fact and the previously
processed text. The system infers that John has the goal of obtaining money and
that owning something is related to that goal. ATLAST has limited knowledge in
this area, however: it knows only that possessing an object of value is a precondition
to selling it (path2) and that possessing an object which can be used as a weapon is
a precondition to stealing something (pathl). ATLAST is unable to decide between
the two paths so both are retained.
New path discovered: pathl
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Activating pathl
New path discovered: path2
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
No-decision metric — pathl and path2 are retained
De-activating pathl
De-activating path2
Continuing with the second sentence of Text 10, ATLAST reads that what John
owns is a gun. While a gun can be viewed as an object to be sold (path4), ATLAST
determines that a more specific use of a gun is as a weapon (path3). The evaluation
metrics select path3 over path4, and any retained paths that are sufficiently related
to either path3 or path4 are re-evaluated. The path that is consistent with the use of
the gun as a weapon (i.e., pathl, in which possession of a weapon is a precondition
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to stealing) is activated. ATLAST has determined that John is going to use his gun
to steal money.
New path discovered: path3
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is am instamce of WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is am instamce of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to shared nodes with pathS
Also reconsidering (path2) due to tie with pathl
Activating path3
Activating pathl
No-decision metric — pathl amd path2 are retained
De-activating pathl
De-activating path2
New path discovered: path4
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is am instance of WEAPON
WEAPON cam be viewed as OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with path4
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to tie with path2
More-specific metric — path3 more specific than path4
De-activating path4
Activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
tham path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathl
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathl path3 pathO)
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instamce POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is am instance of WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPQN is an instance of POSSESS
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Pointers to memory structure:
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Event: eventO
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (BE)
Object: (POOR-STATE) I
Direction: nil "
Event: event 1
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (POSSESS)Object: (GUN) |
Direction: nil
I
I
I
I
I
I
A.1.3 The third sentence
I
I
ATLAST then begins work on the third sentence of the text. After reading ||
John went in the context of the previously processed text, ATLAST infers that John
is going to some yet undisclosed location to steal money. |
New path discovered: pathS
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-BUYER _
BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL I
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with pathS
Activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
than path2
De-activating path2
I
I
I
I
I
I
New path discovered: path6
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (path2 path4) due to shared nodes with path6
Activating path6
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
thain path2
De-activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path4
De-activating path4
New path discovered: path?
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Also reconsidering (path2) due to shared nodes with path?
More-reinforcement metric — path? has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Activating path?
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
thain path2
De-activating path2
New path discovered: pathS
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL has the precondition POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is an instance of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to shared nodes with pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
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Activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — path? has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Active memory structure:
Paths: (paths path? pathl pathS pathO)
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL has the precondition POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is an instance of POSSESS
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is an instance of WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is sm instamce of POSSESS
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instaince JOHNO
ATLAST completes processing on the remainder of the third sentence and finds
that John went to the pawnshop. The system infers that the pawnshop will be the
victim in John's plan of stealing money.
New path discovered: path9
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is em instance of BUSINESS
BUSINESS can be viewed as BUYER
BUYER is a role-filler of BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Also reconsidering (pathS pathS) due to shared nodes with path9
Activating path9
More-reinforcement metric — path? has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
New path discovered: pathlO
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is an instance of BUSINESS
BUSINESS cein be viewed as VICTIM
VICTIM is a role-filler of BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Also reconsidering (pathS pathS) due to shared nodes with pathlO
More-reinforcement metric — pathlO has more shared nodes
tham path9
De-activating path9
Activating pathlO
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — path? has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathlO pathS path? pathl pathS pathO)
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is an instance of BUSINESS
BUSINESS can be viewed as VICTIM
VICTIM is a role-filler of BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is am instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
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BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL has the precondition POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is am instance of POSSESS
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is an instance of WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is an instance of POSSESS
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (BE)
Object: (POOR-STATE)
Direction: nil
Event: event1
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (POSSESS)
Object: (GUN)
Direction: nil
Event: event2
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (GO)
Object: nil
Direction: (PAWNSHOP)
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Using its limited knowledge of goals, plans, and preconditions, ATLAST has
made the inferences necessary to tie together the pragmatically ambiguous events and
states of the first three sentences of Text 10. Up to this point ATLAST has discovered
eleven paths, six of which now make up ATLAST's active interpretation while the
remaining five are retained. The active interpretation is shown in Figure A.2.
A.1.4 The final sentence
ATLAST now processes the final and contradictory sentence of Text 10. The
system had determined previously that John intended to use his gun to steal money
from the pawnshop. However, just the first two words of the final sentence, John
sold, inform ATLAST that it has made the wrong inferences. Initially, ATLAST
finds connections between selling and being poor (pathll), between selling and pos
sessing something (pathl2), and between selling and going somewhere (pathl3).
These paths are added to the active interpretation. The inferences are inconsistent
with the existing interpretation but are not suflScient to cause ATLAST to revise
other inferences.
New path discovered: pathll
Path from SELL to POOR-STATE
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Also reconsidering (pathS path2) due to shared nodes with pathll
Activating pathll
More-reinforcement metric — path7 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
thsui path2
De-activating path2
New path discovered: pathl2
Path from SELL to POSSESS
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SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
PQSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (path2 pathS path4) due to shared nodes
with pathl2
Activating pathl2
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
thain path2
De-activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path4
De-activating path4
New path discovered: pathlS
Path from SELL to GO
SELL has the precondition BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Also reconsidering (pathS pathS path9) due to shared nodes
with pathlS
Activating pathlS
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared.nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — path7 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathlO has more shared nodes
than path9
De-activating path9
Now ATLAST adds pathl5 to its representation of the text, connecting John to
the selling plan. Once this occurs there are ten active paths in ATLAST's interpre
tation of the story: five paths supporting the stealing interpretation, four supporting
the selling interpretation, and one neutral path. While there are more paths favoring
stealing, the four paths representing the selling plan are relatively short paths. Any
yet-to-be-discovered paths which competewith these four paths and also incorporate
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the stealing plan will be longer than their competitors (and fairly uninformative be
cause they include is-a intersections), as in the case of pathlT below which competes
with and loses to pathl2. The longer paths will lose when evaluated against the
shorter paths and the four paths supporting the selling plan will remain active.
Onthe other hand, the five active paths which support the stealing plan compete
with five retained paths which support the selling plan. These retained paths are
approximately the same length as their competitors (give or take a viewed-as link,
which is disregarded in assessing path length) and will consistently win when re-
evaluated because of the reinforcement provided by the four short and effectively
immovable paths supporting the selling plan. An example ofthis occurs below during
the processing of pathlS in which the retained pathS is re-evaluated and supplants
path?. Thus, as new paths are evaluated and retained paths are thereby re-evaluated,
ATLAST will incrementally supplant its "steal money" interpretation with the "sell
possessions" interpretation.
New path discovered: pathlB
• Path from SELL to JOHNO
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Also reconsidering (path2 pathS pathl4) due to shared nodes
with pathlS
Activating pathlS
More-reinforcement metric — pathl has more shared nodes
than path2
De-activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — path? has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Shorter-path metric — pathl2 shorter than pathl4
De-activating pathl4
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New path discovered: pathl7
Path from SELL to POSSESS
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-GBJECT has the role-filler OBJECT
OBJECT can be viewed as WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is an instance of POSSESS
Also reconsidering (path6 pathl4 path2 path4) due to shared nodes
with pathl7
Shorter-path metric — pathl2 shorter than pathl7
De-activating pathl7
New path discovered: pathlS
Path from SELL to POOR-STATE
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
POSSESS has the instsnce POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Also reconsidering (path6 pathl4 path2 pathS pathl6 pathl7 path4)
due to shared nodes with pathlS
No-decision metric — pathl and path2 are retained
De-activating pathl
De-activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path7
De-activating path7
Activating pathS
Old path rediscovered: pathl7
Also reconsidering (path4 path2 pathl pathl4 path6 pathlS) due to
shared nodes with pathl7
Shorter-path metric — pathl2 shorter than pathl7
De-activating pathl7
More-specific metric — pathS more specific than path4
De-activating path4
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Activating path2
More-reinforcement metric — path2 has more shared nodes
than pathl
De-activating pathl
Shorter-path metric — pathl2 shorter than pathl4
De-activating pathl4
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Activating pathS
Shorter-path metric — pathll shorter than pathlS
De-activating pathlS
New path discovered: pathl9
Path from SELL to POOR-STATE
SELL has the precondition BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-VICTIM
BE-AT-VICTIM is a precondition of STEAL
STEAL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Also reconsidering (pathlS pathS pathl4 pathl pathlS path? path9)
due to shared nodes with pathl9
More-reinforcement metric — path9 has more shared nodes
than pathlO
De-activating pathlO
Activating path9
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path9 pathS path2 pathS pathlS pathlS pathl2 pathll
paths pathO)
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is am instzuice of BUSINESS
BUSINESS can be viewed as BUYER
BUYER is a role-filler of BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-BUYER
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BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instsince BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from SELL to JOHNO
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
POOR-STATE is an instsm.ce of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Path from SELL to GO
SELL has the precondition BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instsmce of BE-ATrPLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from SELL to POSSESS
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is sm instance of POSSESS
Path from SELL to POOR-STATE
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is an instamce of WEAPON
WEAPON is a role-filler of POSSESS-WEAPON
POSSESS-WEAPON is an instance of POSSESS
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instamce JOHNO
ATLAST's interpretation now consists of ten paths. With one exception, all
paths either support the "sell possession" interpretation or are neutral (i.e., pathO).
The exception is path3, which connects GUN to POSSESS and is the only active path
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containing the GUN node. As the remainder of the final sentence is read, ATLAST is
reminded of the retained path4 which also includes the GUN node and makes the final
correction. The system also adds a path connecting GUN and SELL.
Old path rediscovered: path4
Also reconsidering (pathl7 pathlS) due to shared nodes with path4
More-reinforcement metric — path4 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Activating path4
New path discovered: path21
Path from GUN to SELL
GUN is am instamce of WEAPON
WEAPON cam be viewed as OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
Also reconsidering (pathlS pathlT pathS) due to shared nodes
with path21
Activating path21
ATLAST completes processing of Text 10 and issues its final interpretation:
Processing completed
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path21 path4 path9 pathS path2 pathS pathlS pathlS
path12 path11 pathO)
Path from GUN to SELL
GUN is am instance of WEAPON
WEAPON can be viewed as OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
Path from GUN to POSSESS
GUN is an instance of WEAPON
WEAPON can be viewed as OBJECT
OBJECT is a role-filler of POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is aii instance of POSSESS
Path from PAWNSHOP to GO
PAWNSHOP is an instance of BUSINESS
BUSINESS can be viewed as BUYER
BUYER is a role-filler of BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from GO to POSSESS
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Path from POSSESS to POOR-STATE
POSSESS has the instance POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is a precondition of SELL
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from GO to POOR-STATE
GO is a precondition of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the instance BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is a precondition of SELL
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from SELL to JOHNO
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instaince JOHNO
Path from SELL to GO
SELL has the precondition BE-AT-BUYER
BE-AT-BUYER is an instance of BE-AT-PLACE
BE-AT-PLACE has the precondition GO
Path from SELL to POSSESS
SELL has the precondition POSSESS-OBJECT
POSSESS-OBJECT is an instance of POSSESS
Path from SELL to POOR-STATE
SELL is a plan of A-MONEY
A-MONEY is a result of POOR-STATE
Path from POOR-STATE to JOHNO
POOR-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-ECON-STATE
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HUMAN-ECON-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance JOHNO
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (BE)
Object: (POOR-STATE)
Direction: nil
Event: event1
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (POSSESS)
Object: (GUN)
Direction: nil
Event: event2
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (GO)
Object: nil
Direction: (PAWNSHOP)
Event: events
Actor: (JOHNO)
Action: (SELL)
Object: (GUN)
Direction: nil
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ATLAST's final interpretation of Text 10 is, in part, a network of relationships
between concepts represented by the 11 paths listed above. This network is high
lighted in Figure A.3. In the process of deciding upon those 11 paths, ATLAST
discovered and ultimately rejected 13 others. This example has concentrated on the
path evaluation process. However, the collection of chosen paths alone does not
provide a complete understanding of the text. Thus, concurrent with the discovery
and selection of explanatory inference paths, ATLAST has constructed a sequence
of pointers into the network which provides a temporal ordering on the events and a
determination of thematic role assignments (i.e., who did what and when).
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money 'pawnshop' 'went' 'gun'
Figure A.3: Active paths in memory after processing all four sentences of Text 10.
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In brief, ATLAST has resolved the pragmatic ambiguity presented by Text 10,
incorrectly at first, and then corrected its mistake. This is accomplished using the
same processes used in the lexical ambiguity example of Chapter 5. There are no
changes to the program other than the two parameter values mentioned at the be-,
ginning of this example.
A.2 Strategy-driven inference processing
In the example above, ATLAST's ability to process the text successfully stems
from twofundamental assumptions: (1) the inseparability and uniform representation
of lexical and pragmatic knowledge, and (2) the retention of rejected inferences. The
examples which follow will demonstrate how those same two assumptions enable
ATLAST to model the strategy-driven inference behavior described in Chapter 6.
The first of these examples will show ATLAST modeling perseverer behavior on a
simplified version of Text 8:
Text 8: Wilma began to cry.
Fred had just asked her to marry him.
The second example will show how ATLAST models recency behavior and arrives at
a different interpretation of the same text due only to a difference in how ATLAST
deals with unresolvable inference decisions. The semantic memory used in these two
examples is shown in Figure A.4.
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Figure A.4: Memory network for Text 11.
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A.2.1 An example of perseverer behavior
As with the previous examples, the input text has been simplified for the next
two examples. The simplified text is:
Text 11: Wilma cried.
Fred had proposed to Wilma.
As ATLAST begins processing this example using the perseverer strategy, a
new inference evaluation metric, the preferred-link metric, is added to those used
in previous examples. The parameters controlling retention and re-evaluation again
have been tuned for better performance.
Input text is:
Wilma cried.
Fred had proposed to Wilma.
Inference strategy in effect: perseverer
Ordering of inference evaluation metrics in force:
MORE-ACTIVATION-METRIC
SHORTER-PATH-METRIC
MORE-REINFORCEMENT-METRIC
MORE-SPECIFIC-METRIC
PREFERRED-LINK-METRIC
NO-DECISION-METRIC
Maximum distance of marker-passing: 3
Distance to pass markers per cycle: 3
Are rejected paths being retained?: t
Max. no. of unsuccessful evaluations: 3
Min. no. of shared nodes to force re-evaluation: 4
Are function words being allocated processing cycles?: nil
Is inference processing forced to complete at periods?: t
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During the processing of the first sentence, ATLAST finds competing paths
joining the words Wilma and cried.
New path discovered: pathO
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a result of HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
Activating pathO
New path discovered: pathl
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a preferred result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
Preferred-link metric — pathl has more pref links than pathO
De-activating pathO
Activating pathl
The first four inference evaluation metrics are unable to make a decision between
the competing paths. This would normally result in a split-decision to be resolved
later, but in this caseone of the paths, pathl, contains a preferred link. The preferred-
link metric determines therefore that pathl is a default inference and chooses it over
pathO. Because the preferred-link metric is always the last decision-making metric to
be invoked, ATLAST uses default inferences only as a last resort.
Active memory structure:
Paths: (pathl)
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a preferred result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
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Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor; (WILMAO)
Action: (CRY-TEARS)
Object: nil
Direction: nil
As ATLAST processes the second sentence, any inference decisions are biased
by the active context from the first sentence—that Wilma is crying because she is
sad. Thus, Fred's marriage proposal, which would normally be viewed as a happy
event, is interpreted as one causing despair.
New path discovered: path2
Path from PRGPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Activating path2
New path discovered: pathS
Path from PRGPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PRGPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE has the preferred result CRY-TEARS
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path2
De-activating path2
Activating pathS
New path discovered: pathS
Path from PRGPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PRGPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instemce FREDO
Also reconsidering (path4) due to shared nodes with pathS
Activating pathS
Shorter-path metric — pathS shorter than path4
De-activating path4
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New path discovered: path?
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path?
De-activating path?
Active memory structure;
Paths: (paths pathS pathl)
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is em instauice of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instaoice of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE has the preferred result CRY-TEARS
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a preferred result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
ATLAST reads the last two words of the text, to Wilma, and finds two more
paths that reinforce its existing interpretation.
New path discovered: pathS
Path from WILMAO to FREDO
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
Activating pathS
New path discovered; path9
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Also reconsidering (path4) due to shared nodes with path9
Activating path9
Shorter-path metric — path3 shorter thzin path4
De-activating path4
Suppressing path4
New path discovered: pathlO
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is a result of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the preferred instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Also reconsidering (path7) due to shared nodes with pathlO
More-reinforcement metric — path9 has more shared nodes
than pathlO
De-activating pathlO
More-reinforcement metric — pathS has more shared nodes
than path7
De-activating path7
Suppressing path7
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path9 pathS pathS pathS pathl)
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Path from WILMAO to FREDO
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
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Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE has the preferred result CRY-TEARS
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a preferred result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
Processing completed
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event1
Actor: (FREDO)
Action: (PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
Object: nil
Direction: (WILMAO)
Event: event0
Actor: (WILMAO)
Action: (CRY-TEARS)
Object: nil
Direction: nil
This example of ATLAST's perseverer strategy provides another demonstration
of ATLAST's ability to resolve pragmatic ambiguities using the same processes that
were previously employed in a lexical disambiguation task. ATLAST's interpretation
of Text 11 is displayed in Figure A.5. If the reader senses something familiar about
the perseverer strategy, it is because the perseverer strategy was used in all previous
examples. The preferred-link metric was not used during the processing of Text 5 or
Text 10 so it wa5 omitted from the sample output. In this sense, the example just
presented is redundant in that it tells us nothing new about ATLAST. It is included
here as a basis for comparison to ATLAST's processing of the same text. Text 11,
using the recency strategy.
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Figure A,5: ATLAST's per5everer interpretation of Text 11.
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A.2.2 An example of recency behavior
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ATLAST's recency strategy for inference processing is different inonly two ways
from its perseverer strategy. One difference is that the occurrence of an unresolved
path competition results in both competing paths being locked out of the inference
evaluation process until ATLAST has read the entire text. These postponed decisions
are stored in a queue so that the most recently postponed decisions will be the first
to be re-evaluated at the end of the text. Thus, the recency strategy postpones the
resolution of split decisions, while the perseverer strategy resolves them as soon as
possible. In conjunction with the forced delay in deciding ties, the recency strategy
also does not invoke the tie-breaking rule, the preferred-link metric, until the end
of the text when the postponed split decisions are reprocessed. This is the second
difference between the the two strategies.
When told to use the recency strategy, ATLAST's inference processing changes
only in the two ways just stated, yet because of these two differences, ATLAST will
arrive at a different interpretation of Text 11 using the recency strategy than it did
when using the perseverer strategy. All other parameters are the same as they were
in the earlier perseverer example.
Input text is:
Wilma cried.
Fred had proposed to Wilma.
Inference strategy in effect: recency
Again ATLAST reads the sentence, Wilma cried. This time, however, the tie
between pathO and pathl is not immediately resolved. The two paths are retained
and prevented from being re-evaluated until the end of the text.
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New path discovered: pathO
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a result of HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
Activating pathO
New path discovered: pathl
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a preferred result of SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
No-decision metric — pathO and pathl are retained
De-activating pathO
De-activating pathl
Old path rediscovered: pathO
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to tie with pathO
Evaluation of pathO postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of pathl postponed due to recency strategy
Active memory structure:
Paths: nil
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event0
Actor: (WILMAO)
Action: (CRY-TEARS)
Object: nil
Direction: nil
Because no decision was made during the processing of the first sentence, there
is no active context to guide the understanding of the second sentence. As ATLAST
discovers competing pairs of paths in this network, it is unable to make any decisions
at all. ATLAST activates only pathS, which simply says that Fred and Wilma are
both human, by the end of the second sentence.
INew path discovered: path2
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Activating path2
New path discovered: pathS
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE has the preferred result CRY-TEARS
No-decision metric — path2 and pathS are retained
De-activating path2
De-activating pathS
Old path rediscovered: pathS
Also reconsidering (path2) due to tie with pathS
Evaluation of pathS postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path2 postponed due to recency strategy
New path discovered: path4
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Activating path4
New path discovered: pathS
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is an instance of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the result SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
Activating pathS
New path discovered: path6
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
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HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE has the preferred result CRY-TEARS
No-decision metric — path4 aind path6 are retained
De-activating path4
De-activating pathS
New path discovered: path?
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPDSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to shared nodes with path?
Also reconsidering (path4) due to tie with path6
No-decision metric — pathS and path? are retained
De-activating pathS
De-activating path?
Evaluation of path6 postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path4 postponed due to recency strategy
New path discovered: pathS
Path from WILMAO to FREDO
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instauice FREDO
Activating pathS
New path discovered: path9
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance SAD-STATE
SAD-STATE is a result of SAD-EVENT
SAD-EVENT has the instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Also reconsidering (pathl path4 pathS) due to shared nodes
with path9
Also reconsidering (pathO) due to tie with pathl
Also reconsidering (path6) due to tie with path4
Also reconsidering (path?) due to tie with pathS
Activating path9
Evaluation of pathl postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path4 postponed due to recency strategy
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Evaluation of pathS postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of pathO postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path6 postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path? postponed due to recency strategy
New path discovered: pathlO
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is a result of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the preferred instance PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Also reconsidering (pathO path6 path?) due to shared nodes
with pathlO
Also reconsidering (pathl) due to tie with pathO
Also reconsidering (path4) due to tie with path6
Also reconsidering (pathS) due to tie with path?
No-decision metric — path9 and pathlO are retained
De-activating path9
De-activating pathlO
Evaluation of pathO postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of pathS postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path? postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of pathl postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of path4 postponed due to recency strategy
Evaluation of pathS postponed due to recency strategy
Active memory structure:
Paths: (paths)
Path from WILMAO to FREDO
WILMAO is am instamce of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance FREDO
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Having reached the end of the text, ATLAST invokes the preferred-link metric
to aid in resolving the postponed decisions. The system then begins to re-evaluate
the postponed decisions beginning with the most recently postponed.
Revised ordering of inference evaluation metrics in force:
MORE-ACTIVATIDN-METRIC
SHORTER-PATH-METRIC
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MORE-REINFORCEMENT-METRIC
MORE-SPECIFIC-METRIC
PREFERRED-LINK-METRIC
NO-DECISION-METRIC
Now processing postponed evaluations
Postponed path being evaluated: pathlO
Also reconsidering: (path6 path? pathO)
Activating pathlO
Activating path6
Activating path7
Activating pathO
Postponed path being evaluated: path9
Also reconsidering: (path4 pathS pathl)
Preferred-link metric — pathlO has more pref links than path9
De-activating path9
More-reinforcement metric — path6 has more shared nodes
than path4
De-activating path4
More-reinforcement metric — path7 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
than pathl
De-activating pathl
Postponed path being evaluated: pathS
Also reconsidering: (path4 path9)
More-reinforcement metric — path7 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
More-reinforcement metric — path6 has more shared nodes
thaui path4
De-activating path4
More-reinforcement metric — pathlO has more shared nodes
than path9
De-activating path9
Postponed path being evaluated: path4
Also reconsidering: (path9 pathS)
More-reinforcement metric — path6 has more shared nodes
than path4
De-activating path4
More-reinforcement metric — pathlO has more shared nodes
than path9
De-activating path9
More-reinforcement metric — path7 has more shared nodes
than paths
De-activating pathS
Postponed path being evaluated: path3
Shorter-path metric — path3 shorter than path6
De-activating pathS
Activating path3
Postponed path being evaluated: path2
More-reinforcement metric — path2 has more shared nodes
than path3
De-activating path3
Activating path2
Postponed path being evaluated: pathl
Also reconsidering: (path9)
More-reinforcement metric — pathO has more shared nodes
than pathl
De-activating pathl
More-reinforcement metric — pathlO has more shared nodes
than path9
De-activating path9
Suppressing path9
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In this example, every one of ATLAST's inference decisions has been initially
postponed and later re-evaluated. Because the first postponed decisions to be re-
evaluated were spawned from Fred's marriage proposal and the proposal is regarded
out of context as a happy event, ATLAST has explained Wilma's tears as tears of
joy. This explanation of Text 11, which is shown in Figure A.6, differs greatly from
that obtained by the perseverer strategy.
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Figure A.6: ATLAST's recency interpretation of Text 11.
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Processing completed
Active memory structure:
Paths: (path2 pathO path7 pathlO pathS)
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to CRY-TEARS
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE has the result CRY-TEARS
Path from CRY-TEARS to WILMAO
CRY-TEARS is a result of HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the instance WILMAO
Path from PROPOSE-MARRIAGE to FREDO
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE is a preferred instance of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the result HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is an instance of HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE is an attribute of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the insteince FREDO
Path from WILMAO to PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
WILMAO is an instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the attribute HUMAN-MENT-STATE
HUMAN-MENT-STATE has the instance HAPPY-STATE
HAPPY-STATE is a result of HAPPY-EVENT
HAPPY-EVENT has the preferred insteince PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
Path from WILMAO to FREDO
WILMAO is em instance of GENERIC-HUMAN
GENERIC-HUMAN has the insteoice FREDO
Pointers to memory structure:
Event: event1
Actor: (FREDO)
Action: (PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
Object: nil
Direction: (WILMAO)
Event: event0
Actor: (WILMAO)
Action: (CRY-TEARS)
Object: nil
Direction: nil
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A.2.3 Comparing ATLAST's behavior to human behavior
Granger and Holbrook's (1983) original work on strategy-driven inference be
havior included a test of subjects' preferences to determine the default inferences
associated with individual story events. As reported in Chapter 6, Granger and
Holbrook found that, in the absence ofbiasing context, subjects consistently inferred
that crying was associated with being sad or upset while a marriage proposal was
associated with joy or happiness. ATLAST exhibits this same behavior: when pre
sented with either of the sentences of Text 11 in isolation, ATLAST will make the
default or preferred decision regardless of the inference strategy in effect. The only
difference is that, when using the perseverer strategy, the system will make the de
fault decision almost immediately, while it will wait until the end of the sentence
when using the recency strategy.
Granger and Holbrook also noted that differences in behaviorwere madeobvious
only through the use of specially constructed, reciprocally ambiguous stories. In
most other cases, they said, readers using different strategies will arrive at the same
interpretation of story events. This effect is modeled by ATLAST as well: ATLAST
will derive the same interpretation for Text 5 using either the perseverer or recency
strategy, and the same holds true for Text 10.
Finally, it was stated in Chapter 6 that retention of competing inferences was
at the heart of strategy-driven inference processing. More specifically, the recency
strategy depends on inference retention. If rejected paths are subsequently discarded
without any trace, the inference processor using the recency strategy will have no way
of tracking the postponed decisions. The competing paths involved in those decisions
will be indistinguishable from the rest ofinactive memory. This is what happens when
ATLAST is using the recency strategy on Text 11 but inference retention is disabled.
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ATLAST processes the text, postponing split decisions along the way, but when it
reaches the end of the text and attempts to reprocess those postponed decisions it
no longer knows which paths were involved. The resulting interpretation is little
I more than that Fred and Wilma are both human. On the other hand, ATLAST is
able to find the correct interpretation using the perseverer strategy with no inference
H retention because Text 11 does not mislead the system. If Text 11 did require error
recovery, ATLAST would be in trouble. Thus, while both strategies need conditional
• retention for error recovery, the recency strategy relies on conditional retention even
H for normal processing without errors.
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Appendix B
The Proof
We wish to show that for a network of n nodes in which every pair of nodes is
joined by a single bi-directional link, the number ofpaths (P) that join two arbitrary
nodes and have length less than or equal to I is given by the equation:
p_^ ~2)!
or, in a simpler form, that the number of paths that join two arbitrary nodes and
have length of exactly i is:
(n - 2)!
(n —i —1)!
Definition: A clique of size n is an undirected graph G with vertices V and
edges E such that the number of vertices in V is n and for all a and 6 in V such that
a ^ b there exists an edge (a, b) in E.
Definition: A simple path is a path which does not intersect itself.
Theorem: Given a clique of size n and two arbitrary vertices a and b m G with
b^ we wish to show that the number of distinct simple paths of length i, denoted
/,>, is given by:
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kn = (n - 2)(n - 3) ••• (n - i + l)(n - i) = (n —^ —1)!
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Proof. By double induction.
Basis: Show that /i,2 = 1. This is trivial, since if a and b are two vertices in G,
there is exactly one path of length 1 between them, which is the edge (a, 6).
Inductive step 1: Assume the hypothesis is true for i < / and n < N. Show
that it is true for i = I + 1 and n = N.
From vertex a in V, we form paths of length I to some intermediate vertex c,
then add the edge from c to 6, thereby forming a path from a to 6 of length 7 + 1.
There a.ve N —2 intermediate vertices available, namely all vertices in V except a and
b. We must now determine the number of simple paths of length I from a to each
fixed c. These paths cannot go through b, since we would no longer have a simple
path when we added the edge from c to b. This means that the the clique to be
considered has size —1. The number of simple paths of length 7+1 from a to 6
then is the number of possible edges from bto some intermediate c multiplied by the
number of paths of length 7 from a to c:
h+i,N = {N -2) •
(TV-3)!
= {N-2) (iV-1-7-1)!
(TV-2)1
(AT-7-2)1
(^-2)!
(n-(»-!)-2)!
(" - 2)!
{n —i —1)1
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Inductive step 2\ Assume the hypothesis is true for z < / and n < N. Show
that it is true for i = I and n — N
From vertex a in F, we now form paths of length 7 —1 to some intermediate
vertex c and add the edge from c to 6, giving paths from a to 6 of length I. There
are 77 —1 intermediate vertices available, since there are + 1 vertices altogether.
The number of simple paths of length 7-1 from a to a fixed intermediate vertex c
is this time governed by a clique of size N as the paths again cannot go through h.
There are of these paths and A'' —1 edges from intermediate vertices to b, so
the number of simple paths of length 7 from a to 6 is given by:
h,N+i — {N —1) •
{N-2)\
= (N-l)
{N-iy.
(n —1 —1)!
(n —1 —i)!
{n —i —1)!
The proof is now complete. •
I
